Arts and creative industries

A historical overview; and
An Australian conversation
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Foreword

Over the last two years, the Australia Council has made a considerable commitment to produce quality research that builds our knowledge of the arts sector, identifies areas of policy development and shares information and insights about the arts in Australia.

This study by Professor Justin O’Connor was commissioned by the Australia Council as part of a long-running and productive relationship between the council and the ARC Centre of Excellence on Creative Industries and Innovation at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT). Our previous collaborations have looked at the contribution of creative activities to health care and, more recently, an analysis of census data on artists’ employment, What’s your other job?, as part of our Artist Careers research. The council is also a partner with QUT in two current Linkage research projects supported by the Australian Research Council.

In commissioning this particular study, we asked researchers to address the following questions:

• What unifies the groups of industries collected together under the name creative industries?

• Are the arts a part of the creative industries?

• What is the input of the arts to the creative industries?

• Are they just a subsidised input to the creative industries?

Our impetus is to add constructively to the long-running discussion about the relationship between the arts and the relatively newly termed creative industries.

Professor O’Connor’s discussion about the history of arts funding and advent of creative industries is thoughtful and his conclusions are stimulating. This study proposes to challenge many of our current conceptions, definitions, and even policies. This is both welcome and timely as an important contribution to the debate and wider understanding of this subject.

Kathy Keele
CEO
Australia Council for the Arts
Executive summary

This report began in June 2009 with a series of interviews with Australian artists and intermediaries from across the arts practice and policy worlds. Participants were asked what they thought about the similarities, differences and connections between the arts and creative industries. Initial responses by participants were based on the understanding that ‘the arts’ were those publicly funded activities and institutions such as galleries and concert halls, symphonies and literature. Quickly however this moved onto the more pointed issues of what is art and why the debate had to be more than just ‘the arts’. Popular culture and creative industries were also about art, and about culture. Maybe there was a spectrum – art at one end, commerce at the other. But did that mean those outside the arts were less creative or less cultural? And if not, why does so much public support for culture go on ‘the arts’, surely other kinds of culture were just as, or even more, creative, contemporary, forward thinking and exciting? Finally, what did ‘support’ mean beyond just subsidy of some kind.

The interviews frequently resulted in fascinating discussions on art, culture, creativity and policy. However, the fundamental question remained of what we meant by ‘art’ and ‘creative industries’. All the interviewees were high achievers in their fields and had much to say about the goals and operations of their businesses or projects. How all these different businesses and projects, values and aspirations, techniques and products fit together under the policy terminology associated with ‘the arts’ and ‘creative industries’ is the real subject of this report.

To address this question we provide an historical approach to understanding the connections between the arts and creative industries. This report suggests that the current idea and practice of ‘art’ emerged at a particular moment in European history, during the rise of capitalism and modernity from the late 18th century. Aesthetics emerged as a particular humanistic ‘science’ charged with understanding this new set of art practices and ideas. The report traces some of the transformations and debates surrounding this idea. The focus is on issues of culture and economy, but these cannot be isolated from wider issues of state and society.

The main argument is that ‘art’ as an idea, as a set of practices, as a set of experiences, cannot be restricted to what is now known as ‘the arts’. ‘Art’, as with other phenomena of modernity, is a mobile term which constantly transgresses boundaries and undermines fixed oppositions. In particular, we try to show how that old opposition of art and popular culture – with its associated binaries of ideal/commerce, public/market, high/low – has always been contested and is now mostly threadbare. This has great consequences for cultural policy in general and arts policy in particular. But if the term ‘art’ can be extended into popular culture then arts and cultural policy have a legitimate stake in policy-making for the creative industries. These industries consequently have more than purely economic importance and their working context is saturated by cultural as well as business considerations. This poses a challenge for existing public policy.

Arts and creative industries

Since the creative industries initiative was launched in Britain in 1998, the relationships between the arts and the newly defined creative industries have been subject of much debate. Out of many questions, two issues in particular stood out.

First, did all these players hang together as a sector? Were industrial designers or computer game companies working in the same sector as record labels, advertisers or TV companies?

Second, what was the value of these sectors for policy-makers? If this value was primarily economic, as it appeared to be, then the question of ‘arts and culture’ became tricky. The traditional justification for arts support had been their ‘intrinsic’ or ‘non-instrumental’ value and their traditional policy instrument was public subsidy. Should there then be a clear separation between publicly subsidised ‘art and culture’ and commercially oriented creative industries under the economic purview of industry development policy?
There were four problems with separating arts and creative industries.

a) Arts as inputs into creative industries

The evidence from many sources and disciplines suggested that the arts had a range of inputs into the creative industries. They were generating new ideas; acting as a kind of R&D; they contributed to a general creativity; they provided an institutional infrastructure for new ideas and experimentation; they contributed key skills to the creative workforce; they attracted creative workers to particular locales and enhanced the creative atmosphere of place, and so on. These different ways of understanding the ‘input’ of the arts need much more clarification, and this is a key purpose of this report. We do however suggest that the ‘separate spheres’ policy model is not adequate.

b) Creative industries and common culture

Creative industries contributed enormously to our common culture; it is inconceivable to have a contemporary cultural policy that does not take into account the central role of commercial culture within our everyday lives. The newer ‘creative industries’ – not just new cultural forms, such as computer games, but new cultural means of creation and communication – have complicated but not removed this issue.

c) Creative workers

Many of those working in the arts and creative industries – including most of those interviewed in this report – see themselves as operating between these two spheres. They might work for one or the other across the course of a day or week, but equally their work, though never receiving public subsidy, might be described as ‘artistic’. Indeed, those working in commercial culture not only value ‘the arts’ but also see their own commercial activity as involving high levels of artistic or cultural purpose.

d) The arts are “big business”

Publicly subsidised culture turns over millions of dollars every month; it employs a vast range of people; it purchases and sells business services commercially; it involves extensive marketing and branding activity; it generates income through tickets and sponsorship. Certain areas of the arts – think of the international gallery circuit – outdo the major luxury brands in attracting the disposable income of the very rich. Cities invest millions in arts-led cultural makeovers. The arts are, or can be, big business.

All of these issues present challenges to contemporary policy makers. On the one hand, should the arts be approached purely in terms of state subsidy or are there other policy approaches better attuned to the commercial practices of the creative industries that could be beneficial to the arts? On the other hand, should the creative industries be approached in purely economic terms; if they are central to contemporary culture, how should they be supported to enhance this cultural contribution?
Arts and creative industries: executive summary

Art media design

We argue that one way of recognising that ‘art’ as a value operates across the subsidised and commercial sectors is to organise the creative industries around art-media-design.

Art covers the predominantly aesthetic symbolic products and practices – music, dance, creative writing, film, computer games, drama – often referred to as ‘content’. It also includes what have been called popular culture and ‘entertainment’.

Media is an essential precondition of art – such as distribution, platforms, information, critics and marketing – as well as making up a lot of its content. But media also carries non-artistic content and fulfills other cultural, informational, educational, social and political functions.

Design draws on aesthetic content within a larger functional brief – a dress has to be wearable and a building stand up. The aesthetic input should not be reduced to the ‘look’, the surface allure of design. The design and craft traditions share with art a history of concern with the relation between aesthetics and wider social and political responsibilities. Nevertheless, design has to consider other functional outcomes.

A new policy vision

Our understanding of art has undergone some radical transformations but we should not lose it as a central cultural value crucial to a modern democratic society. Agencies concerned with the arts continue to engage with the creative industries agenda so that it does not become one concerned solely with economic outputs.

But intervention requires bold policy steps. No longer is ‘market failure’ the only justification for public intervention. ‘Market failure’ is not just about the failures of arts within the market but about the failures of the market itself, the ways in which economic forces provide for but also undermine and cut against individuals and communities.

Arts policy continues to look beyond the traditional art forms and the large institutions. This is clear to many policy makers and commentators though its ultimate consequences are less clear.

We suggest in this report looking to the ecosystem as a whole – the spatial infrastructures, the educational structures, the legal and technical services, the ‘soft’ infrastructure of identity, networking and inspiration. There could be a greater collaboration between the agencies concerned with art, media and design, as well as other social and economic agendas; and a new set of understandings, skills and sources of intelligence. A combination of cultural, social, economic and urban expertise has been growing in cities and regions here and across the globe, and has been under-utilised by national policy makers.

For arts and creative industries policy to find its full voice we have to find new ways of indicating success: not just employment, rent increases and tax generation but indexes of well being, creativity, empowerment and diversity. This evidence needs to be extended from individual participations to the wider health of the cultural ecosystem.

A historical overview: outline

Chapter 1 outlines the general scope of the issues.

Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of art as a distinct area of life and the relation of this to wider transformations associated with capitalism and modernity.

Chapter 3 explores the ‘art worlds’ of the 19th century city. It outlines the separation between ‘art’ and ‘entertainment’ and the role of the market within this, but stresses that art too was organised around particular markets and economic contexts. We suggest that while art was clearly part of the emergence of a new middle class means of social distinction, art was also part of more democratic aspirations which are still with us.
Chapter 4 looks at the emergence of cultural policy and the role of arts within this. It suggests that art played a pre-eminent, though not exclusive, role within this new cultural policy, associated with the nation building project of the modern state. We also look at how the rise of both the cultural industries and modernist art undermined the unitary affirmative notion of the nation state. The chapter also discusses the emergence of public subsidy for the arts and the ways in which this tended to fix ‘the arts’ within fairly conservative administrative boundaries which, in many ways, are still with us.

Chapter 5 looks at popular culture in the 1960s and 1970s. It outlines the many challenges popular culture presented to a unitary national cultural policy and to certain elitist tendencies in the arts. At the same time, this popular culture could also be seen as an extension of many of the aspirations associated with art to wider sections of society. Cultural industries, popular culture and art began to intermingle in complex ways. We look at community arts and the rise of new kinds of cultural policy, in particular, the rise of ‘alternative cultures’ with an emergent economy linked to, but in friction with, both ‘the arts’ and large cultural industries.

Chapter 6 directly addresses the emergence of ‘creativity’ and the creative industries in the 1990s. It suggests that the creative industries combined arguments coming from the ‘information society’, Schumpeterian entrepreneurialism and innovation theory with the increased economic importance of sectors involved in the production of cultural goods. We look at new ideas in both creative work and creative consumption and explore arguments that the opposition between economics and culture was now over. The chapter considers some of the conflicts between creative industries theory and traditional notions of art and cultural policy, and between creative industries and earlier approaches to the cultural industries. We argue for the distinctiveness and continued relevance of the notion of ‘art’. In doing so, we suggest that art is not to be directly equated with ‘the arts’, as traditionally defined, but so closely intertwined with popular culture that the traditional distinction (such as high and low) is redundant. It concludes by assessing the policy landscape within which these debates have been engaged and the challenges for a new forward looking policy.

Chapter 7 considers how the arts and creative industries have been defined by academics, consultants and policy makers. It argues that creativity is not an adequate way of identifying this particular sector and suggests that many of these definitional models reproduce unhelpful distinctions between art and commerce, art and ‘entertainment’, art and functionality. We put forward a broad schema of art-media-design within which we can better consider contemporary arts and creative industries policies.
Arts and creative industries

An Australian conversation

Justin O’Connor
with Stuart Cunningham and Luke Jaaniste
In June 2009 Stuart Cunningham and Justin O’Connor conducted a series of interviews with people in arts and creative industries. Given the necessarily limited number of interviews possible in such a diverse field, the interviewees were selected for their broad perspective and not just the ability to draw on their individual experiences. The interviews teased out working practices and opinions from a sample of respondents across the practice, management and policy worlds.

Eighteen interviews were conducted and recorded. The interviewees included individual practitioners, micro business operators, curators, managers, directors, lecturers and consultants. The interviews were conducted mostly face to face, with two over the phone, and conducted in the second half of 2009. They lasted around one hour and were relatively unstructured.

We asked them what they thought about the similarities, differences and connections between the arts and creative industries. The interviews all resulted in fascinating discussions on art, culture, industry, creativity, policy and so on. All the interviewees were high achievers in their fields and had much to say about how their businesses or projects operated, and with what challenges, goals and aspirations. However, as the interviews unfolded it seemed that the fundamental question was what we meant by ‘art’ and ‘creative industries’.

Many of the initial responses were couched in terms of ‘the arts’ understood as those publicly funded activities and institutions with which we are all familiar – galleries and concert halls, symphonies and literature. Very quickly this dissolved into more pointed issues. What is art and is it the same as ‘the arts’. Popular culture, creative industries – these were also about art, about culture. Right? Maybe there was a spectrum – art at one end, commerce at the other. But did that mean those working commercially outside the arts were less artistic or less creative? And did artists operate in a world of pure subsidy? Surely not.

There was clearly a lot of ambiguity and complexity in this discussion as it unfolded. How did all these different businesses and projects, values and aspirations, techniques and products fit together under the policy terminology associated with ‘the arts’ and ‘creative industries’. In A historical overview we attempted a historical and conceptual clarification of these terms and some of the crucial contemporary issues that they entailed. In An Australian conversation we attempt to give a sense of how these issues appeared to these particular respondents.
Conceptual confusion?

The most striking aspect of the interviews was the confusion around the term ‘creative industries’ itself – a confusion heightened when contrasted or linked to ‘art’. Those involved in policy or in managerial positions knew something about the history and implementation of the term – one or two very well indeed – whilst the practitioners tended to be more hazy about what it might mean. The interviewers (and the briefing paper) gave the standard definition of 13 subsectors in which ‘the arts’ had been included in the creative industries by the UK government. Whilst two people working in the arts definitely resisted such an inclusion (though one of these did so on the basis that it was they who had been excluded from the CIs) most more or less accepted that in some way art and creative industries hung together.

However, we do not want to give the impression that there is a robust definition of the term creative industries out there which policy makers sort of understood and practitioners only dimly. For two reasons.

First, as argued in some detail within A historical overview, there is much conceptual confusion in the academic and policy definitions of the term ‘creative industries’. Indeed it has proved highly controversial both in its strict definitional sense – what is included/excluded and on what grounds – and in its wider conceptual claims. The confusion ‘out in the field’ is in part a reflection of this.

Which leads to the second reason. Any policy initiative with any real legs has to mobilise a set of ideas, narratives and values which have some resonance with the people or sector to which it is targeted. The idea of ‘creative industries’ has in many ways succeeded in doing this because it has highlighted some important changes in the ways art and culture are produced and consumed, where its markets are and how they are changing. Whatever its conceptual confusions the idea has resonated with those working in policy, management and practice in ways that we need to understand.

Within A historical overview we have attempted to do this from a historical and conceptual viewpoint; here we try to show what sorts of ideas, values and narratives are intertwined for our respondents with this idea of creative industries. How do they understand it, how does it describe or help frame their practice?

One thing is clear; however they interpret the import of the ‘creative industries’ this does not happen in a space separate from their understandings of ‘art’ and culture in general. Only one person sought to make an intrinsic difference between art and creative industries (which we examine below) though quite a few others pointed to artificial barriers between them. Which means that if we cannot identify a ‘pure art’ distinct from the world of markets, industries and commerce, nor then can we separate the world of business models, labour markets and value-chains from artistic and cultural practices and values.

In short, rather than seeing these different and sometimes conflicting views as a sign of the conceptual confusion of practitioners we should see them as a reflection of the complex and conflicted questions around contemporary culture.
Intrinsic difference?

One respondent suggested that art was intrinsically different from creative industries:

The creative industries are not part of my way of seeing my place in society… In terms of how I see visual arts in terms of other creative disciplines, like gaming, architecture etc, I feel that it is quite different. That’s because we don’t have someone coming to us with a set of parameters and a job to complete that needs to go in one way. I don’t mean to say a designer is compromised by the client on every job but limited by client’s requests and budgets and even the form of the outcome. Designers are very creative, clever people but always have to answer to a brief that they don’t set. Even a good brief, like Greenpeace asking for inspirational work, their work is still mediated by that brief. In my work, I’m interested in environment but don’t produce one-sided work, sometimes it has a darkness to it even though it talks about ideas of living in a better world. It often pushes you away, does not draw you in [like advertising and advocacy material] which are things that don’t have the potential to be poetic, cannot go beyond the way that we see things now.

It is important to note that here ‘art’ is set against examples taken from design, architecture and advertising which involve the provision of services to clients hence within set parameters. There was no consideration here of art’s relation to other forms of audience consumption (such as television, or pop music, or film), which also make up the creative industries.

This was not a defence of subsidy over or against the market. In discussing how visual artists worked the respondent was talking about a particular market – what in A historical overview we have called an ‘art world’ – whose general outlines (artist-agent-curator-gallery) have evolved over many years. As a successful artist, they did not demand subsidy for themselves – though they recognised its usefulness for others – but saw the main policy task as growing this market:

I don’t want a grant, give them to others. My work is too expensive. In Australia, the market is small so galleries don’t make huge sales.

The key policy task from this viewpoint is to raise the profile of visual art in Australia – audience education – in order to grow the market and make ‘the galleries more confident to back us’.

The other respondent who made the art/creative industries distinction did so on a similar ‘intrinsic’ basis:

I define art as more troubling than [a Kylie Minogue concert]. You know what you will get; to me art is not knowing. You can make a fortune on Kylie Minogue but [your] first three novels – nothing! Bill Henson is not a creative industries art person, he’s an artist so causes trouble. Creative industries would have the girls more clothed or the like.

Here the issue is less about conforming to a client’s brief but to prior audience expectation (‘you know what you will get’). It is a well established view which opposes commercial mainstream to subsidised or under-funded, marginalised, precarious art. Art ‘pushes you away’, is ‘troubling’, ‘goes beyond the way we see things now’.

The key claim is that the creative industries as ‘the market’, cannot produce these things. The ‘restricted’ market which produces art is more precarious and has less money because it does not set out to satisfy these obvious needs. The standard conclusion is that it therefore needs subsidy. In our sample this stark opposition was not a common view. It is not that the importance of ‘artistic value’ was ruled out, just that such a division was too simplistic. Indeed, even those who supported subsidy thought it had its dangers (as we shall see) and that the potential ‘commercial’ market for valuable art was much bigger than often suggested.

We would make two points here.

First, because this opposition of art and creative industries is frequently characterised as outdated and/or elitist it is important to emphasise that this view of artistic value as something unexpected, something that challenges, something open-ended or ‘poetic’, is a value most respondents shared. It is sometimes encapsulated in the term ‘creative’ (though this can also mean enterprising or using initiative). But this artistic value or quality is not restricted to what has been traditionally identified as ‘the arts’ nor dependent on subsidy.

I don’t agree that art cannot be provocative, life changing, stimulating, confrontational unless it’s outside the mainstream. Take Tarrantino’s movies for example; they’re part of the mainstream, but are in-your-face-movies.
Here the word ‘art’ is used to describe film and by implication the wider sphere of popular culture. So too:

Is a rock festival a creative industry? You could say it’s very commercial, but for youth who attend it is a creative space.

One respondent routinely discusses games in terms of art:

On the surface some games may look like films but the core aesthetic of a game is experienced through engaging in play – and these dynamics and rhythms of gameplay give the form a kind of pure, almost mathematically visceral aesthetic similar to music. It’s like the pleasure I get from the Marriage of Figaro – yes I’m enjoying the story and the staging, but the almost physical thrill I get is from the music. The narrative content of many operas can be weak and ridiculous, but that doesn’t stop them being interesting works of art. In the same way I appreciate Lucia di Lammermoor for the beautiful coloratura, I can appreciate the beautiful, transcendent gameplay of a game in spite of any tasteless, violent melodrama. And while I’m passionate about opera, the key difference for me is that opera was the art form of someone else’s time, while games represent the art form of mine.

Others question the boundaries of established arts:

ABC is at an interesting point because we have ‘artistic’ radio and television programs from drama to music etc. But in another way all of its creative output should not be seen as something different to arts.

Second, this artistic value was not seen as elitist or necessarily inaccessible:

People really respond to art, they step up to it…. 120 000 people went to my show in Hobart over four months. The highest figures they ever had at an art gallery/museum. Most of the promotion was word of mouth. People do want to go somewhere like that. … the young children loved my work. They loved being in the big dioramas I made…. They respond to my work because it’s about them, their environment, what’s happening in science and ethics, it’s different from what they see in the media yet still has a bit of it. That’s why they respond to my art, it’s of it’s time, it’s funny yet serious.

The artist adds immediately that such popularity is often suspect in the art world:

That’s bad in the art world, you’re not a serious artist if people like your work… Some of the old people… are quite elitist. They don’t understand that the arts are becoming more important yet less supported, more money being put into sport and celebrity culture. Stuff that diverts people’s attention from what’s happening in the world.

Though our sample would resist the direct equation of art with subsidy and established art forms, most would endorse ‘art’ in this sense as a key value and most agree that there was a role for government intervention, including subsidy in some form, to ensure this.

The government, instead of reducing funds, they need to put money into promoting arts, they only have games, films, celebrities – hard to compete with them because they have so many economic pay offs. Young people need other ideas.

The value of art might be set against the ‘mainstream’ but not against ‘the masses’.

The new and shiny versus the old and boring

One common understanding of the ‘creative industries’ is that they refer exclusively to digital or electronic media. This was not the case in this sample of professionals, apart from one who did make this distinction, and linked it to profit-driven business.

I never know what creative industries means, I think it means electronic media in a profit making business model.

When understood in this way it can produce quite defensive reactions from those in older or non-digital art forms, setting up clear oppositions: art is ‘old and boring’; it is live (or at least pre-digital) and more expensive; it challenges rather than confirms; it does not do it for money. It is therefore ignored by the creative industries and by policy makers, students and educators who see it as too expensive, not fashionable and not likely to make a profit. Creative industries are about giving the audience what it wants; it is about the attraction of the new and shiny, about new media technologies.
These are fairly common views in the current debates within the cultural media. It is not, however, restricted to those feeling edged out. From the other side, the ‘Gotterdammerung’ of all established arts and media under the cleansing fire of new digital media technologies is a common trope amongst many cultural bloggers. Neither view stood out in our (unscientific) sample.

Though often rather defensive about being left behind by the ‘shiny and new’, two ideas are worth noting.

First, that there was real potential for collaboration between these older ‘art forms’ and the new ‘electronic’ creative industries. The skills of the writer, according to this view, could be really valuable to the film or games industry. There were ‘wasted assets’ in the theatre and literature, and the creative industries were ‘re-inventing the wheel’ or not fulfilling their potential because of it.

Second, from this point of view the problem was the creative industries, not the arts; people from the creative industries ‘came and talked but did not follow through’.

Prompted to reflect on what could be done they suggested a brokering role for the Australia Council or other cultural agencies. The respondent would love to see their organisation “appear on the credits for a film or a game or something online”. Both the perceived sense of being left behind, and the desire to engage and contribute are important points.

On the other hand, some respondents thought that the arts dismissed the commercial sector too quickly:

I think [creative industries] is probably about design and advertising. I imagine people would put us in that box as well because there seems to be a divide seen by others – a divide between ‘real’ writing and writing we do. …We’re seen as commercial because of the ads [in our culture guide magazine].

These divisions between the arts and creative industries were therefore sometimes about intrinsic differences but mostly about perceived or artificial distinctions between the art/subsidised side and the commercial. In the vast majority of cases these hard and fast distinctions were questioned. Those in the first sector began to talk about the evolving art market and those in the latter asserted their artistic and cultural motivations and concerns. As the interviews unfolded it became more clear that the landscape of contemporary art and culture is not marked by ‘high’ and ‘low’, as in art versus popular culture or creative industries. It might be marked by the challenging and the mainstream, or by good and bad, but this did not clearly map onto what was and was not subsidised or commercial.

**Different languages?**

One respondent saw the distinction in terms of a different viewpoint – the creative industries being about the economic dimension and the arts perhaps blissfully unaware of this, just doing their thing.

We see ‘creative industries’ as part of an economic process, whilst the ‘arts’ is more about an outcome, e.g. painting, performance. So creative industries help us to improve… building into economic practices and processes, with the capacities to drive employment outcomes. The artistic arena does not sit nearly as well with this thinking. That’s the difference for me.

A slightly different version of this sees the Arts Boards concerned with the economic/policy outcomes and the artists again somehow reluctant to talk about markets:

The arts are part of creative industries because they are in business of selling tickets, experiences, with KPIs [key performance indicators] often around attendances even though market cannot support them totally. Arts are an industry… Yet there is a different view from boards [of arts organisations] than from artists. Boards are dealing with KPIs, so look at increasing revenue… But within the arts, practitioners are reticent to view their work as commercial…

These views might suggest a division of labour between artists and policy-makers/managers, where the artists concentrate on what they do with little concern for where the money comes from or how it is justified. However, though this might occur within the subsidised sector it does not apply within the commercial sector; and we certainly cannot restrict the concept of artist to the subsidised sector. These views do however speak of some complexities and tensions within the creative industries between economics and cultural values, to which we will return; they also point us to that ecology within which subsidised and commercial activities can be intertwined and co-dependent.
A mixed economy

Given this it is no surprise that most saw the arts and creative industries as part of the same thing. The term ‘creative industries’ was not overly associated with ‘digital’ – though that was clearly an important topic it was mostly assumed as part of the landscape in which the whole sector works. For the most part the term was taken to imply a stress on the economic or market dimension, and the need for artists and policy-makers to accept and deal with this.

Money and meaning

Many of the artists in the sample refused the traditional opposition between art and markets, making a living and making meaning:

Just because word ‘industry’ or ‘industries’ is used, doesn’t mean we are not making art.

The clichéd view of artist is no longer the case – many are now very savvy and can handle money.

I’m in a strange position with the traditional art community, I have a reputation for being expensive. If artists are smart, that’s where you want to be.

Arts agencies talk about commercial /non-commercial as if it’s important, but this is not a clear distinction because commercial imperatives can drive the arts, such as the focus on increasing revenue etc.

The more traditional arts sectors are themselves a mixed economy:

Take the visual arts: there is an interplay between emerging artists and the role of commercial galleries. One of my friends, a gallery owner, says gallery owners give resources and nurture new artists. Established artists say commercial players enabled them.

Art is both commercial and non commercial and subsidised for various reasons. For instance, documentaries tell local stories but are often non-commercial.

The arts are an industry in its own right with cultural values.

[There is] some elitism in traditional arts; it’s crude to have engagement with commercial enterprise. It’s ridiculous because the arts industry is a commercial enterprise. They are marketed, a marketed product, but they won’t use those terms. If we treated that as reality, artists should be paid more.

This mix of the commercial and the subsidised, the ‘industrial’ and the ‘cultural’ does give rise to some reservations or caution.

In my experience I’ve never seen a distinction between arts and creative industries. I work with fine artists and understand they have different approaches, so maybe some have a reluctance to be seen from commercial perspective.

The arts are part of creative industries because they are in business of selling tickets, experiences, with KPIs [key performance indicators] often around attendances even though market cannot support them totally. Arts are an industry… But within the arts, practitioners are reticent to view their work as commercial…

[A difference between arts and creative industries?] It depends on how you define industry basically. If its about cultural activity that is industrious, creates product, then there’s no divide. But if it’s about cultural activity which is commercially viable, then there is a divide.

These reservations should not necessarily be seen as backwards-looking or precious – they are tensions and ambiguities that remain important to both the identity of artists and to many creative businesses.
Finding a balance

For many the working life of the artist involves a mix or balance of many different elements:

There are sometimes pure pieces of arts activity, but with things I’ve done, such as running venues, cultural destinations or tourist sites, I can’t say there’s the arts bit. You have to say there’s the arts bit, the tourist bit, and the entrepreneurial bit...

I have multiple areas of operation. I know how to speak the language necessary for each group of people I deal with, I recognise my markets. I’ve got to this point by sitting on the fence, so all are comfortable working with me. I think falling into special categories is limiting for artists. It’s very complex really.

For others these ‘bits’ are more distinct, depending on who they are working for:

I work two half days a week for [an independent media outlet], and when doing that I’m a market contractor for [a commercial firm]. As part of my freelance work, I write for [a national media outlet], do arts reviews and also some consulting. And I work for [major building and public space developer] at the moment, telling what interesting things they could build on their roof.

These ‘bits’ might also include ‘less’ or non-artistic work:

I think it’s slowly becoming more acceptable for artists to work in other areas [although] people do worry they won’t be taken seriously as practitioners if they have to do other work to generate income. Some have projects they put their names to, and others they do not put names on. We need more awareness of this dynamic, and teach practitioners how to balance and manage that.

Most artists will do work in whatever context. Reality is many are doing multiple jobs and often mixed with non-arts work for income reasons. Depends on what kind of artist they are. Consider the music field: classical musicians are narrower in their work, either performance or teaching, not what they see as commercial. Others outside classical are more varied. Some of the classical musicians run private studios teaching etc – which is in itself a commercial activity.

As evidenced by many other studies, artists were frequently working in a mixed economy of subsidised and commercial, and of artistic and non-artistic work.

This subsidised/commercial binary does not describe two distinct sets of practices, nor two sets of values – artistic and profit driven. As we have seen they overlap in quite complex ways which make the boundaries fuzzy:

If we talk about the subsidised and commercial aspects of the creative industries, then in reality there is at least one more category: a large amount of activity is not in framework of subsidy but not is commercially viable either. A lot of it is self-subsidised through other work.

Most saw their interconnection and felt they needed to be managed as a whole, as an ecosystem:

Seems to me to be more intelligent to think of the arts and creative industries as one thing because they are interwoven. I think it is still the case that the commercial end of creative industries benefits from some of the subsidised activities in terms of what’s possible and it’s also true that on the funding side we need to find ways to move artists on from funding. So better to talk about them together. If you do, where does the conversation sit? Who is running it, what’s the hierarchy of relationships, how do they talk to each other?
Art and design: separated at birth?

Having noted this mixed economy, when asked how they understood the term ‘creative industries’ some respondents, as we have seen, suggested it might be about design, architecture, advertising and other (often business-to-business) services. Rigid distinctions between art and creative industries were mostly rejected but the designers interviewed (echoed by some artists) did want to make a distinction between what they did as designers and what artists did.

I feel that [the visual arts] are quite different [from creative industries]. That’s because we don’t have someone coming to us with a set of parameters and job to complete that needs to go in one way. I don’t mean to say a designer is compromised by the client on every job but limited by client’s requests and budgets and even form of the outcome. Designers are very creative, clever people but always have to answer to a brief that they don’t set. Even a good brief, like Greenpeace asking for inspirational work, their work is still mediated by that brief. In my work, I’m interested in environment but don’t produce one-sided work, sometimes it has a darkness to it even though it talks about ideas of living in a better world. It often pushes you away, does not draw you in like advertising and advocacy material which are things that don’t have the potential to be poetic, cannot go beyond the way that we see things now.

From the point of view of those involved in the arts, creative industries have different motivations: for example, designer versus artist. Graphic designers are usually working for a client; money for service. This is different for artist and patron, or the commercialisation of their art. The caveat on this is you could have a designer that approaches the condition of art in some way – treated now as piece of art rather than graphic art – so things can transmute from one to other. The artist’s motivation is to transcend the relationship around creativity, hard to express properly – to go beyond the designer who is looking at working creativity into a particular transaction – the artist does something over and above that, not the traditional mode of something being bought or sold even though there is some commercialisation aspect, but distant from the creation. I’m talking as a designer; it’s probably different for music etc. Design is intensely commercialised at one end of spectrum, and approaches art at the other.

Designers usually work within constraints from market, client, with the product needing to be right. The artist does not necessarily have this. Like pure research versus applied research, pure science versus applied science.

When somebody comes to me for a job I ask them, are you a designer or an artist?

The meanings at play in these quotes are complex; in A historical overview we show how they go back right to the emergence of the idea of ‘art’ and ‘artist’ during the Renaissance, and increasingly from the 18th century onwards. The distinction was not immediately about ‘pure’ art versus commerce but between ‘pure’ (that is autonomous) art versus ‘applied’ art – with the terms of that application usually set by someone other than the artist or designer (therefore ‘heteronymous’).

In traditional conceptions of art which valued its autonomy above all (versions of 19th century romanticism or 20th century modernism, for example) this usually means that applied, craft-based or decorative art is compromised. But there have been strong opposing tendencies which have stressed the social role of art and design, that it was there to respond to, enhance or help shape the emergent life of modern society. The traditions stemming from the Arts & Craft Movement, through Art Nouveau, Bauhaus, Art Deco, Constructivism and to the International Style in architecture, have all been attempts to do this. In performing this task the designer/artist necessarily has to respond to what are perceived to be the socio-historical parameters within which this new design must take its place. Even the most autonomous ‘master-builders’ of modernist architecture insist that they are conforming to, or anticipating the future requirements of the modern city.

A designer is… limited by the client’s requests and budgets and even form of the outcome. Designers are very creative, clever people but always have to answer to a brief that they don’t set.
From a designer’s perspective this is not always a problem rather this is the problem to which their skills and vision are to be applied:

The designer… is looking at working creativity into a particular transaction.

Designers pride themselves on dealing with solutions to functional problems. Some of these are set tight – a logo, for example – and some set more widely – a new public space or an integrated communications strategy. It’s the willingness to engage with these problems within the constraints of ‘requests, budgets and…outcome’ that for one respondent marks off the job-seeking artist from the designer.

But most artists also find themselves working for a client; they might have more ‘wriggle room’ than designers but they mostly have to conform to a brief. Film music, copy writing, public art, photography, illustration for example, all have set parameters. This is even more so when it comes to music for toys, adverts and games, or voice-overs, acting theme-park characters, or filming inserts for commercial websites and so on. Very few artists work outside constraints – and many thrive on them! On the other hand certain graphic designers (Peter Saville), or celebrity fashion or product designers (Philippe Starck) and so on have much more autonomy than many artists. Hence the caveat above:

[that] you could have a designer that approaches the condition of art in some way – treated now as piece of art rather than graphic art – so things can transmute from one to other.

The key polarity however remains that between ‘problem solving’ and free exploration, between functionality and intrinsic meaning. It is a spectrum more than a binary or hierarchy: design may ‘transmute’ into art, but many designers reject the designer-as-artist image often associated with the 1980s.

Design thinking… is using the skill set of design not to just supply gloss at the end of the development of product, but to define what the product or service can be right from the start and use design as a framework. It could be put as stylists versus designers. Any kid with photoshop could be a stylist.

I get annoyed when architects think of themselves as part of an arts rather than a design faculty. It’s demeaning to the rest of design. Industrial design is profoundly more affecting than architecture. Only five to seven percent of buildings are built by architects, whereas industrial design changes the way cars, ipods, computers, buses etcetera work. The intellectual reach for higher ground from architects is, I think, largely unfounded; or rather other design disciplines have the same intellectual reach, but not as powerful a part of the profession.

The ‘constraint of the brief’ is not quite the same thing as saying “designers are usually working for a client; money for service”. The tension between economics and culture that we saw with artists also operates for the designer. There are jobs you would rather remained anonymous, to get the money (some have projects they put their names to, and others they do not put names on) and there are ones where you put more of yourself than simply cost-benefit. The problem lies not in the external brief – which is what the designer is about – but in the client’s limited vision or the allotted resources not being sufficient to the full demands of the job in hand. And of course artists too chafe under similar conditions.

The broadening of ambitions for design…could also include the shape that government takes and citizen’s engagement with those things. That’s why design has a huge role to play, to rethink what government and citizens are. Culture in Raymond Williams’ sense rather than cultural production. There is something in design (which could be tested in music) that is different from the production of art because it is concerned with cogs, wheels, oil. Whether it’s lived culture or industrial process. Art is not like that except for commenting on it, its not same motivation from a creative point of view.

This tension between economics or lack of vision and the full possibilities inherent in the problem to be solved (a new house, a new city, an internet application, a game narrative) is also as old as modernity itself – where profit was very often seen as coming before clear vision and rational planning. Many working in the tradition of modern design saw their role as in part transformative of the social realities to which they sought to respond. Some design traditions – modernist architecture, city planning, constructivist signage, social network platforms – could be radically utopian, seeing only a future society as capable of acting on its ideas. Here again design comes close to the aesthetic tradition which stresses the uselessness of art in the face of an instrumentalised and inhuman society.
Designers navigate the spaces in which they must make a living just like artists do; both would sometimes prefer to do a job anonymously. But like those artists working within a commercial setting, there is great scope for quality work. Business clients are not to be characterised in terms of some uniform bottom line; the permeation of design within product, branding, marketing, office interiors, logistics and so on is extremely sophisticated. Businesses are also judged by consumers, other businesses and design professionals in ways that have direct impact on their image. The different ‘design worlds’ have the constraints and ethics of many more ‘artistic’ communities of practice. Equally designers work for public agencies with wider remits than the shareholders and set within other kinds of constraints. And designers also employ ‘artists’ in areas where the symbolic dimension is concerned with the dynamics of allure, feel, experience etc. Many design jobs employ fully autonomous artists as well.

In this sense there are strong homologies and interconnections between art and design, just as there are areas which clearly mark them off. The functionality of design is not necessarily the same as its commerciality, though obviously the latter is a constraint on the former. But similar things could be said about much artistic practice. The contemporary field of design is not only vibrant because of the rise of design inputs within business to business services (a dynamic discussed in A historical overview) but also because – perhaps in response to the overstressing of art’s uselessness – it holds out the possibility of solving some real problems in an elegant way.

The arts and creative industries cannot be mapped onto art versus client services – because these services do not characterise the production of culture direct to market (audiences, consumers). But design does indicate the sorts of distinctions within the creative industries which we need to acknowledge. Similar arguments can be made for the area of media and communication, though this was not broached in any great detail in these interviews. It is for these reasons that A historical overview talks about the creative industries as art-design-media.

Finally, though the designers in the survey saw themselves as part of the ‘arts and creative industries’ they also saw a role for a distinct design strategy and in two cases a distinct design agency – along the lines of the British Design Council. There was a need for better education of the public and government:

We have concerns about decisions made in public competitions for architecture – they do not always pursue progressive options; the more safe pathway is taken. So there is a potential to be progressive but it’s not taken as done in other countries. For example Copenhagen – amazing public architecture supported and financed by government. Not here.

My thought is that the greatest need for investment in arts and design in Queensland is in the education of the general public. We face issues of the appreciation of the value of design and art. Newspapers no longer represent any design discourse.

Design is caught between ‘art’ and ‘industrial design’, where the latter is seen as too commercial and the former too ‘arty-farty’.

I can’t imagine an Arts Council would deliver on applied design except in a side way, such as curating an ‘art’ of car design...We don’t have an equivalent to the UK’s Design Council. Feels to me that’s not the Australia Council’s role. If I compare the Royal Society of Arts to the Design Council, I see two different agendas, though they may slightly overlap. Two different missions. The Royal Society commissioned the first public exhibition of art in UK in around 1700, the Design Council is very different, industrially lead. I would say in the Australian context, Kim Carr’s lot, industry innovation councils and so on, should get behind design. It’s frustrating that they don’t come from a design perspective that much.
Subsidy

The issue of subsidy came up repeatedly. We did not set out to probe the complex policy debates around this issue but covered it in so far as it related to the main issue of arts and creative industries. For many commentators the distinction arts/creative industries is co-terminus with subsidy/market. This was a minority view in the sample, who mostly saw it in more complex terms. Many – including practicing artists – were keen to stress that ‘industry’ can describe what the arts did – or should do – as much as the commercial sector. But there was also a recognition that the market could not deliver everything.

[A difference between arts and creative industries?] It depends on how you define industry basically. If it’s about cultural activity that is industrious, creates product, then there’s no divide. But if it’s about cultural activity which is commercially viable, then there is a divide.

This is not about ‘the arts’ versus the rest but about the need to support those things that are not commercially viable, either as good in themselves and/or as an essential part of the whole creative ecology.

[The] Australia Council and Screen Australia exist... to pick winners not identified by the market....Ten Canoes – the market did not appreciate it.... It would not have been driven from a commercial perspective despite it doing well through critical acclaim.

Art is both commercial and non-commercial and subsidised for various reasons. For instance, documentaries tell local stories but are often non-commercial.

In my situation I’ve had good support from funding agencies, my argument is I produce work that does not make objects, so therefore no market as such in a commercial sense, I work in public spaces. So I receive support: I think it is the sort of work they should do, support works that are not about long term commercial gain, but have immediate gain for communities. So I have been able to experiment in a way I couldn’t do in a commercial world.

In general there was an acceptance of subsidy in some form, but the respondents also identified real problems with it.

Downsides to subsidy

Many saw the importance of subsidy in start-up but thought that in certain cases it could lead to dependency. Some respondents suggested it kept them from moving outside into new challenges and markets.

I know artists who had grants, went into lecturing, never exhibited in real world. That happens with grants, artists who redefine objectives and continue to get grants.

I think it is still the case that the commercial end of creative industries benefits from some of the subsidised activities in terms of what’s possible and it’s also true that on the funding side we need to find ways to move artists on from funding.

For success and creativity industry needs new ways of resourcing... [subsidy] has not produced the quality expected....The opportunity to pursue different [funding] models is there now, but resisted. Subsidy should be part, but perhaps not as it is at the moment. We need to use different ways of generating income for smaller companies/individuals using subsidy model, gradually phasing out subsidy... [like requiring them] after three years...to attract sponsorship.

Going out into the market is seen by many respondents as having a positive effect rather than compromising ‘pure art’ for money.

Being in the market is good for new magazines because they are answerable to readers... a good magazine is one who knows its audience. Being exposed to an audience means you have to do a good job. Here’s one sent to me [holds up magazine], I guarantee it won’t come out again. Too expensive, not funded, has ads, no definition. If they lose their start up money, it could be a useful lesson: next time go for a cheaper start.

The market in this view provides crucial information, but it is not absolutely determinant, nor is advertising revenue, which has to be chosen carefully.

We’ve always been low cost, so smaller risk. We have said no to advertisers and are still running. Some people think if they buy an ad, then we will write an article: like a festival recently, related to an album release, bought a banner ad and thought we’d automatically write CD review. We would never do that.
Some also felt they could manage this relationship between commercial and creative concerns.

Because of my background in media and publishing, I’ve always tended to be closer to the commercial end, I’m more conscious of the role the private sector can play in creative work, I’m not prejudiced, as long as it’s administered fairly and relationships managed well, there’s great potential for benefit on both sides. A lot of my work has been mediating between those two sides.

Others noted that the application and reporting procedure were often very cumbersome, not like going to private sector.

I’m a pragmatist and never gone for funding, because the times I have gone for quick grant, e.g. one for $500 – the application was twelve pages long – nothing quick about that. Whereas I picked up phone and called someone I know working at a clothing label and they gave me $1000, one phone call.

There were some who preferred not to apply for grants because they felt they might lose control.

We have not applied for grant funding in case of restrictions. [We tried doing editorial work for a magazine financed by the city]. It was an exhausting checking process. This could introduce a filter between us and the audience.

No [we would not accept a grant] because we want to keep control. We can create strange intelligent writing, which may not be allowed.

I would get a commercial partner rather than working with government, especially because of compromises that have to take place.

These are all common complaints and are certainly not restricted to Australia. Though some might be more valid than others, from our perspective the key points are that support for the arts is not simply about the defence of subsidy, and that the creative industries agenda is not seen as simply the pursuit of commercial profit as a replacement for that subsidy.

Did the creative industries challenge subsidy models?

There were some serious structural objections that suggested that the current subsidy might need to catch up with or reflect transformations currently underway. Some suggested subsidy was locked into particular art forms and created bureaucratic barriers to new genres or, worse, suggested that anything outside of these was not art. The games industry was frequently cited in this context.

Yes, the Australia Council is structured around traditional art form boards. Now, games developers’ projects theoretically fit with Australia Council support and should get funded. But it doesn’t happen.

What is the cultural contribution to Australia of Australian computer games manufacturing and distribution? I think it is significant, there’s probably more Australian audience for games than other screen-based pursuits... In the shift to restructure support for the film/TV industry we create Screen Australia and new tax-based incentives. Games associations at the same time asked for support, but this didn’t happen.

Our games exports are significant, greater than feature films, yet this sits outside cultural policy, and commercial music pretty much the same, yet it is key to what it is to be Australian.

I think there are great games made in Australia, but people don’t get funding to go on and make more.
Whatever the factual basis of these claims (and the issue of games funding is too big to explore in this document) the questions raised here reflect current debates around the purpose of both arts and ‘creative industries’ based funding. If the former is about ‘intrinsic value’ and the later ‘economic’ or instrumental value then games might be covered by a spectrum of agencies from the Australia Council to Austrade. It is clear from these quotes however that many see support for commercial cultural industries as involving both economic and cultural policy objectives. This is something film support agencies, for example, have constantly had to wrestle with. The creative industries agenda might give renewed emphasis to those cultural activities (existing and emerging) which are implanted within more commercial/industrial frameworks – but it clearly does not override the cultural imperatives around ‘national identity’ and other cultural policy concerns.

For others the problem is not just art-form categories, but also the kind of mixed economy in which they operate.

I founded another magazine with creative industry content, and a music and fashion magazine; through all of those projects and others, I pulled the focus out a bit and realised that it’s an ecosystem e.g. musicians need film makers, artists need fashion designers, these people usually socialise together and share ideas.

These sorts of fast-moving and ‘promiscuous’ collaborations and projects are often viewed by the respondents as not well served by the art-form based subsidy system.

In response it should be noted that the term ‘subsidy’ is more complex than simply grant-giving. Apart from grants to individual artists and larger organisations public money is given to projects which employ artists. That is, they work within the subsidised realm but not on the basis of grants but more commission or competitive tender. The growing levels of public investment, private sponsorship, business to business services and new digital platforms have increased the possibilities and complexity of the market – and the need for creativity in navigating it.

Anyone in creative industries should apply creativity to everything they do, not just the art. We bought a warehouse, we lease it out, we pay rent here as this is our workplace. I could have gone bigger and taken on more profitable projects, but it meant I would have had to become like an architect’s or designer’s office, all those things. I prefer to fly under radar, keep low scale and employ when there’s projects, so I don’t have many overheads yet still dealing with major works.

We have seen that the subsidised arts are also sometimes described as important feeders into creative industries businesses, or else they should/could be. Furthermore, the subsidised arts can also be employers of creative industries firms and personnel (who contribute to large-scale performing arts events for instance). The relationship might, or should, work both ways – between the subsidised arts and (other) creative industries.

For many these different kinds of mixed economies mean that grants miss their target; more crucially they cannot deal with the mix of profit and non-profit.
Profit/non-profit

Here also the arts/creative industries binary is frequently mapped onto profit/not-for-profit. It is important to be clear here that institutions in receipt of grants can (and do) generate surplus, indeed they are encouraged to do so, operating on a commercial basis within a framework of ‘artistic excellence’. There is currently a lot of debate about the impact of subsidy on wider markets; on how far institutions should have freedom to use grants; about the grounds on which such decisions are made and the mechanisms of distribution. We cannot touch on these here. Amongst our respondents there was a strong sense that grants could lead to complacency and dependency. However, they did not call for a free market approach so much as a new configuration between subsidy and commercial operations. This was a strong interpretation of the creative industries agenda.

But within the arts, practitioners are reticent to view their work as commercial… This is a problem and a powerful discourse, embedded in bureaucratic structures in the arts in Australia… There’s a need to evolve, not a free market approach but some leeway needed.

This in-between approach to subsidy and market, not either/or, is a common view amongst respondents.

The arts funding structure puts people in a situation where, if applying for funding, they have to decide if project is for artistic integrity and for social and artistic deliverables, or…developing a business.

For others, and in terms of the larger grant-receiving organisations, there should be less strings attached to the grant money but less guarantees also.

An alternate model would be the example of a young company receiving subsidy… after three years they needed to attract sponsorship for work, and they must seek this. Maybe access international work and money. If that worked, whoever was overseeing the creative industries, after a period of years they may judge eligibility for upfront money, get five years subsidy in one grant. Companies need to be aware that this is coming, either further subsidy or the stopping of funds. Five years is a fair time to do this. There should be no restrictions on the use of upfront money, in the ways used to generate income.

The plea is not that subsidy be stopped, but that it recognise the realities of the mixed market across the arts and creative industries. The alternative to this recognition – and this was strongly expressed by a number of respondents – is that, on the one hand ‘the arts’ are artificially protected and on the other, this hybrid, mixed culture is left to its purely commercial self. This distinction is frequently challenged under the rubric of the creative industries agenda – as A historical overview tries to outline.

If we talk about the subsidised and commercial aspects of the creative industries, then in reality there is at least one more category: a large amount of activity is not in framework of subsidy but not is commercially viable either. A lot of it is self-subsidised through other work.

Why should an artist selling work at the Sherman Galleries get funding from the Australia Council to develop a new exhibition?
New policy tools, new policy rationales

As we have seen, a range of ‘marketplaces’ or social-cultural-economic contexts contribute to this ecosystem, from patronage to clients, and mass consumption to DIY/amateur/volunteer networks. Multiple interactions and identities exist, with freelancers and businesses engaging in profit, not-for-profit and socio-communal activities. In this perspective the arts and creative industries are brought together in terms of a common infrastructure – that supports the full spectrum of commercial and non-commercial – and the bits that fall in between.

I don’t think either system [subsidy/commerce] really works. I don’t think they value creativity and emerging creative arts. The only way, I think, to bring them together would be to address some of the structural issues, like the hard infrastructure that they all need to flourish. The approach needs to be some other way, not about funding – my perspective is lots get funded that shouldn’t be. I’d rather talk about investing in infrastructure, a lot of what artists need is the same as what the creative industries need.

This shift to a mixed economy or ecology, to the language of investment, to the elaboration of new financial and economic development tools for this sector and so on – all are very much part of the creative industries policy agenda. But this brings its own challenges.

Our respondents had many ideas about what this sector might need: infrastructure, especially spaces, business and facilities; training and support for micro-business models; business and professional skill development; and increased digital literacies. (We should note in passing that many of these are already in existence.)

[A] lot of what artists need is the same as what creative industries need – such as space to work and space to exhibit and perform. Less obvious things too like business skills and professional skills… And we need more creative industries-focused skills development programs.

There are emerging artists who are able to deal with the funding sector as it is – people who build long term careers out of this. For the rest, probably we could fund different types of infrastructure rather than individual artists… Also venues and real estate is very expensive; finding ways of addressing these would help.

In Australia, you reach a certain point then there are no more opportunities for you here. So you need opportunities to grow your business knowledge and maybe an opportunity to feel you belong to an industry. These are ideas about soft infrastructure rather than spaces. Perhaps we need to make some of the spaces we have more accessible, when spaces are developed, creative industries should rate higher.

People need an incubator program, even office space – bread and butter things needed, advice on intellectual property etc. More hand holding on the business side.

Let’s have mentoring master classes by people who know the business. That’s essential, people who know the business and also people who appreciate the contexts creatives work in today, who understand not everyone is looking for a massive market, or that traditional forms of media no longer have the same power, so traditional marketing doesn’t work.

We tend to have high creativity and innovation in pockets of television, music, film, arts and are well positioned globally. So we need to stimulate the sector, for example through grants, tax-based incentives etc. What has been lacking is how to get capital. Australians don’t invest well in intellectual property.

The venture capital community here does not invest in certain aspects of creative industries, so government funding is often the only option.

From this perspective the creative industries agenda is not about cutting government subsidy but finding new policy tools to support the creative ecology as a whole. But these are complex instruments which most likely involve the collaboration of a range of different agencies, which is never easy.

To solve the problem I think more inter-agency co-operation is needed… such as trade and arts working together. But there is duplication of effort, lack of co-operation between branches of government, between federal and state government. We need more partnered schemes or projects.

State government agencies trip over each other and at federal level things are divided into different portfolios.

Competition [for funds from different government bodies] reinforces silos in terms of policies and funding.
In some cases – design certainly, but maybe games also – there is a lack of relevant agencies that can properly address these issues. One respondent suggests there is a dearth of institutions to underpin such collaboration:

NESTA [National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts] can exist in the UK because of a different ecology, e.g. there’s always been strong design institutions in UK – so NESTA can sit in middle with the right components around it – we don’t. We could not have in Australia a NESTA funding collaboration, say, between Imperial College and Royal College of Arts...We don’t have a Royal College of the Arts or design institutions, or Victoria and Albert Museums – so we need to address the poverty of our institutions.

The UK history is often cited as being more ‘holistic’ in its approach, not separating arts and creative industries. The culture of collaboration in the UK is ‘really mature, no one worries about their own identity’. But Creative Nation was also mentioned, as ahead of its time in terms of cultural policy, especially its recognition of new media technologies and its willingness to bring different portfolios together, in the manner of the DCMS.

When Keating did Creative Nation in ’94, you had a mandate from the Prime Minister for a nexus between communications and the arts in a portfolio. It was a time of trying to drive agenda that said there were big changes on the communications front, and unfortunate if the arts were left behind. Good point. My view was that that was important, having communications and arts working together, so the whole digital area had logical connection. The problem now with change of government [Howard to Rudd] is the world has moved on, the arts are no longer high policy priority for Labour. The arts are barely mentioned in terms of policy debate. Communications moved away from arts and once again segregated… Conroy gets communications with broadband and film agencies, so what Labour have done is create a new divide. You’d think that the history of communications and arts working together over different governments, bringing in the creative industries in a meaningful way, should lead to positive outcomes rather than separation.

For one the Australia Council has also retreated from an engagement with commercial culture, which hinders its contribution to this process:

For various reasons, two main areas in the Australia Council in its earliest days – the film and television board and the architecture and design interests – were lost to it. Film has spun off to the Australian Film Commission and architecture and design was abolished. If both were still there we would have a very different debate around commercial/non-commercial.

As we have seen most respondents do not see a chasm between arts and creative industries, and view culture and commerce as intertwined. One quoted a literary man from the 1890s, who saw ‘no distinction between culture and commerce’. The problem is that government does.

Part of the question of policy ownership or collaboration is what grounds there are for this collaboration, what kind of narrative will underpin its vision, what will sell it to government?

So from one perspective the creative industries agenda is about widening an ‘arts policy’ into a ‘cultural policy’.

What’s the difference between cultural and creative industries? Tricky question. The distinction is unpleasing, want to go back to notion of cultural policy more than just arts policy.

For others, however, the creative industries agenda is an attempt to get government to take them seriously, which means using the economic argument.

[The cultural argument] is a dangerous one, we stayed away from [it] in the [digital industries] action agenda process. Because it has been tried, it’s hard to win and kind of an ever smaller race to get grants. So we tried to make argument from an industry and commercial basis. That we need to pick up on growth as sector increases. Kind of a new manufacturing sector in some ways, but intellectual property based. The cultural argument was already tried by film and television and they found it tough. It will get some funding – but what we want is an industry recognised as important in its own right, not just because of cultural issues.
It is clear that the ‘arts and creative industries’ involve subsidy, unpaid and commercial activities, and that they put into play artistic and cultural as well as economic values. How the different dimensions of such a policy agenda are put together – and even recognised as such at government level is not easy. The ‘creative industries’ agenda has brought with it arguments for employment and wealth generation, that it represents a future industry or a major source of innovation across the economy. But it has also been used to stress the mixed ecology of artistic and cultural production and consumption, where markets and different forms of subsidy and investment are required. These two approaches are not implacably opposed, but nor are they seamlessly united.

It is not just about collaboration or dealing with complexity, but the values at play in such policies. Economic versus cultural, artistic versus commercial is too stark, too simplistic, but within this new complexity there are conflicts, different interests which need to be brought out.

As one respondent said:

*So it’s better to talk about [the arts and creative industries] together. If you do, where does the conversation sit? Who is running it, what’s the hierarchy of relationships, how do they talk to each other?*

This is perhaps where we need now to start.
Interviewees

Stephen Adams,
Composer, radio producer/presenter at Australian Music Unit, ABC Classic FM, Sydney

Terry Cutler
Strategy consultant, managing director of Cutler and Company, Melbourne

Michael Gow
Theatre director and playwright, recent artistic director of Queensland Theater Company, Brisbane

Dan Hill
Designer and urbanist, senior consultant at Arup, Sydney

Julian Knowles
Composer and performer, Professor at QUT Creative Industries Faculty, Brisbane

Tom Kennedy
Film and digital media producer/entrepreneur, head of digital at Onmilab Services, Sydney

Tim Lindgren
Fashion designer, Tim Lingren label, Brisbane

Michael Lynch
Arts administrator, board member of ABC, Sydney

Ewan McEoin
Creative director, designer and principal of Studio Propeller, Melbourne

Penny Modra
Editor and freelance writer, including ThreeThousand.com.au, Melbourne

Katharine Neil
Games developer and sound artist, Melbourne

Patricia Piccinini
Visual artist, Melbourne

Anna Rooke
CEO of Creative Enterprise Australia (CEA), Brisbane

Jess Scully
Creative director, journalist, recent festival director of Creative Sydney, Sydney

Kirsti Simpson
Designer, director at HASSELL Ltd, Brisbane

Lyndon Terracini
Opera singer, festival director, artistic director of Opera Australia, Sydney

Craig Walsh
Visual and new media artist, Brisbane

Michael Ward
Television operations, head of operations planning in ABC Operations Group, Sydney
Arts and the creative industries

A historical overview

Professor Justin O'Connor
Creative Industries Faculty
Queensland University of Technology
Chapter 1

What is this report about?

Background

As presented in An Australian conversation this report began in June 2009 with a series of interviews with artists and intermediaries from across the practice and policy worlds. We asked them what they thought about the similarities, differences and connections between the arts and creative industries. The initial responses were couched in terms of ‘the arts’ understood as those publicly funded activities and institutions with which we are all familiar – galleries and concert halls, symphonies and literature. Very quickly this dissolved into more pointed issues: first what is art and then why it had to be more than just ‘the arts’. Popular culture, creative industries – these were also about art, about culture. Right? Maybe there was a spectrum – art at one end, commerce at the other. But did that mean those outside the arts were less creative or less cultural? Surely not. And if not why was it that all the money for culture went on ‘the arts’; surely other kinds of culture were just as, maybe more creative, contemporary, forward thinking, exciting? But then again, we don’t want subsidy. But what did ‘support’ mean if it did not mean subsidy?

The interviews frequently resulted in fascinating discussions on art, culture, creativity and policy. However, at the end of the interviews it seemed that the fundamental question was what we meant by ‘art’ and ‘creative industries’. All the interviewees were high achievers in their fields and had much to say about how their businesses or projects operated, and with what goals and visions. How all these different kinds of creative projects and businesses fit together is something we will discuss in this report but it is also a subject for a future report. How all these different businesses and projects, values and aspirations, techniques and products fit together under the policy terminology associated with ‘the arts’ and ‘creative industries’ is the real subject of this report.

In order to address this question we took a more historical approach to understanding the connections between the arts and creative industries. Whilst we have tried to achieve clarity, we also acknowledge that we have made some seemingly clear-cut issues more complicated. Hopefully this will be seen not as arcane hair-splitting but as a necessary condition for a mature and sophisticated arts and creative industries policy debate.

This report suggests that the idea and practice of ‘art’ we use today emerged at a particular moment in European history, during the rise of capitalism and modernity culminating in the late 18th century. Aesthetics emerged as a particular humanistic ‘science’ charged with understanding this new set of art practices and ideas. The report traces some of the transformations surrounding this idea and the debates to which these gave rise. The focus is on issues of culture and economy, but these cannot be isolated from the wider state and society.

The main argument is that ‘art’ as an idea, as a set of practices, as a set of experiences cannot be restricted to what have now become known as ‘the arts’. ‘Art’, as with other phenomena of modernity, is a mobile term which constantly transgresses boundaries and undermines fixed oppositions. In particular we try to show how the opposition of art and popular culture, with its associated binaries of ideal/commerce, public/market, high/low has always been a contested one and is now mostly threadbare. This has great consequences for cultural policy in general and arts policy in particular. But if the term ‘art’ can be extended into popular culture then arts and cultural policy also have a legitimate stake in policy for the creative industries. These latter consequently have more than purely economic importance and their working context is saturated by cultural as well as business considerations. This poses a challenge for existing public policy.

Arts and creative industries: what’s at stake?

In the ten years since the creative industries initiative was launched in Britain in 1998, the relationships between the arts and the newly defined creative industries have been subject of much debate. The initial definition of the creative industries deliberately included the traditional arts with the ‘classical’ cultural industries (broadcasting, film, publishing etc.), design-led industries (architecture, craft, design, advertising, fashion) and so-called new media (software, computer games and electronic publishing). Out of many questions two issues in particular stood out.

First, did this sector hang together as a sector? Were industrial designers or computer game companies working in the same sector as record labels, advertisers or TV companies? This was not so straightforward because even if practitioners
initially rejected or ignored the label (“I’m not a creative industry, I’m a photographer”) policy makers and theorists were intent on grouping them together: indeed, these same practitioners now routinely (if sometimes tentatively) refer to themselves as creative industries. What was it that they shared? Though involving very disparate kinds of skills, business practices and industry structures, there seemed a common thread running through all these sectors. Obviously there was ‘creativity’, but as we shall see, this was never quite enough (“is science not creative also?”). Others used the terms ‘symbolic’, ‘cultural’ or ‘expressive’ value, or described them more generally as ‘experience’ ‘identity’ or ‘attention’ economies. These are all terms that had traditionally been reserved for ‘art and culture’. So on the one hand the inclusion of ‘the arts’ made perfect sense; on the other hand however, weren’t the arts somehow different?

Second, what was the value of these sectors for policy-makers? If this value was primarily economic, as it appeared to be, then the question of ‘arts and culture’ became tricky. Their traditional justification had been their ‘intrinsic’ or ‘non-instrumental’ value and their traditional policy instrument was public subsidy. Should there then be a clear separation between publicly subsidised ‘art and culture’ and commercially oriented creative industries under the economic purview of industry development policy?

There were four problems with separating arts and creative industries

a) Arts as inputs into creative industries
The evidence from many sources and disciplines suggested that the arts had a range of general and specific inputs into the creative industries. They were generating new ideas, acting as a kind of research and development; they contributed to a general creativity; they provided an institutional infrastructure for new ideas and experimentation; they contributed key skills to the creative workforce; they attracted creative workers to particular locales and enhanced the creative atmosphere of place and so on. These different ways of understanding the ‘input’ of the arts need much more clarification, and this is a key purpose of this report; but it suggests that the ‘separate spheres’ policy model is not adequate.

b) Creative industries and common culture
The creative industries themselves contributed enormously to our common culture; it is inconceivable to have a contemporary cultural policy that does not take into account the central role of commercial culture within our everyday lives. This notion has been central to cultural policy and cultural studies for over half a century, and continues to inform ‘cultural industries’ policy on broadcast media, film, publishing and so on. The newer ‘creative industries’ – not just new cultural forms, such as computer games, but new cultural forms of creation and communication – have complicated but not removed this issue.

c) Creative workers
Many of those working in the arts and creative industries – including most of those interviewed in this report – see themselves as operating betwixt and between these two spheres. They might work for one or the other across the course of a day or week, but equally their work, though never receiving public subsidy, might be described as ‘artistic’. Indeed, those working in commercial culture not only value ‘the arts’ but also see their own commercial activity as involving high levels of artistic or cultural purpose.

d) The arts are ‘big business’
‘Publicly subsidised culture’ turns over millions of dollars every month; it employs a vast range of people; it purchases and sells business services commercially; it involves extensive marketing and branding activity; it generates income through tickets and sponsorship. Certain areas of the arts – think of the international gallery circuit – outdo the major luxury brands in attracting the disposable income of the very rich. Cities invest millions in arts-led cultural makeovers. The arts are, or can be, big business.
A challenge to policy makers

All of these issues present challenges to contemporary policy makers. On the one hand, should the arts be approached purely in terms of state subsidy; are there not other policy approaches more attuned to the commercial practices of the creative industries that could be beneficially applied to the arts? On the other hand, should the creative industries be approached in purely economic terms; if they are central to contemporary culture how should they be supported in ways that enhance this cultural contribution?

If ‘the arts’ are not just seen as a subsidised ‘input’ into the commercial creative industries but very much intertwined with them, what might such an arts policy look like, one that mixed public sector investment with commercially oriented ‘industry’ strategies? This is not just a question of policy tools – new forms of ‘smart finance’, increased R&D, new technologies – but of how ‘the arts’ relate to contemporary culture. At the same time, it demands that creative industries policy engage with the cultural dimensions of these creative industries as well as the purely commercial.

To address the question in this way might go someway towards improving the relationship between the arts and creative industries policy discourses in Australia. These last emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s (as cultural industries) and directly fed into the Creative Nation initiative. In the last decade however they have tended to be defined in a much more economically oriented fashion (see chapter 6).

Certainly ‘on the ground’ such polarisations may be much less marked, as creative producers and companies move within a complex ecosystem of profit and non-profit (and all spaces in-between) activities. Equally, local policy makers are involved in pragmatic accommodation with the various cultural, economic and social dimensions of these sectors. But at federal and state levels there are clear rifts between these two policy agendas that also engender mutual distrust.

These questions are not just about statistical definitions, nor pure policy pragmatics. The presence of ‘the arts’ in the creative industries debates raises fundamental questions of value – of instrumental or intrinsic worth, of the use of art and its justification for public spending, of the role of commerce in culture – just as some versions of the creative industries idea question the very necessity and relevance of art itself. These make discussions quite fraught, and heavily-laden words pile into each other spilling historical baggage everywhere.

Inevitably the notion of creative industries, with their close links to new technologies and emergent social and cultural forms, are associated with the new and the innovative; we look to them for the emergent outlines of the future. At the same time, they come at the end of a long history of similar hopes and fears for past and future; what are we losing, what are we trying to achieve? It is for this reason that we have taken a more historical approach to the question, trying to situate the origin of contemporary debates within a much longer tradition.

The usefulness of art

Clash of binaries

Approaching the question of the multiple relationships between arts and creative industries needs more clarity. Recent reports dealing with this issue have used words such as ‘culture’, ‘art’, ‘the arts’, ‘aesthetics’, ‘publicly funded culture’ often interchangeably; they have used ‘cultural industries’, ‘creative industries’, ‘commercial culture’, ‘popular culture’, ‘mass culture’, ‘entertainment’ similarly. It is not simply a matter of definitions; all these terms come with complex historical connotations operating in ways that can make the debate both passionate and completely self-referential. In order to help make these debates more open to a productive exchange with each other, we need to trace the historical genesis of these debates, how they have changed and what future they might hold out for us.

The clash of these two sets of concepts tends to be around binaries such as culture/economics, art/ market, intrinsic/instrumental, and in terms of elitist/populist, critical/passive, heritage/contemporary, depth/shallowness, contemplative/active, mind/body, analogue/digital and so on – a debate therefore involving some of the fundamental questions regarding the ways we do or should live. This report outlines how these questions have been raised in relation to the public policy issue of the relationship between arts and creative industries. It offers a way of getting beyond these binaries; to place the debate on grounds more appropriate to the complex issues that confront us.

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Use or ornament?
One of the main themes around which this debate has been conducted in recent years has been the opposition between the ‘instrumental’ function of art (usually economic or social) and ‘art for art’s sake’, that is, art as completely self-sufficient and needing no other justification than its own enjoyment. In fact ‘art for art’s sake’ was a particular historical position taken by a limited number of artists/critics, mainly in France and England, during the second half of the 19th century. It took some tendencies in aesthetic theory (which we will discuss below) to an extreme position; it certainly was not generally representative of art practice or theory at that time. From romanticism through social realism right through to modernism and on to the present, the idea that art is created separately from society in some ideal realm, or that it should have no consequences for that society, has been explicitly rejected. ‘Art for art’s sake’ certainly does not inform contemporary art history or theory; indeed, it is usually presented as a very particular product of its epoch and social milieu.

Of course the ‘pure’ enjoyment of art – of colour, line, sound, rhyme or movement – is a real feeling; but the social spaces and the kinds of subjectivity that allow enjoyment of these things in such a way are themselves part of a wider historical development. Aesthetic enjoyment apart from any ‘use’ is a phenomenon of more modern European history. ‘Art for art’s sake’ cannot be understood otherwise than as one kind of response to modern industrial society, and the people making such claims are equally products of that very same society.

‘Art for art’s sake’ was but a small part of a wider and still powerful feeling that art involved some universal value that transcends historical circumstances. Its ‘use’ was to deepen our humanity, to reflect on our common fate. At their best, artists transcend their own time and space to speak to all other such products of art through the ages; they speak through their own time but achieve a human universality in which we all (potentially) share. This approach has a very long history, going back to the 18th century. It informs the idea of a canon of great works as well as that sweeping historical narrative which arranges collections of artefacts stretching back to Neolithic times into ‘the story of art’. The first Minister of Culture in any European country was the Frenchman Andre Malraux, and his idea of ‘the imaginary museum’ presents this historical narrative of art as the foundation of modern European cultural policy. Art is a universal and privileged symbolic act that both encapsulates the culture within which it is born and goes beyond it towards the universal human. It can do this because the artist is someone possessing a spark of creativity that puts them in touch with this universal; and we who look properly can discern this kernel of great art in all symbolic artefacts.

From this perspective, to suggest art should be put to some other (economic, political, social welfare) use – rather than this most important possible use – is to commit an act of historical vandalism for which future ages will condemn us. It is against this narrative, not the rather circumscribed notion of ‘art for art’s sake’ that the charges of ‘instrumentalism’ must be weighed.

The end of idealism?
In A historical overview we outline how this idealist view of art has been criticised, and indeed, how the notion of art that informs cultural policy has also changed. This has important consequences for the arts/creative industries debate. In short it questions what now counts as ‘art’ and why we value it – more pointedly, who gets to do this ‘valuing’. In the 1970s and 1980s work within art history, literature, philosophy, cultural sociology and cultural studies all contested the idea that there was some eternal human capacity called art or creativity (here in the sense of artistic drive or capacity). In 1980 Janet Wolff wrote two densely argued books that summarise these arguments. She showed how art is simply a particular kind of labour in a particular kind of socio-economic structure and has to be understood in these terms and not as a local exemplar of a universal capacity. In 1990 Tony Bennett, coming from cultural studies, systematically dismantled the claims of art and aesthetics to have some transcendental insight into a universal truth of history, positioning them squarely in their economic, social and political context of the rise (and fall) of the middle class and the liberal democratic nation-state.

It is now a commonplace notion in humanities disciplines that ‘high art’ was and is the culture of the elite, used by them to legitimate their position; that the ‘canon’ is simply the choice of this social group; that ‘art’ is merely one ‘sub-culture’ amongst all other kinds of cultural consumption; that art’s educative function is at best patronising and at worst an insidious elitism. These beliefs are by no means confined to academia. One of
the problems facing most cultural policy and arts funding agencies today is the sense that their legitimacy is unclear. Though in fact arts funding still gets high ratings from public opinion, the grounds for that public funding seem contested. The arts might be good in general but who decides what gets funded, and by what means are these funds distributed? It is in this context of uncertainty that the issue of ‘usefulness’ arises, and the creative industries discourse is usually taken to represent a clear statement that this use has to be ultimately defined in economic terms.

This report attempts to explore the current debates on this issue and to provide better grounds on which this legitimacy can be discussed. It tries to do so not by dismissing the arts or rejecting the creative industries, but by rethinking the two together. It does so in order to form a productive relationship that responds to the changing context within which artists, intermediaries and policy makers work.

Rather than isolate ‘the arts’ in a distinct policy space of public subsidy, or leave the creative industries in the realm of purely commercial industrial considerations, this report for the Australia Council proposes a productive collaboration of policy stakeholders in the arts and creative industries in order to create a new kind of creative industry strategy.

Summary

Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of art as a distinct area of life and the relation of this to wider transformations associated with capitalism and modernity.

Chapter 3 explores the ‘art worlds’ of the 19th century city and the some of the debates to which this gave rise. It outlines the separation between ‘art’ and ‘entertainment’ and the role of the market within this, but stresses that art too was organised around particular markets and economic contexts. It suggests also that whilst art was clearly part of the emergence of new middle class strategies of social distinction it was also part of a wider set of more democratic aspirations which are still with us.

Chapter 4 looks at the emergence of cultural policy and the role of arts within this. It suggests that art played a pre-eminent, though not exclusive, role within this new cultural policy, associated with the nation building project of the modern state. We also look at how the rise of both the cultural industries and modernist art undermined the unitary affirmative notion of the nation state. The chapter also discusses the emergence of public subsidy for the arts and the ways in which this in turn tended to fix ‘the arts’ within fairly conservative administrative boundaries which, in many ways, are still with us.
Chapter 5 looks at popular culture in the 1960s and 1970s. It outlines the many challenges popular culture presented to a unitary national cultural policy and to certain elitist tendencies in the arts. At the same time this popular culture could also be seen as an extension of many the aspirations associated with art to wider sections of society. In the process cultural industries, popular culture and art began to intermingle in complex ways. The chapter looks at community arts and the rise of new kinds of cultural policy; in particular it charts the rise of ‘alternative cultures’ with an emergent economy linked to, but in friction with, both ‘the arts’ and large cultural industries.

Chapter 6 directly addresses the emergence of ‘creativity’ and the ‘creative industries’ in the 1990s. It suggests that the creative industries combined arguments coming from the ‘information society’, Schumpeterian entrepreneurialism and innovation theory with those that suggested the increased economic importance of those sectors involved in the production of cultural goods. It looks at transformations in ideas of both creative work and creative consumption and explores arguments that the opposition between economics and culture was now over. The chapter looks in detail at some of the conflicts between creative industries theory and traditional notions of art and cultural policy, and between creative industries and earlier approaches to the cultural industries. It makes an argument for the distinctiveness and continued relevance of the notion of ‘art’. In doing so it suggests that art is not to be directly equated with ‘the arts’ as traditionally defined, but that it is closely intertwined with popular culture in such ways as to make this traditional distinction (high and low etc.) redundant. It concludes by assessing the policy landscape within which these debates have been engaged and the challenges for a new forward looking policy.

Chapter 7 takes a detailed look at how the arts and creative industries have been defined by academics, consultants and policy makers. It argues that creativity is not an adequate way of identifying this particular sector. It also suggests that many of these definitional models reproduce distinctions between art and commerce, art and ‘entertainment’, art and functionality that are unhelpful. The chapter puts forward a broad schema of art-media-design within which we can think contemporary arts and creative industries policies. The chapter concludes by identifying in general terms in which such a policy might consist.

1 Similarly, the demand that art be purely for itself can be deeply political act, whether in counter-reformation Italy, or Dickensian utilitarian England, in Franco’s Spain, or Stalinist Russia.


Chapter 2
The emergence of art in modernity

What is ‘art’?

The idea that art is rooted in particular social and historical circumstances, and that its nature and function change with those circumstances, is not at all new. In fact we might say that the modern idea of ‘art’ itself emerged at the same time as the modern idea of ‘history’ – in the 18th century. Both came from a recognition that the world changed and that customs, beliefs and institutions changed with them. The role of artists was to give new forms to these new times, knowing that they could draw on but not simply repeat the ‘classical’ forms of antiquity. The idea of art has complex links with ‘enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’ (a word not coined until mid-19th century, along with capitalism), both of which bring new conceptions of knowledge and history. The key point is that our own ideas of – and indeed the very words – ‘art’ and ‘artists’ emerged in quite recent historical circumstances. We cannot read our current ideas of art and artists back through history in the way that has been done by traditional art history; and we must also acknowledge our definitions might need to change.

The symbolic practices which we call ‘art’ have historically been intertwined with ‘magic’ and ‘religion’ (whose boundaries themselves are by no means hard and fast). Both of these involved ways of understanding the world and trying to change or affect it for human purposes. Ritual in this sense is a form of technology. In this sense too religion, science, art and technology (not to mention magic and alchemy) were part of the same attempt to understand and change the world, and they remained closely intertwined until the 18th century. Faculties of ‘the arts’ taught mathematics, astronomy, theology, ethics and so on well into the 17th century. The magician John Dee appointed by Elizabeth I used state of the art mathematics in his astrological charts just as Kepler, the great astronomer, applied himself to the alchemical tasks set by the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf.

Symbolic forms and rituals were also used as ‘social technologies’: religion did not just explain the world or attempt to sway obscure forces, it was also used to organise societies and set forth the principles on which they should work. The medieval church’s organisation and control of learning was accompanied by a sophisticated understanding of the social power of ritual as a form of heightened communication, using images, sounds, rhetoric and movement.

The word ‘art’ relates to ‘artefact’ and to ‘artisan’; it is a specific skill, or handicraft or technique, which in turn relates to the Greek tekne, the root of our word technology. It is in this sense that we talk of the art of war, or diplomacy, or horse riding – difficult skills needing to be mastered. It is out of these various skills and forms of practice, often regulated by specific institutions such as guilds, that ‘the arts’ and ‘the artist’ as we understand them began to emerge in the 15th and 16th centuries. This emergence however involved a process of separation of ‘the arts’ from many other social practices (such as science and religion, but also from ‘everyday life’) and of the ‘artist’ from mere artisans, handicraft and common labour.

But before we jump to the conclusion that this is some elitism or humanist idealism, or that we can simply write this history in terms of the development of technology and division of labour – as with certain forms of innovation literature or evolutionary economics – we have to understand how those societies understood or rather lived their relationship to the spiritual and physical world. These societies were fundamentally different from our own: and just as reading symbolic artefacts for traces of ‘artistic’ merit is now seen as ahistorical, so too we should resist reading them simply as containing the seeds of (or impediments to) future socio-technological advances.

The uses of ‘art’ and the nature of those who produce it are embedded in their own particular social and cultural worlds; neither our ‘art’ nor our socio-technological ‘utility’ can be read back into these worlds. This applies as much to the ancient Greeks as it does to indigenous Australians. What this encounter should give rise to is the question: how, in our society, did art become separate from other forms of knowledge and practice?

The emergence of ‘art’

The answer is bound up with that of European capitalism and modernity. How it is bound up is crucial for current debates about the nature and function of art. There are five broad areas in which the emergence of art has been discussed.

Technology, media and society

The recognition of the profound impact of the Internet and digitalisation on contemporary society and culture underlined the crucial role played by Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 34
media. These new technological media do not just have consequences for the ‘transmission’ of art, at the same time they affect its content (‘medium is the message’). Not just content; the ways art has tried to understand and organise the world, its ways of making and doing, and thus its relations to the rest of culture and society, are challenged – some would say fatally.

We have already suggested that art/ritual/religion/technology might be intertwined in other societies; how did they come to be separated and recombined to different effect in our own?

We can start with the key technological development, the establishment of the first printing press in 1450. Its impact is one of the touchstones of our culture, and is constantly invoked in current debates about the Internet. When Victor Hugo, in Notre Dame de Paris, wrote that the printing press was the cathedral of the modern age he was suggesting not just a technology of reproduction but a new way of organising our understanding of the world and our place within it.

The printing press had its most basic impact on the control of information. Not only did it allow the flow of new and recovered learning we know as the Renaissance, the proliferation of copies of the bible (also increasingly translated into the vernacular) meant that the church could no longer mediate the word of God. The link between printing and the protestant reformation was that everybody and anybody could now read the bible. The local world of the cathedral, with its visual symbolics (including the shape and proportions of the building) gave an account of good and evil, the seasons, and the progress of life and death and beyond. Cathedrals and churches structured and punctuated local life. They gave way to the reading of books produced beyond the local horizon – previously a privilege of the priesthood and organised by the Church. The vernacular bible and growing literacy made feasible by printing (why would you read if there were no books) gave rise not only to the Reformation but also a new way of organising our understanding of the world and our place within it.

The technology of printing gave rise to new social technologies. With the addition of woodcuts, and later engravings, printing facilitated the expansion of the technology of writing that had been a scarce and controlled resource since ancient Sumer. This was action at a distance, as Ricci the famous Jesuit missionary to China wrote: “the whole point of writing something down is that your voice will carry for thousands of miles, whereas in direct conversation it fades at a hundred paces”.

Printing took this to a new level; if it increased the democratic circulation of information, it also facilitated the establishment and management of those complex social entities we know as the nation-state. As such it also has to be linked to those other forms of communication with which they worked – roads, waterways, postal services, and the organised exchanges of the market economy.

But Hugo’s image recalls the famous line by Hegel that reading the morning paper is modern man’s substitute for Morning Prayer. This suggests that the kind of social cohesion based on mass printing was very different from the collective participation of the Catholic Communion. Though public reading could remain oral and collective, the act of reading alone and in silence produces a distinct form of the subject, opening up an inwardness upon which much of our sense of the rational individual citizen is based. The challenge to established traditional sources of authority was thus also part of a new kind of social organisation that called for individuals with a new kind of subjectivity.

In this sense the new print media contributed to a radical transformation of European society and culture.

Markets and commodities

The invention of printing had such an impact because of the prior emergence of a developed market economy in Europe. Gutenberg’s was a failed commercial operation, and the ‘book trade’ was always rooted in the market. The separation of ‘the arts’ into distinct practices thus takes place within the context of a new and expanding market for symbolic products.

Symbolic artefacts can be seen as part of a wider system of religion, magic and ritual, and as such they often had sacred qualities giving them a certain distance from everyday life. Benjamin called this sense of distance an ‘aura’. However, from Neolithic times there was trade or exchange of these artefacts. They formed part of what Arjun Appadurai calls a ‘gift economy’, exchanges of precious objects whose value was not based on a money equivalent – what we call commodity exchange – but on their wider social value. Complex social codes governed the mutual giving and receiving of these singular objects. Such gift
economies marked much of the trade in symbolic artefacts up to the early modern period, where the rich and powerful would exchange precious objects (and sometimes precious artisans). But there was also a more commodity-based trade, in which symbolic artefacts were bought and sold for money in markets often ‘decorative’ items such as metalwork, jewellery, glass and ceramics, and but also religious souvenirs). In fact bronze casting was the first mass reproduction technology, and medieval Chinese porcelain production was organised on what we would recognise as an industrial scale. Printing took its place in existing gift and commodity markets, books and prints as ‘precious’ objects operating across both markets for many centuries.

It is important to distinguish between markets and capitalism. Markets, in which commodities were exchanged for money, existed in some form since the first cities emerged around 8000 BC. China had the world’s most developed and sophisticated market economy until the late 18th century; Islam dominated world trade and ran some of the largest commodity markets. None of these were capitalist. Nor were the market economies that began to emerge in Europe from the 12th century and which, by the time of the printing press, had become extensive, complex and locked into continental and global flows of trade and production. As these market economies developed and the population got wealthier the trade in precious and luxury goods began to grow. This included ‘artistic’ or symbolic goods such as books, paintings, prints, sculptures, bronzes, medallions, glazed ceramics, along with theatrical and musical performances, secular festivals, celebrations and pageants, new and varied buildings, interior decoration, frescos, panelling – products not just of the secular culture of Renaissance humanism, but also of the massive organisations of Church and State which also used these new forms of display, communication, control and prestige.

These markets were characterised by direct patronage, where a craftsman, musician or painter was employed on a long-term basis, or by direct commissions on a one-off basis, or sometimes by more speculative commercial enterprises such as Elizabethan theatre or large scale printing initiatives. Rarely was an artist faced by ‘the public’ as represented by ‘the market’ as in the 19th century. This rapid development of the market in symbolic goods had a profound effect on the organisation of production. The medieval craftsman was more or less anonymous and highly regulated by the guilds and church in terms of skills, quality and content. The growing market saw an increased demand for skilled craftsmen who now had more autonomy from guilds and could demand larger sums of money. They could set up their own studios and workshops and introduce new divisions and hierarchies of labour. In certain trades – especially those associated with what were to become the ‘fine arts’ of painting, sculpture, poetry and architecture – this new autonomy and hierarchy was accompanied by a change in status, from artisan to artist.

The labour of the artist was increasingly seen as a different kind to that of mere ‘mechanicals’. The growing prestige of the arts meant that those who supplied these artistic goods also shared in this prestige. Just as the new elites separated themselves from manual labour so too artistic labour was now to be of a different order. They could draw on [humanist] authors such as Vasari who, in his The Lives of the Great Artists (1550), saw the new Renaissance artists as engaged not in work but in creation and possessed of a visionary faculty that set them apart. This applied to different art forms in different ways – poets, painters and sculptures came first, musicians were latecomers, and actors never got a look in. Not only did it downgrade the manual skills of artisans but also ‘female’ crafts were now restricted to the domestic sphere.

The autonomy of artists was not just about their growing financial independence vis-à-vis patrons it was also about the kind of art they produced. The history of art gives a narrative of artistic vision struggling to free itself from the confines of authority and tradition. However, though there are clear exceptions, this was less a conscious challenge to authority than a claim to autonomy in their work. It was over the illegitimate interference in the work of the artist on his materials, rather than explicit ideological content, that artists rubbed against external authority. In this way, though taking his distance from craftsmanship and techne, there remains that sense of a job well done, of fitness for purpose, of faithfulness to the demands of the material that marked the craftsman. In this sense the position of artist always kept open its links with the artisans; indeed, artisans saw their own aspirations reflected in the work of the great artists.
Both artists and artisans were to face in different ways the challenges of the industrial revolution in which ‘technology’ became linked to the maximisation of profit and the ‘subjugation’ of nature. In his critique of technology as domination of the world, Heidegger looks back to an older notion of techne that accepts and respects the given materiality of the world, a notion of respectful artisanship incarnated in art. Similarly ‘artistic work’, so different from manual labour, become an ideal of meaningful work, where hand, eye and brain work together in close correspondence with the material it transforms. More recently ‘creative labour’ – work so meaningful and autonomous it is hardly work – once the preserve of an elite is now held out as the aspirational norm for modern employment.

Social differentiation, consumption and distinction
Where was the demand for artistic products coming from? The growth of the market economy in Western Europe had, by the 16th century, produced a growing market for ‘luxury goods’ amongst states, princes, nobility, clerics and the urban elite. By the early 18th century, production for such markets formed part of what economists have called the ‘industrious revolution’ – highly developed markets involving various degrees of capital outlay and domestic labour employed by piece work on basic technology. It was a market society Adam Smith would recognise and equally marked the global economic giant China. In one sense the ‘fine arts’ along with the decorative arts of ceramics, metalwork, glass and textiles, merely responded to this growth in demand. But there were other dynamics at work.

The emergence of Renaissance humanism in 15th century Italy was part of a wider change of society and ‘manners’ that Norbert Elias called The Civilising Process. In Elias’ account this change includes the ‘pacification’ of feudal society – the expulsion of violent conduct to the margins of society (to warfare) and to the creation of new kinds of subjects able to control their emotions and conduct themselves in ways conducive to civilised (and this usually meant urban) interaction. This shift can be related to the rise of capitalist markets and trade (which demanded new legal forms of regulation and redress as well as ‘rational’ behaviour), the growth of cities (close proximity) and to the new power of the Absolutist State that wished to monopolise violence, and resulted in the separation of ‘courty society’ from the rough manners and customs of those around them. This ‘civilising process’ worked on everyday behaviour or ‘manners’ - not fighting, not swearing, not blowing your nose or pissing in public. But it also emphasised learning and ‘the arts’. In such a way the practice or appreciation of the arts – poetry, dancing, music, architecture (and town planning), painting and sculpture – became an essential attribute of the civilised man. These practices distinguished the social elites and also brought prestige and legitimacy to rulers and states.

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu sees this new form of distinction at the very origin of the modern notion of art, expressed by Vasari. The wealthy and powerful use art to distinguish themselves from the common mass culturally as well as in terms of money and power. Parallel with the growth in the market we can see the extension of such prestige function – ‘cultural’ as opposed to ‘economic capital’ in Bourdieu’s terms – to the growing bourgeoisie of the towns and cities of Western Europe. However, there were other currents that complicate this. The bourgeoisie did not simply follow the nobility, they insisted on their own definition of culture. To the display of wealth and power which marked the great chateaux and villas, the Baroque churches, the pageants and spectacles, the huge tapestries and paintings – they stressed a form of inwardness, plain speaking and truth separate from religious and secular power. This can certainly be seen as part of the game of distinction – the art of the elite is fake and shallow, ours is the authentic. But the game of social distinction had political consequences.

Politics and the public sphere
Contesting the legitimacy of rulers and elites in setting the standards of artistic practice is linked with the wider political contestation whereby ‘society’ claimed autonomy from the state. Modern political theory dates from the 16th century and was concerned with the respective roles of civil society and the state. The emergence of both the idea and the material foundations of the public sphere (newspapers, clubs, coffee houses, salons, etc.) over the next two centuries saw ‘opinion’ enshrined as a force which could subject government to the judgment of rational open debate. But if the ‘public sphere’ could be seen as crucial to modern democracy it was also in part where the ‘autonomy’ of art was registered.

Developing technologies of production and reproduction, new forms of transport, a growing market economy and new forms of
communication and social assembly allowed new ideas of ‘public opinion’ to take hold. This public opinion – organised around particular locales but also extending across educated Europe, with its critics, newspapers, meeting rooms and academies – gave an alternative source of artistic value to that of elite patronage. It formed the basis of what came to be known at the end of the 17th century as ‘taste’. Taste was not just about social distinction but also deeply political.

The heated debates on ‘taste’ was in part a defensiveness on the part of social elites about the extension of artistic and (what had previously been) luxury consumption to classes they considered unqualified – just as the aristocracy had earlier attempted to stop social mobility by introducing strict (though rarely enforced) dress codes or ‘sumptuary’ laws. But it also involved the claims of ‘society’ against the state. The Earl of Shaftesbury, often credited as one of the originators of ‘aesthetics’, was following the ‘liberal’ John Locke in asserting the primacy of the former over the latter. Society ‘contracted’ the state to keep order but in many respects civil society was capable of regulating itself. ‘Taste’ was one such area where the free play of civil society could define the acceptable and the unacceptable – it did not need the state to regulate. Of course, Tony Bennett, following Terry Eagleton, is correct in showing how the ability to exercise taste is restricted to an elite bourgeois ‘society’. The theorists of this British ‘civic humanism’ argued that only those with an income sufficient for leisure and education were able to exercise responsible judgement. The labouring classes, driven by the necessity of work and lack of time, are thus disqualified.

The exercise of taste was linked therefore to that of responsible citizenship; taste was not just some form of appropriate manners or knowledge of the arts, it involved a programme for new kind of subjectivity. Hegel’s image of the newspaper reading bourgeois at Morning Prayer was a new kind of individual who had to be made, or rather self-made. Foucault’s account of the construction of modern states, based on a shift from a ‘repressive’ to an active ‘productive’ notion of power, involved the creation of subjects that needed to ‘work’ on themselves, to internalise power not just follow external rules and prohibitions. This was of course a softer side to the harsher discipline aimed at the lower classes. But it shows how taste in this civic humanist tradition is linked to the project of education – not just ‘manners’ for society but a fitness to exercise responsible political judgement. As modern writers have pointed out, this has both its democratic and exclusionary or disciplinary sides, which we are still working through today. Through a long line of thinkers, including Mathew Arnold and F.R. Leavis, it continues to inform the rationale on which an education in the arts is deemed essential to modern democracies.

Thus, for example, whilst the novel can be seen as reflective of ‘the rise of the bourgeoisie’ in both its form and its content, it has more recently been seen more in terms of how it carved out a new space of subjectivity, of interiority. Lyn Hunt, for example, has shown how the idea of ‘human rights’, emerging at the end of the 18th century, grew out of the human ‘sympathy’ stimulated within the emotional interiority of the novel reading public. This became a central claim of humanist education.

In Germany the growth of a science of aesthetics in the mid-18th century was closely linked to the middle class refusal of the right of an autocratic state to define the parameters of taste. Kant’s systematisation of this refusal in his *Critique of Judgement* laid the foundation for a new kind of state educational programme based, in part, on individual development through *Kultur*. This self-development or *bildung* tradition relates back to British thinking through Coleridge and others in a process famously traced by Raymond Williams in *Culture and Society*. The key point here is that art has been part of strategies of social distinction, but it has also formed part of the political discourse of the self-governing subject that has underpinned the educational and cultural strategies of the modern state.

**Aesthetics, knowledge, modernity**

In *Distinction* Bourdieu suggests that Kantian aesthetics, the study of art as sensible perception, established ‘disinterest’ as the main basis of its appreciation. According to this model, art does not excite the appetites or the will but exists to be received in a state of disinterested pleasure. The charge is that this is a continuation of Shaftesbury’s idea – that the servitude of work makes aesthetic disinterest impossible for the lower classes. Bourdieu sees this in contemporary distinctions between the working classes who look to functional or ethical qualities (a good likeness, skill, evoking ‘good’ emotions) and the middle class who value art’s separateness from all social function – found above all in abstract classical music. In masking the social basis of art through
‘disinterest’ they deny the real social (educational, economic, cultural) qualifications for it; ‘the art galleries are free, therefore the working classes only deny access to themselves’. The second charge (though this is less marked in Bourdieu) is that the emphasis on ‘disinterest’ removes aesthetic appreciation from the lower faculties of appetite towards the higher ones of mind. This distinction is then read onto the social body, where the lower orders and their ‘entertainments’ are driven by bodily pleasures whereas the middle class rest on mindful contemplation free from such appetites. This opposition can be found at its strongest in the contemporary opposition of ‘popular’ to ‘classical’ music.

There is clearly some truth in both these charges, as art became part of a middle class way of life and used to mark itself off from the ‘vulgar’ lower classes. But it is only partly true, and we shall discuss this more below. The idea of the ‘aesthetic’ is not just a construction and legitimation of bourgeois taste but part of a wider re-organisation of knowledge and production, of ‘making and doing’.

We can outline this by looking at the shift between medieval and modern ways of ‘making and doing’. Forms of knowledge and practice (religion, science, ritual, art) inseparable in the Christian middle ages began, in early modern times, to separate out. Thomas Aquinas saw Euclidian geometry as a route into the divine order laid out by God for us to discover. Writing in the mid-13th century he became anxious at the thought that objective knowledge might be separated from other aspects of the human being: “Provided a geometer makes a true demonstration, it is of no importance how he stands in regard to his appetitive part, whether he be joyful or angry”. This objectification of the external world was famously outlined by Descartes 300 years later in his Discourse on Method. The only undeniably existing thing, and the basis on which all other truths were to be built, was the self: cogito ergo sum. The internal world of consciousness was radically severed from the mechanical external world; the former’s task was simply to uncover the objective laws of this world.

But when the Renaissance humanist and architect Alberti wrote ‘man is the measure of all things’ he was also referring to man’s productive capacity, his ability to create the world. Aquinas had man taking his measure from the divine; by what principles was man now to create measure both for the world and for himself? This was the basic question of the 18th century Enlightenment, as it slowly emerged from the scholastic metaphysics of the middle ages. What constituted knowledge; how did it relate to the passions and the will; on what basis did man give measure to his own actions in a self-created world?

Kant’s first and second critiques were attempts to ground knowledge and morality in a Newtonian universe with no divinely revealed theological principles. They established the categories of perception and understanding on which our knowledge of the world was based, and the rationally based universal principle on which all morality should be founded. What then were those forms of sensory perception that gave pleasure – the arts – and yet did not seem part of either morality or knowledge?

Kant’s engagement with aesthetic theory related to the debate above as to whether civil society or the state should legislate taste. The German philosopher Baumgarten, seen as founding aesthetics in his book of 1750, suggested that ‘the arts’ involved a specific form of knowledge – the poetic, the beautiful – that could not be subsumed under Reason. Rejecting the notion put forward by the official philosophers of the Prussian state that art was merely the attractive clothing through which lesser intellects came to rational understanding, he suggested that, through beauty, the senses had their own distinct form of knowledge – aesthetics means precisely ‘pertaining to the senses’.

In the early 20th century the sociologist Max Weber suggested that a distinguishing characteristic of modern society was the separation of spheres – economic, legal, political, and aesthetic – each with its own autonomous laws. What then was the aesthetic sphere that seemed to be neither about morality or objective truth? Speaking of the impact of classical mythology on European art, Malcolm Bull writes:

“whatever way you looked at it, the renaissance had fostered a third category between the true and the false, namely that of images which were acknowledged to be false but were nevertheless admissible…Culture could no longer operate on the assumption that its content was true”.

The space of this third category was fabula, invention – the creative imagination that extended beyond the reach of reason.
Such fabula – a ‘mass of chimeras, daydreams, and absurdities’ – were ‘admissible’ under certain conditions. Since the Renaissance, these conditions were set by the forms and functions of the different ‘fine arts’ (painting, sculpture, poetry, theatre etc.) which, following Aristotle, allowed these ‘neither true nor untrue’ inventions to be justified by their wider social function (moral lessons, allegory, catharsis, etc.). The ‘fine arts’ were also organised as a hierarchy based on the ‘nobility’ of their themes, images and forms (poetry was the highest, music the lowest). Aesthetics shifted the emphasis from the hierarchy of forms to the senses themselves, to a particular mode of apprehending the world. Instead of the different ‘arts’ we get ‘art’: a singular “sensible mode of being” shared by all artistic products.

‘Aesthetic art’ demanded a particular orientation or disposition associated with the new forms of subjectivity we have been discussing. The ability to display this capacity would become a form of social distinction, but this ‘disinterestedness’ also referred to a way of apprehending the world differently to that of the abstract universal knowledge produced by modern scientific reason. A fundamental claim of aesthetic theory was that rather than establish general laws which abstract from all particular instances – the method of modern science – ‘art’ creates singular, sensuous forms which embody a universal truth. Fabula does not simply apprehend the world; it is a productive power which creates new forms and new worlds that are not part of objective knowledge (they are neither true or untrue) nor subject to ordinary moral laws.

If both British ‘civic humanism’ and Kant in their different ways looked to fix the autonomous productivity of aesthetic sensibility within socially agreed ‘taste’

‘aesthetic art’ in the 19th and 20th century constantly undermined these confines with a dynamism of invention that disturbed each new attempt to fix a tradition or canon. This crossing of boundaries does not just transgress the fixed forms and content of art; it also crossed those that sought to fix the limits of the aesthetic sphere itself. Art constantly crossed over into life, using the most mundane or vulgar aspects of this life and subjecting them to a different kind of gaze.

It is often argued by economists and artists alike – that ‘art’ is a remnant from a feudal/aristocratic age, operating on a time lag in a modern capitalist society. Its ‘resistance’ to (or ‘drag on’ if you like) modern society was seen as an assertion of older values (human/elitist) left behind by social and economic change. The opposite is in fact the case; ‘art’ came into being at the same time as capitalist modernity, as a distinct set of practices whose awkward critical tendencies are part of that divided modernity in which we still live.

A only a few years after Descartes, in the late 17th century when the economic and artistic energies of civil society were coming into their ascendency in France and Britain, the critic and librettist Fontenelle wrote:

“If reason governed the world nothing would happen. Sailors most fear tranquil seas where they are becalmed, and they want wind even if it brings a gale. Amongst men, the passions are the winds that put everything in motion, though they often cause storms”

Art also has its share in the production of modernity, contributing to and trying to mitigate this new world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’.
4 In fact the early modern Catholic Church staged a rather successful late comeback in the counter-reformation Baroque, linking its age-old experience of popular cultures with the new spectacular techniques of the post-renaissance 'arts'.


6 “The significance of this mass ceremony – Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers – is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar” Benedict Anderson (1983) Imagined Communities London: Verso. p.35


15 Critiques of Pure Reason (science, objective knowledge) and Practical Reason (morality).


18 How taste can emerge from a multitude of appetites is the same question Adam Smith faced; how can a harmonious society emerge from multiple acts of self-interest. Shaftsbury and Smith both had versions of the ‘hidden hand’, providence guaranteed their eventual harmonisation. Kant could not rely on British providence and sought the grounds on which such judgements of taste could be made – in this case by disinterest, a recognition of beauty with appetite at bay. In this sense it was part of the civilising process.

19 In 1830 there were near riots when Victor Hugo used the vulgar, domestic word ‘chambre’ on stage; Joyce was banned for the inclusion of similarly vulgar bodily and domestic functions.

20 Malcolm Bull, op.cit. p.395
Chapter 3
Art and industry: production, distinction, discontent

Art worlds

It is often argued that in the 19th century art and industry were separate entities, never the twain to meet. This problem was sometimes held to stem from ‘art’ – haughtily placing itself above the material concerns of everyday life – and sometimes from ‘industry’ – which bought into the art ideology itself, trying to justify itself through cultural philanthropy or sending its children into the ‘aristocratic’ liberal arts1. But it is not clear if this was a gratuitous separation – John Holdan argues they were easily united in the 18th century22 – or more structural, related to a particular form of mass industrial production – as John Hartley seems to suggest21. Is the rise of the creative industries a reunion of what was falsely rent asunder or a socio-economic shift suggesting a new kind of relationship between art, culture, industry and everyday life?

In the sense in which we now often use ‘industry’ to mean a more or less coherent and coordinated mobilisation of various physical and human resources and the creation and distribution of economic value therein – as in the ‘security industry’, ‘health industry’ or ‘sex industry’ – then ‘art’ was an industry. The ‘art industry’ emerged as a particular set of structures and practices very distinct from those of the new factory based industrial activity of early 19th century England. Indeed, it is this difference which gives the force to creative industry arguments; not that the last 200 years were some sort of aberration but that the sorts of practices associated with the arts now offered mainstream industry a powerful set of models and inputs – if they would only listen. This also comes with the rider that art, too, must drop its historical prejudices against industry.

Nevertheless, ‘art industry’ is restrictive in its description of how these structured practices hang together; in 1984 Howard Becker instead used the term ‘art worlds’24. As with many in the same period (see above) he was concerned to break with the idea of art as the work of the singular genius speaking a universal language and tried to show the dense networks of collaboration and divisions of labour involved in even the simplest artistic product. Traditional art history, he suggested, with its emphasis on the individual artist, has tended to occlude this fact. The ‘art worlds’ of the 19th and 20th centuries are thus inconceivable without those complex developments in technology, markets, social distinction, politics and aesthetics associated with emergence of modernity.

Take ‘classical’ music, for example, a defining image of ‘western art’ in the last two centuries. The symphony orchestra demanded new levels of instrumental craftsmanship based on technological innovation and industrial standardisation, underpinning the possibility of a global circulation of (and thus market for) music repertoires (a clarinet in Melbourne was expected to be the same as that in Shanghai). The piano was the most complex piece of machinery most domestic houses were likely to encounter – certainly the most bulky. By the 1820s piano production in Europe – especially London – was organised on industrial lines, with factory-like divisions of labour and innovations (such as the upright) targeted at new domestic consumers. From the 1840s pianos and orchestras could move more freely on railways and international shipping lanes, co-ordinated by sophisticated postal services and telegraphs.

Sheet music production began to improve and innovate from the end of the 18th century, allowing for the circulation of orchestral parts, stimulating domestic piano playing, and becoming the first part of what we now call the ‘music industry’ to commercialise around mass reproduction. By midcentury a popular song could sell upwards of 200,000 copies. Around sheet music emerged new copyright laws and practices, with performing rights lagging behind. Only in the early 20th century was sheet music replaced by gramophone recordings (and piano rolls)25.

The biggest technology of the 19th century involved the rapid growth of the new cities, and it is within these that the explosion of music practice took place. The informal spaces of the 18th century public sphere, such as assembly rooms and pleasure gardens, were transformed, opening up to new urban (paying) publics. They were joined by the new public infrastructures of the reforming industrial cities. Concert halls, recital rooms and opera houses; museums, libraries and galleries; parks, boulevards, public squares, exhibition palaces and town halls; department stores and hotel lobbies; ballrooms, cafes and restaurants – these became the basic facilities for any city wanting to be regarded as modern and cultured, and as such they were exported not just to the provinces but to the colonies.

The ability of forty or so professional musicians (able to make a living) to assemble, with their expensive instruments, trained to international standards (by teachers and standardised...
These many apprentices and that amount of precious colour, this and that both known and often specified in advance; this Renaissance in which the price of everything was Goods.

These new markets for artistic goods. In Worldly Goods Lisa Jardine gives an account of the Renaissance in which the price of everything was both known and often specified in advance; this and that amount of precious colour, this and that size, these many apprentices. By the 19th century artists had achieved some autonomy from this, but the price of the labour and materials involved in artistic goods was clear to all in societies of material scarcity. Beethoven's letters are full of demands for payment, for commissions promised or unpaid, of talk about expense and anger at dodgy publishers. As countless plays, novels and memoirs make clear, the artist's life for most was one in which money and poverty loomed large.

It is also clear that these new markets for artistic goods became differentiated and segmented, and that these markets and the intermediaries who attempted to direct and profit from them had a growing impact on what kinds of artistic goods got produced, and that certain aspects of both the goods and the artist associated within them became singled out and promoted ('commodified') as part of the appeal to these markets. Dickens' novels were produced within a market created by newspaper and magazine serials; the classic three part novel was a product of the profit strategies of the publishing industry.

These were complex activities calling for technological, economic and cultural divisions of labour that took a whole century to fully emerge. New levels of professionalisation as well as new kinds of professions emerged. Impresarios, publishers, dealers – all facilitated the functions of these new markets for artistic goods. In Worldly Goods Lisa Jardine gives an account of the Renaissance in which the price of everything was both known and often specified in advance; this and that amount of precious colour, this and that size, these many apprentices. By the 19th century artists had achieved some autonomy from this, but the price of the labour and materials involved in artistic goods was clear to all in societies of material scarcity. Beethoven's letters are full of demands for payment, for commissions promised or unpaid, of talk about expense and anger at dodgy publishers. As countless plays, novels and memoirs make clear, the artist's life for most was one in which money and poverty loomed large.

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However, artistic products were not simple commodities as we now understand the term. They were not goods with clear functional value exchangeable for specific sums of money determined by the market-price mechanism of neo-classical economics. Their non-market or 'intrinsic' value derived from the fact that their price was set within a wider socio-cultural dynamic not driven by markets. Art worlds, in extremely complex ways, set the values which determine the value of artistic products. They operate within cultural and artistic conventions, codes of meaning that have deep social roots. They operate within systems of meanings set by arts schools, universities, journals, newspapers, critics, professional associations, and public agencies. The markets of an art world are a long way from the expressed preferences of the neo-classical consumer – they work within a wider system of values, which assigns value to non-functional goods.

**Distinction**

Becker's account, despite its rootedness in everyday production, is rather a-historical – accepting the emergence of art as such – and he treats art worlds, whether 'high' (e.g. modernist art) or 'low' (stereography, cowboy art) as exemplifying the same dynamics in a rather pluralist manner. But a major current of the 'social critique' of art since the 1960s – exemplified by Pierre Bourdieu's work – suggests a more systematic organisation of these 'art worlds', and indeed the art world writ large, around the class distinction strategies of the bourgeoisie. From the end of the 18th century the bourgeoisie used the ideology and practices of art to give their economic domination a new legitimacy. Their particular interests were dressed up in the language of universal cultural values. Jürgen Habermas, the theorist of the 18th century public sphere, argues that the bourgeoisie separated themselves out from and became pre-eminent within this sphere in the 19th century. They set the content and tone of that century.

Historians have argued that the middle classes began to take hold of the performance spaces of the 18th century and impose a new kind of discipline, of silent, motionless, 'serious' contemplation, excluding the noise and bustle of the old entertainments of aristocratic and popular cultures. Di Maggio, for example, has shown how a particular ‘concert going public’ and repertoire...
was formed in 19th century Boston, allowing the middle classes to claim a distinction based on its cultural capital\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{2}. Serious art music, like serious literature, theatre, art and sculpture, becomes the possession of the middle classes and marked off against, not so much vulgar popular culture – which was beyond the pale or romanticised as ‘folk’ – but the new urban commercial cultures increasingly called ‘popular’ that used many of the forms of ‘serious’ culture but to commercial ends. The distain for operetta, the ‘penny dreadfuls’ and ‘illustrated magazines’, for cheap prints and photographic images and so on was part of the ‘ policing’ of the legitimate boundaries of cultural distinction. These boundaries, it was claimed by many in cultural studies, were reproduced in the new 19th century education system and the development of curricula used to inculcate the notion of the artistic canon as well as to erect hidden barriers to its access for those outside the middle classes\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{3}.

In this context the opposition of ‘art’ to ‘industry’ acquires the overtones of 18th century civic humanism: those who have the material means to acquire culture disdain and disqualify those who do not have these means, along with that part of the bourgeoisie who actually engage in the production of these material means. It links to that aristocratic disdain of ‘trade’ and the display of art as luxury which many bourgeois elites adopted. Art becomes a hypocritical veil thrown around the piano legs of a material and vulgar world; it becomes the sign of a noble soul too sensitive for an ignoble industry.

All these things happened as a matter of historical fact. And in a new society such as Australia, where older social distinctions had to be vigorously asserted rather than naturally assumed, the machinery of cultural distinction was plainly visible – exemplified maybe in the image of the piano as harbinger of cultured civilisation. But it has become a new orthodoxy, an a-historical caricature of a complex and contradictory historical process, which has debilitating consequences for contemporary cultural policy.

A new public

First, this process of distinction and the social and cultural structures within which it was exercised (including the inhabited subjective worlds of those who exercise it) had to be created, to be won, in an uncertain historical process. The kind of class consciousness which Bourdieu and others take for granted was not created over-night (as E.P. Thompson showed for the English working class\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{4}). Beethoven’s music was produced for a new kind of public. No longer aimed at the restricted ‘society’ of an aristocratic elite it emerged alongside the new claim, made by the 1789 French Revolution, that ‘the people’ truly represented society. This new ‘public’ was the people in their deliberative glory, and it is in their new language that Beethoven’s symphonies – much longer, more muscular and rhetorical, involving more instruments intended for much bigger performance venues (hence his constant demands on technology and technique) – tried to speak. It was the same public that the revolutionary French painter David attempted to address. As Adorno wrote, whoever does not hear the revolutionary bourgeoisie in the fifth symphony does not understand Beethoven. This struggle to speak to the public as ‘the people’ continued until the mid-19th century. It marked social realism and painters such as Courbet as well as writers such as Hugo, Heine and Sand. If the bourgeoisie came to see themselves as the exemplary public then many artists tried to either recall them to their roots (something found in Hugo but also in Dickens) or sought to connect instead to the working classes. That is, at no point in the 19th century did the domination of the ‘public’ by the middle classes go unchallenged.

As a result, and despite middle class attempts to define and dominate it, ‘the public’ could be an unknown and often fearful entity. Strategies of distinction operated against the expansion of the artistic market that seemed to offer access to any with money; against the market tendency to segment this public, rendering it opaque, ambiguous and elusive. In the new cities the middle class public had to distinguish itself from the urban crowds whose very mobility and unreadability threatened fixed social distinctions. This fear of the crowd, exemplified in the urban artistic and entertainment markets from mid-century, strongly marks middle class attempts to define the public precisely because of the jostling and pressing of the modern city. This shift can be seen between two French contemporaries. Victor Hugo communicated with his reading public as an orator might the ancient republican crowd-people, calling them to social solidarity; Baudelaire’s public was the atomised mass of urban consumers to whom the artist, like the whore, was forced to sell his wares.
Art worlds and popular culture

Second, though ‘policed’, the boundaries between art worlds and popular cultures were fluid and permeable. Older unruly popular cultures had been increasingly ‘civilised’ by the disciplinary regime of the new factories and industrial cities, and art spoke to the mind not vulgar bodily appetite. But from mid-century a market for entertainment and light art had emerged in the cities, and by the end, this was part of an international circuit. In the 18th century ‘popular’ was used in relation to a generalised taste; by mid-19th century the divisions between art and entertainment were emerging around the market; it was only towards the end of the 19th century that ‘popular’ came to be defined as that which sold a lot and that therefore ‘popular’ had to mean of little artistic merit. But these were not fixed separate worlds, and it is precisely their juxtaposition which made for vigorous efforts to distinguish them.

The forms of the new commercial popular cultures were often drawn from artistic models, though they were also subject to irony and parody. Many composers, musicians, writers, artists worked across the lines; some complained, others did not. Virtuosi from serious music became popular stars – as they remained until the 1960s. Film music was ‘applied’ classical music from the piano accompanists in silent film until the 1960s; photography constantly looked to artistic models (especially in pornography); interior design, ceramics, jewellery and so on also responded to art worlds, as did department store window dressing and emergent advertising. The line between popular and literary books could be very fine (hence attempts to make it bolder), as witness the careers of Wells and Kipling. In fact, until the end of the 19th century, the middle classes were the market, and certainly its most lucrative part: the lines between commercial and serious art were being drawn within the middle class. Thus artistic works constantly migrated to popular culture – operetta, Viennese waltzes, historical novels (Dumas fils), paintings of Roman peasant girls or Dutch interiors and so on. Historical work over the last forty years has uncovered how these art and popular culture worlds overlap and exchange. Likewise, ‘popular artists’ kept in touch with ‘high art’, even in areas such as Jazz, which seemed to many to involve a radical break. Alex Ross details how avant-garde figures such as Mahler, Strauss and Schoenberg would flock to Puccini premiers: Italian opera itself is an enduring case of popular ‘serious’ music. The entry of commercial popular forms into ‘high culture’ is complex; they appear as subjects in novels, paintings, and music (think of Zola or the Impressionists, or the use of waltzes and other dances in symphonies) but only perhaps at the very end of the 19th century are they used to disrupt established aesthetics – the cabaret art of Montmartre, Cubism’s collages, Mahler’s use of popular tunes and similar borrowings in modernist novels.

Art and democracy

Third, the notion of a serious art different to commercial entertainment was not restricted to the middle classes, nor was the aspiration to acquire it. Values associated with art and learning had been fundamental to many popular religious and political movements since the Protestant Reformation. A long tradition of radical artisan learning can be found in Europe and North America, and was to strongly mark colonial cultures. The value of ‘great art’ and literature embodied in the ‘canon’, whose popularity was held to transcend any monetary commercial success, animates these popular traditions just as much as the bourgeois art ideologues. These values were present, for example, in British Chartism, as it was in the later trades union and socialist movements of Europe and North America and could be found in the various workers education movements and institutions that flowed from these. They underlay the immense popularity and prestige of John Ruskin and poets such as Walt Whitman as well as the more political works of William Morris, or later Jack London, or Henry Lawson. The 20th century labour movement was animated not by an assault on art, but claims for its democratisation, for the ability of all to enjoy the fruits of human culture and learning.

These movements might enjoy popular entertainments – though many activists frowned at them as either frivolous or pernicious distractions from the political task at hand – but they did not seek to collapse the lines between these and ‘art’. That these workers movements considered art as a part of a wider set of moral and political values is clear in the powerful role art played in the educational aspirations of the lower middle and working classes in the 20th century. Jonathon Rose equates the intellectual life of the British working classes with the autodidact tradition; most of the working classes and lower middle classes (the ‘clerks’) had to educate themselves in the face of hostile or patronising treatment. The aspirations were not just to individual betterment but also to wider social democratic
claims. There were also new occupational positions in working class ‘art worlds’ linked to the institutions of expanding education, working class movements and other social reformist initiatives, and these would support many new kinds of cultural practices – workers literature, painting and music making. Rose also shows how many of the autodidacts ended up in the new commercial worlds of publishing and theatre, later film and radio. The same can be said for new popular music. And this also provoked patronising comments about ‘clerks writing for clergies’ made most famous in Forster’s *Howard’s End*, but also documented (in very partial terms) by John Carey32. But when Bourdieu and others try to show how those with cultural capital always attempted to downgrade the efforts of autodidacts by accusing them of acquiring this knowledge in the wrong way – ‘in one gulp’ as one of the characters in *Howard’s End* put it – they very often end up dismissing their aspirations and belittling their gains.

To dismiss all this as ‘false consciousness’ or to see these attempts, as Bourdieu does, as always disqualified by class distinction and inequality is both to ignore historical evidence and to be equally patronising in turn. The workers’ movements took a strong political stance against those who sought to use art as social distinction or lock it up in the citadels of privilege. It was a charge they often threw at ‘art for art’s sake’ and later at modernism; wilful obscurantism and amorality or decadence was held to be a form of elitism, and this marked much of Marxism’s early response to modernism. On the contrary there were strong currents within ‘aesthetic art’ which offered a different knowledge of the world, a kind of plenitude, a wholeness felt in the sensuous immediacy of the work; this art had strong democratic promise. Not only did it no longer restrict aesthetics to privileged representations, this aesthetic attitude, seeing the world in a different light, was not restricted to one class – the promise to change life could have transformative effects on all individuals34.

Indeed, it is now clearer than ever that Marx’s account of the capitalist commodity form and its overcoming in communism is profoundly related to the early German aesthetic tradition. His account of free labour and fulfilled humanity is linked to the promise of reconciliation and plenitude in Romantic aesthetics. It is in this sense also, as we saw, that the ‘dignity of labour’ in workers’ movements but also in many other social reform traditions (including religious) could find its ideal in the creative artist. It has been argued that movements for social justice and those for a more meaningful or non-alienated life (encapsulated by Rimbaud’s *changer la vie!*) were distinct; that artistic radicals were unlikely fellow travellers with workers’ movements that were not interested in their idealistic aspirations; that the 1960s saw the cultural radicals in turn dumping the social aspirations of the workers35. There is much in this, as we shall see; ideas of the autonomy of labour, its self-fulfilment at work, as well as the claims to social justice they found embedded in the sensuous promise of art indicate that these are not always so distinct. And they were also at the forefront of the creative industries discourse – and its critics.

**The avant-garde and cultural dynamism**

In the last forty years it has been not so much the games of distinction of the bourgeoisie so much as those of the intellectual avant-garde – or the ‘knowledge class’ – that has been at stake. This class and their monopoly of knowledge was threatened by the spread of education and the expansion of the artistic and cultural market. Jonathan Rose follows John Carey in seeing modernism as a deliberate attempt to make art more difficult and obscure, rendering the newly acquired cultural knowledge of the lower classes redundant. This threat to their self-interest is held to explain modernism’s obscurity, along with its contempt for the ‘masses’ and new forms of ‘mass media’, in a process of what John Hartley calls ‘democracy as despair’36.

This account is far too simplistic and reductive. In particular it ignores how the roots of modernism lie also in its opposition to the art world, not just between modernism and popular or mass culture. Modernism had strong, if ambiguous links, with radical politics and could use popular culture as part of its aesthetic radicalism, and in line with many within the working class movement itself, it did not equate ‘mass culture’ with the masses. We will discuss modernism and the mass media in the next section. Here we suggest that this reductive account of modernism as elitist – the avant-garde as ‘aristos’ as John Hold will discuss modernism and the mass media in the next section. Here we suggest that this reductive account of modernism as elitist – the avant-garde as ‘aristos’ as John Hold

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The most systematic statement of these internal dynamics of the art world comes from Bourdieu. In *The Rules of Art* he identifies artistic production with a sub-section of the bourgeoisie – a ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’.

Those with ‘economic capital’ are despised by those who lack this capital but who have high levels of cultural knowledge and prestige – ‘cultural capital’. Those with this cultural capital jealously guard their ability to legislate on art against those who rely on economic power - and those who seek only to serve it.

“. . . the opposition between art and money . . . is the generative principle of most of the judgments that . . . claim to establish the frontier between what is art and what is not, between ‘bourgeois’ art and ‘intellectual’ art, between ‘traditional’ art and ‘avant-garde’ art.”

This does not just separate the artistic producers from the economic middle classes; in more systematic fashion than Becker’s ‘art world’, Bourdieu organises the artistic producers themselves into a relational ‘creative field’. This field of artistic production is autonomous from the field of economic power – and the ‘cultural capital’ of any artist is based on how far they are from the field of power. Thus it is divided into those producers geared to large-scale production, which is close to the field of power (the mainstream bourgeois audience), and achieves good money (high economic capital). This is despised (low cultural capital) by those involved in small-scale or ‘restricted’ production which does not get a large audience, therefore little economic capital, but high levels of cultural capital. A further sub-division suggests a struggle between the established avant-garde and the new bohemian artists, who despise both fortune and fame – thus claiming cultural capital for the future.

In line with many others, Bourdieu thus attacks the very idea of the individual creative genius and situates artists’ work not in personal biography but within a field of struggle, a deadly game from which they cannot escape. Bourdieu certainly outlines the sorts of tensions, maneuvers and self-serving idealisms familiar to anybody who has been involved in an art world. There are problems though. First is the sense familiar from his book on cultural consumption, of marionettes played by the system, the strings finally revealed by the all-seeing scientist. One of the fundamental criticisms of *Distinction* was that it suggested each act of cultural consumption was done purely for the purposes of social distinction, ignoring the real pleasures, the emotional and intellectual investments in this specific object, this specific kind of art. At times Bourdieu comes close to this in *The Rules of Art*, but there is a significant difference. The autonomy of the field of artistic production does not relate, he argues, to some eternal quality of art but is an historical event. But he also argues that this is a real historical gain and that it must be defended against the forces that threaten it – the market and political pressure. The autonomy of art is not just a delusional by-product or empty stake in the struggle between economic and cultural capital: it is a value we should cherish.

We can certainly see the opposition of art to money as often a self-serving game – especially when it comes with a blanket condemnation of popular culture as pure commerce and completely dominated by the market. But its very power to condemn, to structure the field, to create a pole in opposition to the power of money and politics – this comes from an historical energy embedded in the notion of aesthetic art itself. The struggle to acquire cultural capital is worth engaging in precisely because that cultural capital is a capital.

Bourdieu takes great pains to show how Flaubert’s novels represented a move within a complex artistic field of ‘art for art’s sake’ and social realism: Madam Bovary and *Sentimental Education* are both ‘realist’ and ‘pure’ works of art. Flaubert’s artistic success was due to his application of the aesthetic rules of ‘pure art’ to the kind of small town dreamer and adulteress usually reserved for social fiction. He could write a realist novel knowing it was a fiction. The autonomy of the artistic field, therefore, is not just about the accumulation of cultural capital but allows the working out of aesthetic material in accordance with its own requirements and in so doing it reveals a certain kind of truth about the world.

This notion of aesthetic art, as we have seen,
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stemmed from Kant but also the German romantics and idealist philosophers. Aesthetic art was not about an ethical truth or the correct technical execution of appropriate artistic forms (it was not artisanship or virtuosity), it was mode of sensory being. It was different to cognition and the power of the will – it did not subsume the particular under general laws and our response to art was spontaneous, unwilled: Aesthetics has been presented as some pre-modern, aristocratic distain for the material world. As Schiller wrote:

“At the present time material needs reign supreme and bend a degraded humanity beneath their tyrannical yoke. Utility is the great idol of our age, to which all powers are in thrall and to which all talent must pay homage. Weighed in this crude balance, the insubstantial merits of Art scarcely tip the scale, and, bereft of all encouragement, she shuns the noisy market-place of our century”.

This echoes Bourdieu’s ‘art versus money’, but we need to be clear about why this position becomes so influential given the historic association between money, power and art since the Renaissance. In his discussion of Juno Ludovisi Schiller defines the statue of the goddess as ‘free appearance’:

“what the free appearance of the Greek statue manifests is the essential characteristic of divinity, its ‘idleness’ or ‘indifferency’. The specific attribute of divinity is not to want anything, to be liberated from the concern to give oneself ends and to have to realize them”.

Schiller tells us that through the apprehension of art we share in this divinity as ‘free play’, and humans are only fully human beings when they play: “this paradox is capable of bearing the whole edifice of the art of the beautiful and the still more difficult art of living”. The property of being art is not about conformity to an ethical truth nor given by technical perfection “but is ascribed to a specific form of sensory apprehension”. This aesthetic apprehension is distinct from everyday life – it makes everyday experience strange to itself – but it is at the same time about the ‘art of living’ and a form of politics. It concerns “that which comes within the province of art through its adherence to a sensorium different to that of domination”. It is in this sense that no external ‘academic’ or ‘artisinal’ standards can be set; why the dynamics of the art world are anti-hierarchial (the unknown bohemian can claim the mantle of art against the world renowned artist), and why artistic value is volatile and distinct from indicators of price.

For the same reason art is both separate from life but constantly draws everyday life into itself; no experience can lie outside it. For the Romantics art represented a plenitude, a wholeness, that was forever lost by contemporary life. Or art was something to be redeemed, its promise made good by a new kind of community, Art as part of “a sensorium different to domination” could thus hold out the promise to ‘change life’, for a new life in common. It was in this sense, with its inherent democratic principle, that it also inspired the autodidacts and the artisans, the clerks and the shop girls, as well as the bohemians and avant-gardes – and indeed, many in the middle and upper classes. Which is not to say that these are the same experiences; or that art’s plenitude did not ever become a compensation for inequality, deprivation and domination; or that its ever-deferred promises did not provide excuses for all kinds of compromises and evasions. Nevertheless it retained a promise, though of what now remains to be seen.

Conclusion

1. We started with an opposition of ‘art’ and ‘industry’: we suggested that in one sense the word art was an industry, but one animated by different principles than that of factory based mass production. It is only in this way that it was able to offer a different model of ‘industry’ for ‘post-industrial’ societies.

2. We also suggested art’s opposition to industry and markets was not always an aristocratic resistance to modernity or some willful avoidance of the material realities on which its comforts relied. Art’s rejection of the ‘dark satanic mills’ was not (just) about their ugliness or anti-pastoral violence; it was an attempt to assert a different quality of experience. Art was the experience of an object in a different way than the universal equivalence of scientific and technological rationality, the commodity or the administered objects of bureaucratic modernity.
3. Art’s lack of external determination does not have to mean a ‘sacred apartness’, an auralic distance from the everyday. It also gives it a dynamic charge. Its impulse to change life gives rise to new art forms that intersect with the dynamism of the world in ways that are not always opposed to it. The world of ‘all that is solid melts into air’ produces modern art as well as modern industry. The fact that modern art is uncoupled from fixed forms, places and codes gives it its critical, ‘dysfunctional’ aspect, but it also gives it productivity. It animates and transforms the world. As such it is always intersecting with an equally productive and transformative capitalism.

4. If art and everyday life constantly transgress their own borders so to do the realms of culture and economics. Modernism’s maneuvers were in part an attempt to sidestep this process by shattering the representational illusion which seemed complicit with money and power. But of course modernism’s innovations have increasingly been linked to those of capitalism; it is an association not always easy for art to slough off, and its productivity is always there to be used.

5. The respect for art and learning was never just a seeking after knowledge legitimated by the upper classes; it was lived as an aspiration for a new world, an altered perspective on life and how it might be lived. In this sense it contributed to that opening up of a space for subjectivity, which was part of western modernity and on which new forms of disciplinary power were based.

6. Aesthetics also challenged the unified western subject, it did not subscribe to the domination of the rational ego and its work on the self. Aesthetics saw in art a possibility of personal growth through a different relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, between sensuous particulars and universals, through a suspension of will and desire in play. As the later Foucault wrote, there is no universal subject, “the subject is constituted through practices of subjectification, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation”; elsewhere he said: “the transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience.”

7. This was not simply subjectivity, ‘individual feeling’ as it is sometimes described. The Enlightenment opened up a new dimension of subjectivity which was a distinct way of responding to the experience of modernity. Aesthetic Art is not just about individual ‘feelings’ but provides a particular kind of knowledge about the world. This is very important for the justifications for cultural policy which we will discuss in the next two chapters.

8. Just as importantly, art is not only a different way of seeing but also a way of seeing what might have been. The ‘sensorium different to that of domination’ also allowed it to see ‘reality’ as produced by this domination. That is, to see this as one particular reality along with all those possible worlds lay buried within it. This was how Walter Benjamin interpreted the promise of art, that it allowed us to think history ‘against the grain’, that that which is might have been different – and might be still.
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27 Indeed, in some ways ‘art worlds’ represent a form of those embedded economies marked by the specific socio-political and cultural realities of the locality.


32 Alex Ross (2006) The Rest is Noise: Listening to The Twentieth Century New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux


40 Jacques Ranciere Aesthetics and its Discontents, op.cit. p. 27

41 Ibid p.29

42 Ibid p.30


46 Foucault quoted in Andrew Bowie op.cit. p. 13

47 Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with this development

Chapter 4

Arts policy: nation building, mass culture and modernism

Nation building

What we now term ‘cultural policy’ was for a long time ‘arts policy’. The shift from ‘art’ to ‘culture’ relates to disputes around the privileged position of the arts in respect to culture – popular culture, commercial culture, everyday culture – which were launched from the late 1950s onwards. We shall discuss this in more detail later. But the fact that the main emphasis of public policy was on financial support for ‘the arts’ should not hide the fact that such policies were part of a wider system of public intervention that we would now call cultural policy.

We saw in section one how the civic humanist tradition presented art as part of the free development of civil society, and how this fed into the educational vision of the emerging nation-states. Mathew Arnold and his heirs saw this aesthetic education as being about the development of the self – what Michel Foucault called ‘the work of the self on the self’, a particularly modern form of power59. Alongside historians who have shown how the middle classes attempted to define public culture in ways that served their own interests for distinction, there are others who have shown how culture was used as a ‘softer’ tool in the civilization of the new industrial masses. Seed and Wolff showed how 19th century Manchester used a range of cultural institutions – parks, libraries, galleries and concert venues – alongside the statistical and disciplinary forms of control that evolved in the 19th century city56. We have also suggested that the claims of art were also registered in the new working classes amongst autodidacts, mechanics institutes, workers education associations, Ruskin collages, and a range of social reformers. These groups made claim to the promise of art, and to return it to its roots in an equitable social world. This ‘social democratic’ idea, of claiming the rightful inheritance of all for culture rather than its being locked up in the elite, has and continues to be a very powerful strand of policy thinking.

Imagined communities

The civic humanist tradition had a pragmatic idealist mix (‘we must educate our future masters’) that has been disputed since; was it power-sharing or just co-option? But its civilizing project was linked to a more functional, raison d’État approach of nation building in the late 19th century. The mobilization of populations – what Foucault has called ‘biopolitics’ – involved many aspects, but the ‘invention’ of national traditions and symbols of ‘imagined’ communities were a key part of this58. The arts played a role here, but so too did the emerging mass media – the newspapers and magazines, popular songs, postcards and posters. This more direct use of the media – as opposed to the techniques of aesthetic subjectivity – moved to the fore from WW1. The ‘mobilization of the masses’ by the state was inextricably linked to the emergence of new media technologies – film, newspapers, radio – which allowed new forms of mass address. Such potential power suggested an importance that could not be left to the humanists, and state media policy becomes both a new policy object and (partly) separated from humanist institutions. It thus in part threatened the control of an established ‘knowledge class’ over cultural values and legitimation.

Despite this the grand narratives of the nation, the ‘invention of tradition’ and shared symbols of these ‘imagined communities’, whether in social democratic or ‘race and nation’ terms, drew heavily on a notion of art and artists as privileged expressions of national cultures. This derives from Herder’s notion of historical change having its roots in the spirit of a people, ‘culture’ as an organic historical growth medium. The individual genius was never the pure individual creator; they were the expression, often unconscious, of the deeper aspirations of history and the soul of the people. In republican France the genius spoke for the inarticulate people. This is not the place to examine this; the point is that individual artists often presented themselves as voice of the people, and a place where the people could find their greatness reflected. In this sense the national art tradition and the national artist acquired great importance in the last years of the 19th century. The plenitude of the work of art reflected the fullness or potential of the people, which could have social democratic, conservative and radical right wing political consequences; all had difficulties with ‘rootless’ modernism.

Most of these grand narratives were in operation as post-war western states set up their various culture ministries, arts councils, heritage boards and cultural foundations. In these grand narratives ‘the arts’ played a crucial though complicated role; historical monuments and (to a lesser extent) folk culture aside, it was the arts which carried the most privileged national storytelling responsibilities and received the bulk of the state’s attention. The arts became directly financed and central to humanist education, national solidarity and its ‘patrimony’. These grand narratives were undermined from two different directions.
Markets and commercial popular culture

The decision to set up public agencies to fund the arts was presented as the state became a democratic ‘patron’ of the arts, preserving the old and commissioning the new in order to pursue and secure national culture (though within a wider universal humanist framework), often in quite conservative ways. But it also related to the antipathy of the arts to the utilitarianism and the market. In 1945 Keynes said in a radio broadcast:

“The exploitation and incidental destruction of the divine gift of the public entertainer by prostituting it to the purposes of financial gain is one of the worst crimes of present day capitalism”.

He added however that “how the state could play its proper part is hard to say”, also suggesting elsewhere that maybe this was pump-priming and the arts might eventually become self-sufficient. At any rate, he said, “we must learn by trial and error”. This is an important qualification for those who equate ‘the arts’ with public funding; public funding is a recent development and was begun with an open mind. Indeed, as Williams points out, it took Keynes (with his modernist, Bloomsbury background) to wrest the agenda of the Arts Council of Great Britain away form Merrie England to a broader vision.

“The task of an official body is not to teach or to censor, but to give courage, confidence and opportunity. Artists depend on the world they live in and spirit of the age...New work will spring up more abundantly in unexpected quarters and in unforeseen shapes when there is universal opportunity for contact with traditional and contemporary arts in their noblest forms”.

This was then ‘state patronage’ but it was also public funding akin to a ‘nationalisation’ of art. That is, to take it out of the lottery of the market, and at the same time to make it available to all. If for some it was preserving high culture in an ocean of ignorance, for others it was opening up the heritage of nation and humanity to all the people. The market, it is often forgotten, is predicated on the ability to pay; as with education and health, it was blamed for the locking up of art by those who could afford it. There was thus a strong re-distributive, social-democratic aspect, a sense of ‘fair play’, one which underpinned the popular support for the idea of ‘public service’. It continues to have strong resonances, paradoxically maybe more in art and culture than anywhere else.

But despite Keynes’ open mind there was another sense of ‘nationalisation’, not that of public service, nor quite of scarce resource or natural monopoly (though the great heritage institutions and collections might fit this), but that of ‘market failure’. Keynes’ tentative interventions against the market gradually became the main justification. As the new discipline of arts economics made clear by the mid-1960s, the traditional arts were becoming extremely expensive and faced enormous challenges in increasing productivity – they could not whack out more paintings or run five shows daily. The gains from mass reproduction were not available to traditional arts. It was either increased prices, more public funding, more philanthropy or the lights go out. In this context public funding acquired overtones of preservation that allowed the public service ethos to be deemed discharged purely by public subsidy, and its energies dissipated in disputes over how big (or small) the cake was and who got the largest slice. Finally, if it was legitimate in this context that those with the biggest overheads got the biggest slice (inevitably opera rather than, say, poetry), it was less legitimate to equate their activities with ‘the arts’ per se. But in many respects, who got public money became a de facto definition of ‘the arts’.
This logic was reinforced by the transformation of popular culture into what became known as the cultural industries. We saw above how in the 19th century art and entertainment became separated into two different markets, with the latter being subject to the laws of commodification much more rapidly and extensively than the former. The result was that popular culture became associated with market culture, and on that basis was deemed a degraded form of culture. However, it was the middle classes that sustained the market for artistic and entertainment goods in the 19th century: working class popular forms had limited profitability. This changed at the end of the 19th century through new levels of leisure and income but also through new technologies of reproduction. The markets for music hall and variety, popular theatre, dance music and popular song were limited by their restricted reproducibility. Sheet music and novel/newspaper/magazine publishing were exceptions. This changed with recorded music, film and later radio. It was radically transformed again with television in the 1950s. These became very large-scale industries driven by large and increasingly international markets. This presented a challenge to the arts’ pre-eminence in culture, and thus their qualification for public funding. It also presented a challenge to art as a central part of the nation-building narrative. First, nation-states were presented with a challenge to their monopoly of the new broadcast media. This monopoly could be classed as a strategic interest – the state must control a limited communication resource, as the BBC argued. But it also faced new powerful public figures and corporations – such as Lord Beaverbrook in Britain – who represented a challenge to the political class’ monopoly of the media and also to the existing configuration of the public sphere. Second it was also about content. The market meant that cultural commodities were subject to the laws of the commodity, and this meant (as we shall see) that in the search for profits, they often went against the state in ‘giving people what they want not what the state wants them to have’. This tension is still present – see the Murdoch press today! The association of the market with degraded popular culture then became a direct threat to the democratic humanist educative function of the arts, just as it seemed a more direct threat to the preeminence of art and ‘high’ culture. This presented problems for the social-democratic tradition, which could easily be forced into a position of defending ‘elite culture’ (though they denied it was that) by those in commercial popular culture. Cultural studies comes out of this. Third, the commanding heights of the cultural industries lay in America. For both nationalistic and social-democratic reasons (and these were of course closely intertwined) the fact that market driven popular culture was also American presented real problems.

It is for these reasons that post-war (sometimes pre-war) arts policy was also linked to a cultural or cultural industries policy: the active involvement of the state in the regulation and production of cultural industries. It did so mainly by substituting state organisations for the market, and by producing that which was deemed to be of a certain quality and of importance for the nation. These were derived from an aesthetic criteria, which as we saw had long intertwined with film, photography and music; but it was also a national aesthetic – privileged themes and forms which articulated a national culture. It should be noted that this did not preclude popular culture, and cultural industry policies and public broadcasting drew on a tradition of popular culture making which was not purely market driven. Justin Lewis, in his discussion of the founding of the Arts Council of Great Britain, shows how the state subsidy of popular entertainment during the war was very successful and popular. Its post-war abolition and the concentration on the arts program set the tone for the next decades: popular culture is equated with the market, and, unlike the arts, it was seen as able to survive purely on the basis of that market. It was a conceit that was barely challenged until the 1980s.

The avant-garde and modernism

The association of ‘art’ with the shock of the new, with rule-breaking and constant change is nowadays almost complete; it provides a key basis for its association with innovation via the creative industries. This is sometimes seen as raw creativity – or as puerile, deliberately obscure, or the result of a creative field struggle to be the next new thing. We have suggested that the dynamism of art derived from its lack of external determination, and also that it was increasingly a free floating practice; it cut against fixed meanings in complex interaction with the changes of modernity itself. Rather than pre-modern it was anti-traditional.
Andrew McNamara uses George Markos to suggest that traditional culture involves:

"the meaning-bearing and meaning transmitting aspect of human practices and their results, ‘the symbolic dimension of social events’ (Geertz) that allows individuals to live in a life-world, the interpretation of which they essentially share, and to act in ways that are mutually understandable to them”.

In addition, traditional cultural activities were “subordinate to pre-given, externally fixed social tasks” as well as “internally organised around determinate social occasions and situations addressed to some particular, restricted circle of recipients”. This notion would include Raymond Williams’ notion of culture ‘as a whole way of life’, the communities in which people live. It is also how Becker suggests that art worlds are used by social groups and individual artists to organize their working lives, to establish value and distribute tasks. It is also how the nation-state was conceived, as a symbolic community with shared values; art was used to express and to bind this sense of national community. However:

"Modernist cultural activities...are socially disembedded. They are not viewed as God-ordained, nor are they performed constituted in accordance with traditional expectations or rituals at specific times...or places...Modernity introduces and valorates the idea of cultural autonomy...The emphasis...switches to creativity as originality, to critical evaluation and the testing of assumptions, experiment or innovation, at the expense of the priority of precedence. This creativity in modernity is purportedly a remove from received standards or routines, which are traditionally regarded as normatively valid and culturally binding”.

We also saw that in modernity what counts as art is no longer fixed to specific forms and themes, it is both separate from and intersects with everyday life; the aesthetic object is a state of being which is in opposition to that of rational objectivity and moral imperative (it does not have a lesson). These put together make the art of modernity not just a site for the creation of class distinction or modern subjects but one of volatility and uncertainty, of opposition to fixed codes, morality, nation, and utility in general. This is why classes and states that used art were constantly caught out by modernism and disturbed by it. It could be used to épater les bourgeois, it could be used to make the autodidacts feel stupid, but it could also be used to challenge the grounds on which the status quo stood, the arrangement of things, the unitary subject of the modern nation-state and the quality of contemporary experience.

That is, modernism – central to the dynamics of the art world since the mid-19th century – could and did cut across the cultural policy uses to which it was put. This was very clearly recognized in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, neither of whose projects could recognize the autonomy of art – that it could have a specific form of knowledge legislated by itself. This antipathy, or at least ambivalence, was also evident in western countries where modernism was still a disputed form up to the 1970s.

Responses to modernism
One response was to see modern art as an irrational collapse or retreat from modernity – a refusal of social democracy or the class struggle, an abandonment of democracy by the bourgeoisie when it looked like it was slipping away from them. The standard Marxist line was that modernism was simply anti-democratic obscurantism. For the conservatives it was a rejection of artistic standards and social conventions and morality; it was the anti-social work of malcontents. More latterly, modernism has been presented as anti-democratic obscurantism, fuelled by knowledge class malcontents resentful of the rise of popular culture.

A second response was to bring modernism into the narrative of art we saw at the beginning: the history of art is one of an eternal value gradually freeing itself from all extrinsic determination by taking as its proper subject its own medium and material processes. This position is exemplified by Clement Greenberg. Though often over-simplified, his position came to represent a dominant modernist orthodoxy up to the 1980s. On the one hand it allowed a gradual accommodation between the more orthodox history of art and the modernist tradition. If Kenneth Clarke was still rather puzzled by it all in the 1969 BBC series Civilization, Robert Hughes’ 1980 BBC series Shock of the New presented a modernism that was now part of a common democratic cultural heritage. On the other, this position formulated an opposition between a ‘high art’ that was serenely pre-occupied by its own formal concerns and a mass commercial culture designated as kitsch.
In this sense modernism provided a critique of commercial culture by refusing easy identification and by deliberately disrupting the sense of an immediate access to reality given by mass culture and realist art. In kitsch you are not challenged, you find only yourself reflected; it becomes self-confirming, narcissistic. The designation *kitsch* is so easily associated with strategies of distinction and the derogation of popular taste that it is difficult to use today. But as we shall see, the opposition between modernist art and kitsch is one of the unacknowledged sources of the creative industries discourse. For Greenberg modernist art served a necessary political function by creating ‘movement’ in societies that would otherwise stagnate. Only high culture could do this; indeed only the part of high culture that was progressive, experimental and ahead of its time. Kitsch reproduced the world and viewers’ emotions so cleanly and realistically on its own surface that it spoke to audiences without stimulating any thought, change or perturbation. Kitsch wasn’t evil, but it was useless and could be apolitical and thus become dangerous.

A third response moves between the two above. The left modernism avant-garde position shared a concern with the first that to withdraw from the masses and the contemporary world was to fall into nihilism or simply ‘Sailing to Byzantium’. It suggested that the subjective, anti-social, ‘world apart’ version of modern art was politically and morally unacceptable. It was a view stretching back to Hegel and his search for a new practical social ethics, or Wagner’s rather more ambiguous version of founding a new aesthetic social order. This sentiment could be found in Ruskin and Morris, and the ‘arts and craft movement’, which reverberated across Europe and Australia in the last years of the 19th century.

On the other hand it looked to the formal techniques of modernism as new forms of perception, which could give a glimpse of a new possible world, a lived aesthetics of a new social order. Modernist aesthetics would respond to the needs of the masses and a new world that broke with the old. It eruputed in that modernism associated with the Bauhaus and the attempt to link art to the design for a new kind of living together. It was part of the modern movement in architecture and planning which looked to a radical re-design of the city in an age of the masses. It was found in the formal experiments of the Russian modernists, whose concern with their medium had a direct political intent – to design a new visual language for a revolutionary new mass society.

These did not follow either Lukacs or Greenberg into a rejection of the new technologies and forms of production associated with mass culture, but suggested that the new cultural industries of cinema and radio, new forms of print media, as well as other forms of mass production and transportation, all could be used in conjunction with new kinds of mass culture in a way that would re-invent both the artist and aesthetics in a new productivist manner. That is, they tried to establish a connection between mass culture, technology and the formal techniques of modernism in ways that would create a new contemporary art. This third position became very influential after its rediscovery in the 1960s and in the context of new technologies of the 1980s. Yet it said little about the market.

A fourth position had more to say about the market. Coming from left modernism Theodore Adorno saw the combination of new technologies and the totalising tendencies of Fascism, Soviet Communism and Western Democracy as leading to a catastrophic collapse of the critical separation between culture and economics. The combinations of technology and mass culture on which Benjamin and Brecht had looked positively, became not new forms of critical perception, but ways of controlling the masses. For Adorno, the Culture Industry completed the homogenisation process of the nation-state begun in the Enlightenment. The domination of human as of external nature was finalized by the abolition of the aesthetic resistance of the work of art. Acknowledging its deep implication in class society, Adorno nevertheless saw art as representing a critical space that was now being eroded. The form this resistance took was in some ways similar to Greenberg – the insistence of modernism’s formal properties, in pure adherence to the internal logic of the work of art – except that for Adorno the fact that it had to do so testified to the brutalized nature of the world. Not a sign of universal human creativity or a source of plenitude, its relentless negativity was a dark mirror of the catastrophe of the present.
John Holden more or less equates this take with ‘avant-gardism’ as a whole, and in turn dismisses its stance as ‘aristocratic’ and ‘snobbish’. He takes much evidence to this effect from Alex Ross’ survey of 20th century ‘classical’ music. In this book however, Adorno remains a towering presence, annoying and inspiring, in his articulation of the utopian promise of the art work. Most critiques of his work either pass on the absolutist stance of total negativity, or focus on his one-sided attacks on the culture industry. However, it is also important to note that his take on the culture industry informed European cultural policy and contributed to the disdainful attitude to popular culture we shall see in the next section, but it also contributed to an ‘idea’ of art as opposed to homogenisation: the “indivisible remainder” – that which cannot be absorbed within the system. This remnant became a main source of popular cultural energy in the 1960s.

For all these reasons, both commercial popular culture and the different dynamics of modernist art constantly destabilised arts and cultural policies. The situation we face now is the consequence of these two threats coming together in the 1960s.
Chapter 5

Pop culture, cultural industries, cultural studies

Cultural studies – from art to culture

The emergence in the late 1950s of what was to be known as ‘cultural studies’ has had a profound influence on arts and cultural policies – though this is hardly registered in writings on these, or indeed on creative industries61. In terms of our subject here its main impact has been to radically question the grounds on which judgments of artistic value have been made, and indeed to implicate such judgments in the ongoing reproduction of social inequality and oppression. Who has authority to judge; who is allowed a voice?

Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams - in two very different kinds of books published in 1957 and 1958 – suggested that art was only one aspect of a wider system of meanings, institutions and practices which we call “culture”62. Hoggart looked to working class culture to find a rich and varied set of everyday cultural practices. Williams’ took a more historical tack and showed how the ‘idea of culture’ in modern industrial society had been used to rethink and to challenge the fundamental direction and constitution of that society. Art might have provided a privileged site for this articulation, but it itself was only part of this wider reflection on culture and society, and indeed, was implicated in many of society’s self-deceptions and evasions. Hoggart not only suggested working class culture could be a valid object of study (and he comes from a line which includes Mass Observation, Picture Post, George Orwell and others) but also that, like Rose’s autodidacts, it bore the mark of the hidden injuries of art elitism63. Both of these books called for intellectuals, the ‘knowledge class’, to engage with those cultures they had so frequently dismissed or patronised. In a search for a ‘common culture’, the ‘long dominative mode’ of thinking about culture, as well as blanket caricatures such as ‘mass culture’, had to be abandoned, and new forms of listening and talking introduced that would valorise the experiences and aspirations of those excluded from power. Williams wrote:

“A culture in common, in our own day, will not be the simple all-in-all society of old dream. It will be a very complex organization, requiring continual adjustment and redrawing…this…difficulty is only soluble in a context of material community and the full democratic process” 64.

Williams, and later, Hoggart’s team at the Birmingham School of Contemporary Cultural Studies, would move towards that social critique of art we discussed at the beginning. Art was a form of material practice and to be understood as part of wider socio-cultural and economic processes. It was thus complicit with the inequalities of society as well as (sometimes) critical of them. The study of art within cultural studies then lay in its relationship to different social classes and groups, and thus became part of the wider study of ideology and ‘representation’. Cultural studies, through to the mid-1980s, was engaged in showing how various popular cultural forms symbolically mediated the interests or predicament of different social groups. To some extent art could be positioned as a particular ‘sub-culture’ were it not for its historically privileged association with power. It could not easily be welcomed into the club of ‘common culture’, and not just because of these continued accommodations with class and power – those involved in art worlds seemed to refuse the idea of their own socio-economic determination. For the later Williams the specific problem with art lay less in terms of its explicit content (for instance, the landscape art of Gainsborough naturalising the power of the gentry) than the structural refusal of a common materialist culture inherent in aesthetic art. The overall trend of modernist aesthetics, he argues in Keywords, is a drift to:

“isolated subjective sense activity as the basis of art and beauty as distinct…from social or cultural interpretations… an element in the divided modern consciousness of art and society … [where] aesthetic considerations … [were separated from] practical or utilitarian considerations”65.

This is the context in which Bourdieu was also writing in the 1960s. Distinction came out of a long series of investigations into how the working classes were excluded from the spaces of art which were, on the surface, free, democratic spaces. Echoing many in the arts funding establishment since, they seemed to be excluding themselves! The aesthetic disposition – the ability to appreciate something “for itself”, apart from its utility or its skill, or representational faithfulness – was something from which the working classes were excluded. Bourdieu’s powerful charges against the elitism of art is now a staple diet of cultural studies and used by those who don’t buy into his radical politics to attack middle class ‘cultural elitists’. However, there is a profound condescension towards the working classes in his work. As we have seen, Bourdieu sees the autonomy of art as an historical gain, something to be defended; it is just that the working class,
as the dominated class, are not yet ready for it, not yet capable of helping this defense. Equally, though aware that the creative field of autonomous art is the province of (a sub-sector of) the dominant class, he dismisses popular culture as completely determined by commercial objectives, mere production for the market to the exclusion of any other considerations65. Williams and Hoggart refused such a dismissal of popular culture, commercial or otherwise, establishing an engagement that has continued to mark cultural studies in Britain, Australia and North America.

As we suggested above, in the 1980s cultural studies, sociology and art history came together to argue that art was a material social practice, inevitably marked, though in complicated ways, by the social structures in which it was produced – in particular the capitalist division of labour and the production of ideology by the knowledge class. What then was the specific aesthetic experience, the pleasure or sensuous knowledge of art? This was often lost in accounts of its social functions. Janet Wolff’s comprehensive summary argued that the aesthetic disposition, to see something distinct from everyday life, from immediate use, was an historical phenomenon not an eternal quality pertaining to something universal called ‘art’. But what it was exactly needed more research66. Writing at the end of the decade Terry Eagleton saw the promise of romantic aesthetics as pure ideology, a substitute religion; it needed to connect with radical politics and the workers movement in a materialist aesthetics based on the artist as producer not as ineffable genius67.

Tony Bennett, in a more critical and positively angry reading, saw aesthetics as holding out a promise of redemption that was always deferred; a promise held to be embedded in the canon of great art which was in fact historically constructed, arbitrary and tautological: great art can be found in the canon and it’s in the canon because it’s great art. The ‘depth’ of the work of art was merely the reflection of what the critics want to put in it, an endless re-reading, and endless interrogation of ‘the text’. Why? The issue was certainly distinction, but it was also about the construction of the modern subject, the work of the self on the self which Foucault held to mark the organization of modern state power and the foundation of the system of modern education. Aesthetics, and the ideology of art, was dead. Its only meaning (illustrated for Bennett by its use on a hairdresser’s sign!) was now some form of sensuous pleasure or allure. Bennett’s anger stems from the disappearance of the eschatological view of history – that there will be some future reconciliation in which the promise of aesthetics is made good. After the collapse of communism it is not just Marx who goes out the window but Schiller as well. There is no longer any overblown aesthetic radicalism, no more revolutionary avant-gardes, only provisional moves within the cultural institutions in which we are all implicated68. Aesthetics, as he titles one of his chapters, is Really Useless ‘Knowledge’.

The redemptions, ideologies and disciplinary practices of aesthetics might have disappeared, but ‘pleasures’ remained. A common criticism of Bourdieu’s approach is that he ignored the specific qualities and pleasures of the artistic or cultural products being consumed. They were merely gambits in a game of distinction, adopted or dropped as their cultural capital value changed. In response his critics talked about the pleasures of cultural consumption, and their proliferation and hybridisation across class boundaries. It was with these complex pleasures and identifications that cultural studies began to engage in the 1990s. The issue was not just ‘who was being represented and by whom’ but what does representation actually mean, what identifications do we invest in it and what pleasures do we get from it. It began to draw on a series of French structuralist and post-structuralist theorists concerned with the specificity of language and discourse, speaking and reading, signs, images and simulacra, desire and the other. Many of these approaches had their origins in art theory or in philosophies that drew on radical critiques of the western ‘unified rational subject’ derived from modernist artistic practice and criticism. They were now applied to the multiple and multiplying forms of popular culture. Many of the concerns of aesthetics, suitably uncoupled from their romantic baggage, and dubbed ‘the politics of pleasure’ now landed centre stage in academic discussions of popular culture. Stuart Hall writing in 1992:

“Popular culture …is not at all, as we sometimes think of it, the arena where we find who we really are, the truth of our experience. It is an area that is profoundly mythic….It is there that we discover and play with the identifications of ourselves, where we are imagined, where we are represented.”69.
1960s: the expressive revolution

Jonathan Rose suggests 1920s Bohemia was closed to the working classes; bohemians could play with poverty in ways the working classes – conscious of real penury – might not. Eventually, they always had someone to pay their bills. Maybe so, but it was the values of bohemia that formed the real barrier. The untidiness that shocked some of Rose’s would-be bohemians brought up to see cleanliness as the sign of respectability, echoed the fact that to “drop out” (to use a sixties term) for the middle classes was different to that of the working classes. The former, though in real poverty, might have personal, social and cultural resources of self-respect and ‘respectability’ yet for the working classes dropping out meant falling through the social net into an unthinkable hell.

For the working classes art and culture meant ‘betterment’, which if it did not bring material reward, it did bring respect.

Rose goes on to suggest that since the sixties “we are all weekend bohemians now, patronising the ‘creative industries’”. Disposable income led not just to “washing machines and automobiles” but also to “fashion designers, interior decorators, artists, boutiques, rock entrepreneurs, experimental playwrights and trendy restaurants”. This results in a new market for cultural products whose turnover increases exponentially as the next new thing replaces the old. “Far from undermining capitalism, Bohemians are selling ever newer and more expensive products as status markers, thus ‘extending the distance between rich and poor’”. It turns out not to be everyone; it is “middle class youths... leftist academics and cultural entrepreneurs” who have adopted the distinction strategies of modernism (the next new obscure thing). The working class autodidact (“like the factories”) is left behind; his “Everyman’s library will be rendered obsolete by critics who insist that everyone must buy this year’s model of the literary canon, or else subject the old canon to increasingly opaque methods of interpretation”75. Moreover working class culture does not get state funding and they are systematically excluded from that which does.

This is a rather confused and mournful view of the sixties. It suggests that modernist art is the same as Bohemia; that Bohemia (and the counter-culture) is simply a new kind of consumerism; that this new consumerism is about social distinction; that the working classes only value traditional culture; and that working class notions of culture are excluded from, or a victim of, contemporary post-industrial culture. Though this strikes some chords – to which we will return – it is a nostalgic, conservative view of culture that retreats from the challenges set by Williams and Hoggart.

We can tell another story by suggesting a more positive encounter between popular and modernist culture with its ‘bohemian values’; that this was not about ‘distinction’ alone, nor empty consumerism; that it was not confined to ‘middle class youth’ and ‘leftist academics’, but part of a wider set of historical transformations in which the working class shared (if differentially); that there were many similarities between these ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ and those working class autodidacts that Rose and others oppose to these entrepreneurs.

We have tried to suggest that aesthetic art contained an injunction to ‘change life’; it was about self-development but also about founding a new life-in-common. Avant-garde and modernist art tried to implement this in a range of ways. It could uncouple art from everyday culture, but it did this so that the plenitude of art could be re-founded, re-established; it had to be made opaque, or sundered from easy representation and identification; or it had to be made purely in the form of negation. The rifts this set up between it and traditional art (and traditional conceptions of culture) could be read in terms of class – the metropolitan modernists against the middle brow autodidacts and suburbanites. But by the 1950s this was becoming more generational. Modernism, with or without the expansion of education, was becoming popular. The canon of avant-garde and modernist art was becoming more widely established, as was its narrative of misrecognition and suffering at the hands of the ignorant public. Its opacity held out a promise of hard won plenitude. It held out a promise of a different life, one which broke with an older way of living. Jazz, beat, pop art, abstract expressionism – all have to be understood as meeting points where older conceptions of art and life are transformed through encounters with new forms of popular culture. Some of these new conceptions emerged around the unconscious or de-centered subject, new attitudes to the body and sexuality, and a more tactile, immersive sense of communality. These could be found in popular culture, but they were also released from within the aesthetic tradition itself. It was in Bohemia that many of these early exchanges took place, building on the long history of experiments on the self. But they are also found in older avant-garde agendas of social transformation.
This account is most clear in rock and roll, which moved from a new ‘popular entertainment’ form to become emblematic of the transformations of western culture and society. Ian McDonald writes of The Beatles’ ‘turn off your mind, relax and float downstream’ (a quote from the Tibetan Book of the Dead), from Revolver that it signified the “pivotal moment” when the “free world’s coming generation rejected established wisdom, knowledge, ethics and behavior for a drug inspired relativism which has since undermined the intellectual foundations of western culture”71. This was not just rather wild exaggeration; it ignored the more obvious connections to an aesthetic romanticism familiar from Novalis. So too The Beach Boys’ elegy for a lost wholeness and innocence in Barbara from Pet Sounds. Or The Stones’ Sympathy for the Devil. Art schools in Britain and Australia were a crucial site of these exchanges and transformations, producing wave after wave of popular music, which mixed in the ideas of historical and contemporary avant-garde/modernist art and passed these to a new kind of audience. It is not just that popular culture picked up on avant-garde and modernism; it itself became in part avant-garde. The Velvet Underground and Warhol, Paul McCartney attending experimental concerts in London, Brian Ferry taught by Richard Hamilton – these are a few of the thousand such stories. The counter-culture is really “an avant-garde culture in the older sense of that term”, as Derek Scott wrote72. Which is not to say that it was not also something new.

Bernice Martin’s important 1981 book title charts the transfer of bohemian and avant-garde modernism into everyday culture via the counter-culture73. Her account emphasizes the themes of transgression of the rational self and social rules, along with the feeling of liminality, of stepping over a threshold into another world. They sought exstatis and commintas, the overcoming of self and the founding of a new world. Martin calls this the ‘expressive revolution’, which thus leads to a new kind of identity politics – that of individual self-constitution beyond the prescribed rules of social convention. Individual creativity is an expression of self, finding who you are in a private journey of exploration. For Martin and others it is deeply anti-social; two decades later this becomes an essential resource for economic productivity.

These avant-garde and counter-cultural themes were not just ‘expressive’, they were also new forms of knowledge. They were about understanding the self and the world in different ways, and their questioning of the economic-rational and administrative-functional view of the world had, as we have seen, a very long history. The creative and symbolic – ‘expressive’ – resources of identity construction were also resources for interventions into the world.

1968 is emblematic of a shift between a unified ‘left wing’ around the workers’ movement and the ‘single issue’ politics of today, often totally detached from (and sometimes opposed by) that movement. It has been seen as marking a separating out of the workers’ movement concerned with social justice and material redistribution from the new white collar workers or service class (especially young students) who were concerned with autonomy at work, and a general ‘non-alienated’ approach to work, career progression and life. However, these claims also occurred outside of work in terms of anti-urban development, collective consumer (health, public services), gender politics, sexuality, ecology and so on. In Getting Loose Sam Binkley argues that the counter-culture cannot just be seen as simply a new consumerism in the making; it expressed a wider sense of social change not restricted to material goods74. It was about personal growth and new forms of community – what Ronald Inglehart has called ‘post-materialist values’75. These were inextricably intertwined with new forms of, and attitudes to, ‘art’ and ‘popular culture’.

Binkley and others are right to try and place these changes in specific social groups at specific times and places. Bourdieu does this also, with his notion of the new middle classes, but he reduced it to the post-68 generation elevating popular culture into ‘art’ in order to displace the existing holders of cultural capital. Same old game. Many writers have charted the radical challenge to an older conception of cultural hierarchies, personal behavior, social codes and what ‘art’ was. Indeed, many on both the political right and left saw this challenge as the undoing of society. For the right it was about pure individuality; for the left it was a return to an irrational, decadent evasion of class struggle and a refusal of historical reason. Modernist art was still disputed amongst ‘leftish academics’ until the end of the 1980s. For many younger people their first encounter with Barthes, or Kristeva, or Foucault, or Bataille, or Baudrillard was not in a lecture room, but in the pages of the music press (a fact that shocked these theorists when they were informed).

Arts and creative industries: a historical overview 60
This was not an exclusive middle class thing. Punk and post-punk in the late 1970s and 80s represented an extension and intensification of these themes, often into darker waters in a way that mirrored much in the art world in which they were increasingly active participants. Though punk is portrayed as a reaction to de-industrialization, it was a protest against the old jobs as much as the lack of such in the present. Rimbaud’s ‘change life’ applied as much to Joy Division as it did to Dylan. Other forms of popular music cultures linked to the politics of desire and pleasure. ‘Pop’ itself became a form of delight to be set against the earnestness of rock; dance music set the body free against white men with guitars; the comunitas of rave encouraged a new form of temporary networked connections and a belief in a new being-in-common.

By the 1990s the attempt to link such genres to specific class sub-cultures no longer worked, and cultural studies gave up the attempt. It sought new forms of explanation derived from theorisations of pleasure, desire and identification based on post-national subjects, with multiple, temporary and contradictory identities, operating in a fragmented but highly networked social and cultural space.

Popular culture is no longer a stranger to the concerns of aesthetic art, and what this aesthetic might be has changed profoundly in the last fifty years. It is no longer possible to draw neat lines between them. This is a profound challenge to the public funding of the arts. William’s democratic culture is faced with the challenge: who is to say what is of more value than anything else?

**Art worlds and cultural industries**

Art worlds have had to confront commercial popular culture in new ways. Adorno’s newly coined term The Culture Industry was a monolithic system for the pacification of the workers, anticipating and manipulating their responses in ways that safely entertained them and led them to identify with the existing order\(^6\). This was predicated on the complete evacuation of the promise of art; its reduction to an industrial machine. Adorno was not so much talking about commercialisation so much as industrialisation, which is an important distinction because, as we saw, most art in the 19th century was produced for a market of the paying public.

There were a number of problems with this perspective. First, the notion of ‘mass culture’ was being challenged by academics in cultural studies and elsewhere, such as amongst journalists and authors in the counter-cultural and mainstream press, and by the growing evidence of its dynamism and diversity from the 1960s. Second, the culture industry itself was either being challenged or having to respond to this dynamism; popular music industry changed radically, Hollywood films incorporated the independents, radical theatre or ‘performance’ made inroads onto the commercial stage, and television and radio also became a prime site for staging the conflicts between traditional culture and ‘youth culture’. Third, the lines between the big ‘culture industries’ (film, TV and radio, publishing etc.), commercial popular culture (emerging fashion, music, design, publishing), youth/counter-cultures, and ‘the arts’ were increasingly permeable. Artists and entrepreneurs, critics and celebrities increasingly circulated through them all.

There were two sets of consequences, one for the notion of ‘culture industry’ and one for ‘the arts’.

**Culture industry**

A number of academics in France, Britain, North America and Australia, working in the fields of media and cultural studies (though they were often not called that) questioned Adorno’s model. One direction was to suggest that the ‘passive audience’ was not tenable, which has become a powerful strand within cultural and media studies. Another was to show how the machinations of the culture industry were much more ad hoc and contingent, operating in isolation from one another and from the authoritarian state deemed to be running the show. The field of study known as ‘political economy’ suggested that Adorno and ‘Mass Society’ theory was erroneous – not so much because the audience remained active and critical, on which there was a variety of opinions – but because it ignored the real dynamics of culture as a commodity.

Though they could and did have ‘ideological’ effects, cultural commodities were produced not by state propaganda departments but by capitalist companies seeking to make a profit. Cultural commodities had to sell. They had therefore to appeal to what people wanted; a certain ‘use value’ for the audience. What this ‘use value’ might be is the key question of contemporary culture – and indeed central to the concerns of aesthetics. But at this point it is clear that the
systems that organised the dispersed, mediated the everyday life-world as well as the symbolic or challenges the fixed symbolic boundaries of and where. It constantly interacts, or re-enforces what can be written, shown and played, and how, dynamic, constantly pushing the boundaries of commercial popular culture – was restless and should take place: this culture – both art and specify where and when certain symbolic actions and communities organised the life-world and with a set of shared codes within which individuals (which are assessed very differently amongst different groups) are involved in ‘use value’.

These ‘use values’ had to be turned into commodities that brought in profit. Because these were in the main ‘public goods’ – commodities not used up when they were “consumed” – ways had to be found of making sure their consumption was exchanged for money. Each different branch had different methods of monetizing its products: physical products (recorded music, books); or control of access (cinema; live performance) or free/cheap linked to advertising revenue (newspapers); or funded by the state or advertising revenue (TV and radio). There was not a culture industry but cultural industries. Rather than some department of propaganda their need for profits often went against law (censorship, relying on new technologies of copying) and/or challenged its social, cultural and political ethos. This was clearly the case from the 1960s; indeed, part of that ‘use value’ was to be seen to be in some way challenging, rebelling against, this social or political ethos.

This ‘use value’ was non-functional in the strict material sense – it did not perform a set of clear tasks, like a car or washing machine. But of course it did have a ‘function’. It might be for social distinction, or for identity building, or self-expression, or for ‘changing life’. The problem was that this ‘function’, or the object which might fulfill that function, was highly elusive and volatile. Its value was established within those complex symbolic circuits of society we call ‘culture’. And this culture was no longer just a traditional culture with a set of shared codes within which individuals and communities organised the life-world and specify where and when certain symbolic actions should take place: this culture – both art and commercial popular culture – was restless and dynamic, constantly pushing the boundaries of what can be written, shown and played, and how, and where. It constantly interacts, or re-enforces or challenges the fixed symbolic boundaries of the everyday life-world as well as the symbolic systems that organised the dispersed, mediated world of modern society.

If economic value derives from this cultural value, then it becomes an extremely difficult process to predict, manage and generate profit. Most products of the cultural industries fail; they are subsidised by the successes. There are now well-established forms of organising and stimulating consumer demand (genres, stars, sequels, formulas, back catalogues, special editions and the myriad approaches to marketing through the media), many of which were developed in the 19th century, Simon Frith has called this ‘rationalising the irrational’, which is not to say that that cultural choice is irrational, just that it does not follow the logic and form of neo-classical choice theory based on price and function. The ‘irrationality’ involves two things; the unpredictable preferences of the audience and the management of those charged with creating the products for this audience – the artists or ‘creatives’.

Another failing of Adorno’s Culture Industry thesis was that, in fact, these artists or creatives never became reduced to mere ‘factory hands’. Many were freelancers or operated as small business practices; even salaried workers had a high degree of autonomy. The ‘irrationality’ of managing highly skilled, highly motivated and often highly awkward (semi-) autonomous workers involved ‘tacit knowledge’ and know-how that had also begun to develop in the 19th century. The cultural industries were a series of ‘art worlds’ (Becker includes them in his definition), a complex mix of cultural, business and technological practices which had many similarities with ‘the arts’. Their ability to mass reproduce and distribute multiple copies meant that levels of capital investment and profitability were much bigger, and this introduced some distinctive dynamics into the process. As ‘art worlds’ they evolved ways to use creative labour in ways that suited them. The development of creative product (‘R&D’) was mostly done unpaid on the creative’s own time (whilst dreaming in the garret), and a ‘reserve army of unemployed’ artists kept wages down. But each branch (books, film, music, fashion, theatre, TV and so on) developed its own way of managing this with its range of intermediary services (dealers, A&R, agents), educational/training institutions, specialist press and media and so on.

Whether this represented an intrinsic conflict between capitalist profit and culture, or a particularly difficult business model based on the production of unknown value, these cultural
industries could not be dismissed as degraded market oriented culture. The fact that commercial cultural production represented the main source of cultural consumption for the majority of the population meant that they had to be taken very seriously. This had major implications for a democratic cultural policy, and it was mainly in this sense – art, culture or media policy – that the cultural industries were approached up to the 1990s.

‘The arts’
We suggested that public funding of the arts was only established fully in 1945, and its subsidy model rather tentative. We also suggested that as subsidy became more established (due to increasing expense), it tended to absorb the idea of public service, which focused on distributing the cake, and restricted the notion of art to ‘the arts’ that were subsidised. We also noted Keynes’ suggestion that the task of the Arts Council was “to give courage, confidence and opportunity…. New work will spring up more abundantly in unexpected quarters and in unforeseen shapes when there is universal opportunity for contact with traditional and contemporary arts in their noblest forms.” In 1981 Raymond Williams commented on this in ways that could sum up the general approach of the social-democratic discontent with existing arts funding arrangements. He suggested that the task set by Keynes was

“that of encouraging a serious, expanding and changing popular culture… [and it is here] that the whole question of the nature and purposes of art is being redefined, and that the key element of this redefinition is openness… But what is hardest to realize is that even traditional art changes when its audiences change, and that in the making of new art changing audiences are always a significant factor…Thus it is never only a quantitative extension or expansion of a culture. If we take seriously the idea of making art, as practice and as works, more accessible to more people, we have to accept and indeed welcome the fact that as part of these changes there will also be changes in the arts themselves”.

He adds: nobody who knows the history of art should fear these changes, and that there is more danger when art is “locked into courts and academies” or when “artists are pushed by neglect into isolation and there is no flow between them and a wide and diverse public”.

This position clearly links to the community arts movement as it developed from the 1960s which was a much more ambitious movement than the ‘social inclusion’ after-thoughts which characterises much of what we know as ‘community arts’ today. In it art moves out of the (middle class metropolitan) institutions and engages with popular culture – conceived as that ‘whole way of life’ of communities, not just commercial culture. In so doing it picked up ideas of ‘left modernism’, which, as we have seen, directly challenged both traditional aesthetics and that conception of modernism that separated itself from the concerns of everyday life. The engagement with popular culture – what in the 1920s and 30s had been called (in positive spirit) ‘the masses’ – transformed both traditional and contemporary art. In this sense ‘community art’ was also radical and experimental, responsive to the needs of that community; it wanted to transform the passive contemplative spectator of ‘bourgeois aesthetics’ into the active working class participant. Benjamin’s work on the new forms of perception in film, popular entertainment and in the modern city – montage, shock, interruption, non-identification – generally suggested a more active, tactile and ‘distracted’ form of engagement with art. It was a form of engagement linked to the modern city with its juxtapositions, its partial views and unexpected encounters – not the quiet auratic space of the museum.

Brecht’s work was seminal here, and especially his break from the artist-genius towards the ‘author as producer’, a more artisanal, collective and pragmatic approach to creating the artwork. It also began to engage with modern technology. One of the critiques of commercial popular culture in the 1930s and 40s was that it displaced more active and participatory forms of cultural activity by replacing them with cultural forms (such as Hollywood films or Broadway songs) produced a long way away – culturally and geographically – from local concerns. Brecht was clear that the freedom of the artist outside these new technologies was meaningless: “To say to the intellectual worker that he is free to renounce the new work tools is to assign him a freedom outside the production process”.

Community art then was not just about opening access to the working classes as Williams suggests, it involves a radical transformation of that “art” itself. But it also involves a new conception of the artist and the whole production process. What is more
explicit in Brecht is that this involves a more active engagement with both the technologies (an idea powerful in arts education) and the production values of commercial popular culture. Williams might be more circumspect about the big culture industries but community arts suggested that an engagement with popular culture and commercial popular culture was necessary and possible.

Williams argues that the attempt to take ‘the arts’ out of the market was a failure, and that was always going to be so; it is impossible to isolate them from the realities of a contemporary capitalist society. This is also clear amongst those writing from the social production of art perspective – how could they not be part of this society? On the one hand, Williams argued, governments would constantly pressure them to become more commercially viable and account for themselves in crude measures of profit and loss. On the other, the arts were used to promote tourism and lend their prestige – via sponsorship, advertising and ‘corporate’ entertainment – to the business world. For Williams, this cements metropolitan arts elitism and capitalism in ways that lock art up within a new kind of ‘court’; it leads to the underfunding of the regional and community arts activities. Williams was writing just before Myerscough’s work on the economic impact of the arts, where their ability to generate income and employment through tourism and hospitality are used as key justifications for funding (or ‘investment’), and before this became a crucial plank in the new concept of ‘arts led urban regeneration’.

Williams thought that the Art Council’s engagement with new forms of art and popular culture (conceived as an overlapping pair) was the only legitimate justification for public spending. In fact the 1980s saw a significant shift towards the economic justification of public spending on the arts. On the one hand, this resulted in the ‘economic impact’ justifications above, on the other it shifted the sense of public funding from public service to ‘welfare’. That is, the new confidence around the ‘free market’, which permeated political debates especially in the Anglo-Saxon world (and its spheres of influence), suggested that the only reason for public funding was ‘market failure’. The state stepped in because the market failed to provide for certain things – infrastructure, education and heritage – that were deemed socially necessary or desirable. This led to a certain defensiveness on the part of the publicly funded arts organisations who were; constantly tempering accounts of their positive contribution in order not to be asked to stand independent of public funding. Indeed, it could seem that ‘market failure’ was actually the failure of the arts to engage with the market. In this context public funding became ‘welfare’ in the new sense – a dispiriting dependence on handouts, which, in the end, did nobody any good. Part of the appeal of the cultural and then creative industries agenda, as we shall see, is that it seemed to suggest a way out of this impasse.

Williams opposed openness to popular culture, to a situation where art was locked up in the (corporate) “court” and “academy”; but he also opposed the situation where “artists are pushed by neglect into isolation and there is no flow between them and a wide and diverse public”. As Williams and many others had pointed out, both the source of this “isolation” and the dominant mechanism for the flow between artist and public was the market. What is missing in Williams’ account is how this engagement of art and popular culture is to be funded. If commercial considerations are disturbing, and if the trustees of the Art Council become short sighted and dependent on the powers that be, how is democratic public funding to work? Any vision of an open, democratic culture, many suggested, needed an engagement with commercial popular culture.

The cultural industries could not be easily dismissed as pure ideology or pure trash; many of the most innovative and dynamics aspects of popular culture were already deeply involved in this commercial world (at least, they were not state funded). Brecht had been aware of the disruptive energies of commercial culture: “the masses’ bad taste is rooted more deeply in reality than the intellectuals’ good taste”. For him it also represented a form of collective production which had positive potentials: “it is the essence of capitalism and not something generally valid that ‘unique’ and ‘special’ artifacts can only be produced by individuals and collectives only bring forth standardized mass commodities”. Cultural production had to mobilise collective resources in which creation was a collaborative process. Outside of the Soviet block such mobilisation had to be done through the market, even if the state was paying. And ultimately this state-funded production had to legitimate itself in terms of its public benefit and find ways of responding to audience need. In both of these the market was unavoidable. The nature of this ‘market’ and this ‘collective’ or ‘public’ is, however, disputed territory.
Cultural industries, post-Fordism and public policy

Corporate culture

If art is autonomous and opposed to debased commercial culture then the clear task of arts policy is to defend this autonomy, mainly through funding. Since the 1980s such a characterisation of commercial popular culture was not so easy in Australia or Britain (and decreasingly so in other parts of Europe), and the sanctity of the individual creative artist had, as we saw, been repeatedly challenged by art history and cultural studies. Nevertheless, the (relative) autonomy of the artist or the creative process was not to be dismissed especially as a growing ‘neo-liberalism’ and cultural studies populism positioned such claims as leftist elitism. Williams had suggested that whilst in the 19th century the artist had dealt as individuals with the market via intermediaries (dealers, publishers etc.), in the 20th century the dominant trend was towards the ‘corporate professional’, where artists were employed to execute the ideas of the corporate entity. In this sense the erosion of creative autonomy could only result in a corporate-inspired culture.

Bill Ryan’s 1992 account was one of a growing number looking at how ‘creatives’ are managed within large scale corporate entities. Ryan traces in meticulous detail how creatives are “handled” by producers who tend to know the cultural field, but have to work within a wider context set by the accountants and the requirements of the marketing department. Without reducing a complex account too harshly, there is a sense that the authentic use value of culture is gradually shaped and groomed into the capitalist exchange value of a marketing driven enterprise. Much of this is undeniable. However, if one of the difficulties of such enterprises is that cultural value – as what sells – is unpredictable, then simply setting creatives a task to execute does not get at the full complexities of the process. It also does not explain why some great work comes out of these enterprises (as well as lots of rubbish). Becker’s rather sanguine view of the art worlds does point to all sorts of constraining factors which set these enterprises within wider worlds of codes and conventions, accepted practices, reputation, press and media criticism, and the wider cultural dynamics of the market itself. Negotiations around the autonomy of the creative does not just involve the immediate creative workers but involves wider issues for the company – its forms of creative management, its internal culture and its external reputation – that also have an impact on its future employees and audiences. That is, ‘corporate culture’ is constrained in all sorts of complex ways by the nature of its product; it has to be aware of the large cultural dynamics within which its products gain value and the complex ways in which its management of creative input and audience perception of this, affect these values.

As such, large cultural corporations are part of the wider system of the ‘social production of culture’. They rely on many forms of publicly funded input, from educational and training institutions, regulatory and legal enforcements, and from wider inputs in the form of environments conducive to sustaining a ‘creative class’. They also form part of that public sphere which emerged at the end of the 18th century, that is crucial to the openness of that ‘culture in common’ with which cultural policy is concerned. It is in this sense that cultural industries policies are public policies, and it is why they are contested policies. They are always going to involve political, economic as well as cultural interests.

As public policy, cultural policy has to confront ‘market failure’ in a rather different sense: that markets themselves fail or become dysfunctional. They have tendencies to monopoly and agglomeration of which Adam Smith was fully aware. The huge financial stakes in the large cultural industries can make ‘creative autonomy’ a threat to be managed. Directly addressing Bourdieu, Nicholas Garnham wrote:

[7]he dominant fraction [of the dominant class] cannot safely leave the cultural field to be shaped by the interstatus group competition between subsets of the dominated fraction, since the reproduction of their economic capital now depends directly upon both the costs of production and the size of the markets for symbolic goods.

Cultural industries policy has not just been about nation building but also about concerns over the openness of the public sphere. Habermas’ work on the subject was sparked by his concern over how these large corporations were now able to dominate this sphere. Cultural industries policies attempted to set such market failures (distortions) within a mixed economy of state and market, ensuring competition and transparency. With this ambition the stakes of national identity, social democratic openness, strategic media control and increasing national market share have been mixed together.
In response, the 1980s and 90s saw waves of deregulation and globalisation as part of a concerted economic expansion of international corporations against (though sometimes with) local states. These directly challenged the legitimacy of nation-state interventions in the cultural industries. First, there was an ever more forceful ‘free trade’ argument, driven by the World Trade Organisation, World Bank and institutions associated with the ‘Washington Consensus’, which suggested that globalisation could not make exception for cultural goods. Second, technological developments (satellite, fibre optic, internet) alongside the internationalisation of finance and corporate law allowed new levels of global distribution and cross platform ownership. Third, the legitimacy of ‘nation building’ was being challenged across the political spectrum; there was no longer a singular national identity but multiple cultures, multiple identities, many of which have crossed borders and disrupted traditional national narratives. Fourth, cultural studies had strongly challenged the claims of art to provide some privileged access to the essence of national culture, or that they represented universal values to that all sections of society could (or should) subscribe.

For all these reasons, at a time when the authority of nation-states over their own ‘cultural territory’ was being challenged by globalisation, there was growing dissensus around the desirability and feasibility of a cultural policy aimed at promoting ‘national content’. On what grounds could such be identified let alone promoted? By the 1990s governments became increasingly unsure about the grounds of intervention into the cultural industries. By default they began to focus on the ‘industry’ component – how to defend and enhance the competitiveness of national cultural industries as economic entities. By default they began to focus on the ‘industry’ component – how to defend and enhance the competitiveness of national cultural industries as economic entities. However, the promotion of national cultural industries was always to some extent a cultural as well as economic policy; local-national production, it was believed, would ensure locally relevant content. Yet the grounds for this became elusive, and the economic justification increasingly did service for the uncertainty of the cultural politics.

However, this situation was complicated by the emergence of a non-corporate cultural industries sector in which issues of market and culture, both local and global, took on a different hue.

**Post-Fordism and the creative entrepreneur**

The intermingling of art worlds and popular culture in the 1970s and 80s often took place on the peripheries of corporate structures. It received little direct arts funding but thrived within marginal economies dependent on different kinds of public funding and small-scale local markets. These included work in community arts education and facilities, occasional work for the large arts institutions, and informal activity around student unions, university and other post-school educational institutions. Welfare payments were also important. So too were small ‘alternative’ retail, local design work, and the informal economies of the music industry. All these made up a motley economy of independent cultural producers operating in marginal areas of cities.

In the 1980s and 90s these sorts of activities began to intertwine with the activities of larger cultural industries, as in-house employment increasingly gave way to the use of freelance and small business input. This was part of a general shift towards sub-contracting and outsourcing, a response to the new post-70s market fragmentation and unpredictability known as ‘flexible specialisation’ or ‘post-Fordism’. The proliferation of niche markets and the volatility of demand called for the kind of flexibility and responsiveness that had been long established in the cultural industries. It is for this reason that Lash and Urry, in 1994, suggested that the cultural industries were no longer a hangover, a remnant of an older artisanal economy, but a harbinger of the new. They were now cutting edge.

What became clear in the 1980s was that much of the employment in the cultural industries sector consisted of freelancers and small businesses, and they occupied similar social and cultural spaces as the arts. This suggested that cultural production, conceived at its widest, was occurring outside the arts funding system, that it was not opposed to the arts but intersected within them in all sorts of ways, and that it was producing culture within the market but not dominated by the maximisation of profit.
A new cultural policy vision

1981: Greater London Council

It was to this area of the cultural industries that the Greater London Council, in part following experiments in France and Italy, applied itself between 1981 and 1986. Its approach grew out of that desire for a democratic cultural policy we saw with Williams, where art and popular culture would encounter each other. But it did so by building on that political economy insight that most cultural goods were carried by the market. It also suggested that it was the small scale cultural producers who were the most dynamic, that they were embedded in and articulated local cultures, and that they were exploited by the big corporations which controlled distribution and access to markets. The GLC took two lines on this.

First was the attempt to support producers by training and giving access to production facilities, either through publicly financed facilities or through financing co-ops and community arts facilities. The impact on subsequent local economic and cultural strategies was high. It represented an attempt to break out of a cultural policy centred on ‘the arts’, or rather those activities that had established themselves as ‘the arts’ for the purposes of public funding. But in widening their view they were also forced to move beyond the reliance on direct subsidies to artists and producing institutions as the foundation of that policy. They began to address the conditions of the commercial production of culture using economic and statistical tools (e.g. value-chains, employment mapping), focusing on how the sector as a whole worked as an integrated system – including those crucial commercial and technical ‘non-creative’ activities essential to art worlds. As such it represented an ‘industrial’ approach to cultural policy, in the sense that it addressed the complex division of labour and markets involved in the social production of culture. Such an approach also suggested an approach to cultural policy, which used economic means to achieve cultural ends. This had always been so in cultural industries policies at a national level – through the regulation and state financing of large cultural industries – but its application to the local level introduced new dynamics and complexities.

The second line of approach was a new focus on the role of the market at the consumption end. A crucial point made by Garnham, who was involved in these initiatives, was that art and the market were not inimical to each other – the market can be a relatively efficient way of allocating resources and reflecting choice. Public policy can and should use the market as a way to distribute cultural goods and services – and to do so in a way that follows audience demand rather than the ambitions of the producers themselves. Garnham’s focus was not primarily on local production strategies but on developing a democratic cultural policy based on an educated and informed audience demand to which publicly owned distribution companies and cultural producers alike could respond. Garnham was clear that the possibilities for cultural consumption were limited by income, time and competition from other activities; cultural goods, public or private, were in competition with each other and the market was an important mechanism of selection.

Creative Nation

The 1994 Labour Government’s Creative Nation policy statement extended the rethinking of arts into cultural policy from a local to a national level. It drew on modernising currents within the Australian Labour Party who were responding – like many other social-democratic labour parties – to the political challenge from the civil rights, anti-war, feminist and ecological movements of the 1970s. Arguably, however, its most immediate trigger was the role the cultural lobby had played in the election of Labour – its efforts deemed to have assisted it in winning the ‘unwinnable’ election of 1993. Strands of thought that can be clearly discerned in Creative Nation included a much warmer embrace of popular culture than any policies had shown previously. It evoked a diverse popular culture counter-posed to elite conceptions of art. Some saw it as inflected with a complex anti-colonialism in which ‘art’ had been associated with the civilising mission of the mother-country and the impossible aspiration to become ‘just like them’. It was complex because inflected through the question of indigenous culture which positioned white Australia as themselves colonisers. Whilst the GLC experiment certainly had its own complex internally focused ‘anti-imperialism’ it could never articulate this as a national vision. Creative Nation attempted this and remains the touchstone for an ambitious reorientation of the future trajectory of Australia in the 21st century.

Creative Nation also resonated with the growing critique of the arts establishment, finally provided with a national funding body protected by Act of Parliament in 1968. The rapid growth of Australian cultural studies and critical cultural policy studies
from the 1970s onwards gave a combative edge to this critique that was to continue through the ‘culture wars’ of the John Howard government years. But from the perspective of this report, it was the recognition that an inclusive Australian culture had to include not only indigenous (and indeed other non-western) cultures but also commercial popular culture. The work of Australian based scholars – John Frow, Tony Bennett, Graeme Turner, Meagan Morris, Stuart Cunningham, Colin Mercer, Gay Hawkins to name but a few – gave the notion of cultural industries the same kind of positive charge found around the GLC.

In the years around Creative Nation Australia led the Anglophone debates around both the theory and practice of cultural policy. The national vision of a diverse and open culture which seriously attempted to go beyond a traditional arts policy was accompanied by the development of urban cultural industries policies which Conservative Britain made increasingly difficult. It is clear that Creative Nation fed directly into the new cultural policy vision being developed for (what was to become) New Labour by Chris Smith and others. It might be that the term ‘creative’ was the source for the re-named creative industries of 1998.

A new role for markets
The GLC and Creative Nation visions were in their different ways social-democratic attempts to re-assert the role of markets in the face of Soviet top-down planning, as well as the Fordist/Keynesian industrial agglomeration policies of the 1960s and 70s. It also distinguished itself from the free market theories coming from the USA and adopted by Margaret Thatcher; markets were not universal laws but tools that could be adapted and used. These debates formed the backdrop against which cultural policy debates in the last two decades evolved.

The debate around state and market became more ideologically polarised, but on the other the precise nature of markets became more complicated. Although the idea of ‘free market’ had become very powerful, at the same time economists, historians and geographers were suggesting that neo-classical economists had got it wrong. Market economies were not located in some Newtonian space where force is equally distributed and universally the same; economic space was lumpy, uneven, has different dynamics and tendencies in different places. Markets were embedded; they linked with local cultures, histories and institutional structures.

This coincided with a widespread re-assertion of the important implications of local history and identity (or ‘path-dependency’) for economic development. Thus alongside globalisation went an assertion of local economic possibilities that used markets strongly embedded in local socio-cultural contexts.

A new creative habitus
These tendencies could be seen above all in local cultural economies. The absolute opposition to the market, marked classic bohemian culture, was giving way to a more flexible approach. Independent cultural producers were acting in ways akin to small business entrepreneurs; they were self-employed and looked to take advantage of niche, emerging, fleeting markets. But they were distinguished by their cultural motivations. The impulse we identified as emerging in the 1960s – to change life, to break the 9-5, to engage in creative and meaningful work, to be your own boss, to be autonomous – became increasingly operative in the context of these new kinds of ‘post-Fordist’, fragmented, dispersed economies. Making a living in the new art/popular culture worlds involved a complex mix of formal and informally acquired creative skills, as well as an ability to mix business and cultural considerations.

As Oakley and Leadbeater suggested in 2000, these cultural entrepreneurs operate not as heroic individuals but within complex networks of interdependence. These networks do not have simply economic and technical functions; these complex collectives facilitate the creation of economic and cultural value. And they do so in non-linear ways – they take us beyond the simple value-chain. Their concern is not with the neo-classical price-use mechanism, but with the creation of unknown values, of things people do not yet know they want; that is, of new markets. In this sense they intersect with funded artists who also try to get in touch with audiences and to present them with something of unknown value. In many respects artists and ‘creatives’ are working in that same space of unknown value. “What will audiences/markets respond to?” is a question answered by an immersion in a ‘creative field’, knowledge acquired not just at the rational analytical level but through an intuitive grasp of possibilities which Bourdieu described as learning to inhabit a subjective position (habitus) from the inside.
Creative clusters

These local ‘clusters’ (as they became known in the 1990s) provided economies of scale in specialized skilled labour, and they also circulated local tacit knowledge or ‘know-how’. In this sense they formed in part with localised economic systems identified by economic geographers and historians. But as producers of cultural goods their activities were also seen as expressive of place, the sorts of knowledge they mobilised was that produced within, and at the same time reflecting or mediating, local cultures. This very deep connection of cultural industries to cultures of place provided the basis for a convergence between local economic and cultural policy from the late 1980s, at the moment when such a link was being challenged at national level.

These local clusters or ‘ecosystems’ were crucial to the operations of larger cultural companies. We saw above how (despite Adorno) freelance labour had always been the norm in the cultural industries, and even as Williams was writing of the age of the ‘corporate professional’, the small and micro-enterprise sector continued to grow. In an age of volatile and fragmented markets, it made sense for the basic ‘R&D’ to be left to these ecosystems. The big companies and dispersed micro-sector operated in symbiosis. But these local ecosystems, these ‘art worlds’, were creative fields organized around money, aesthetic and ethical/social economies in mutual tension. They were not just driven by money motives; they were also regulated by judgments of aesthetic value. As with Becker’s account, there were complex systems of formal and informal judgment – from peers, from the media, from industry bodies and awards, from educational institutions, from politicians – within which artistic/creative reputation and self-respect were constructed. Equally, there were ethical/social judgments concerning business practice, abuse of trust, personal behavior (to staff and partners, for example) etc, which Mark Banks called ‘moral economies’. These aesthetic and ethical/social (which could also be political) economies were very much at play in the creative industries, as especially within the small and micro-sectors. They were not structured simplistically around the opposition of art and money, as in Bourdieu, but they produced complex systems of value that cannot be reduced to ‘the market’ in the sense of price/profit maximisation.

How these creative ecosystems structure local and global, formal and tacit knowledge, and organise the financial, aesthetic and ethical/social systems of value are still in the process of being understood. But that these ecosystems involve the publicly funded arts, as well as the creative industries, is now well established. The global creative industry capitals are, for the most part, art capitals. There are art capitals, which do not have creative industries, and vice versa, but they do not figure in the top tier of cultural capitals. Currin’s updating of Becker in her account of the ‘Warhol’ economy of art, music and fashion in New York gives some indication of the complexity of this ecosystem, where nightclubs and institutions of cultural modernism occupy key positions on this circulation of value.

Conclusion

The GLC experiment remained only that, and Creative Nation was quickly eclipsed by a new right-wing government. But they both gave rise to three new policy strands in the next decade.

1. They underlined a shift from ‘arts’ policy to ‘cultural’ policy – an attempt to register the difference Williams had made between the arts as a specific set of practices and culture ‘as a whole way of life’. But culture as a ‘whole way of life’ was ambiguous; although it included the meaning systems and practices of a whole social world – the anthropological sense – it was used primarily to assert the claims of ‘popular culture’ against the arts. Popular culture became all those commercial and amateur practices associated with cultural consumption and leisure, and previously excluded by the arts. Cultural policy for local government thus became an expanded sphere of leisure provision in which ‘the arts’ were but one subsection, a particular niche, in a democratic diversity of possibility. This glossed over the fact that the arts often accounted for the bulk of local expenditure (especially galleries, museums and concert halls), but also that the arts continued to receive funding based on claims to a preeminent status within culture. The arts remained the unacknowledged primus inter pares within this new democratic culture. It is this ambiguity that much of cultural studies addressed in the 1990s, exposing the lack of clear legitimacy for the pre-eminence of ‘art’ and the interests associated with this. We return to this in the next chapter.
2. They introduced a concern with the economics of culture into cultural policies. Cultural economics began to take off as a distinct discipline in the 1960s; national governments, as we saw, had taken more note of the economic dynamics of cultural industries, and this extended to the European Union level from the 1980s. In the late 1980s cities also became more interested in understanding arts and cultural activities as economic activities. Statistical surveys and audits, along with economic models such as value chains, became much more widespread. By the end of the 1990s in the UK they became near statutory policy instruments. The motivations for such studies were both economic and cultural, in the way described for the GLC and Creative Nation. Understanding value chains, gaps in infrastructure, market structures and so on, would allow intervention and support to promote a local arts and cultural sector which would also have direct employment benefits. However, these two elements did not always sit together nicely. The range of economic benefits expanded to include tourism, city marketing and urban regeneration which would often cut against the local cultural sectors they sought to promote. In particular, the economic benefits of the arts and cultural industries were recouped much quicker through their linkage to iconic buildings and real estate than they were by longer-term cultural industrial growth.

3. It became increasingly hard to distinguish between economic and cultural benefits in any traditional sense. The contribution of arts and culture to city image were of course measurable in tourist spending and inward investment, and these became classic justifications of arts spending from the 1980s onwards. They were also the site of much conflict over what was real ‘local’ culture and the impact of ‘yuppies’ and ‘gentrification’, which have re-emerged around the ideas of Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’89. But at a deeper level there was a hope that the arts and cultural industries sector, embodying cutting edge cultural and entrepreneurial energy, could enhance the wider dynamism of the local economy. The ‘creative city’ idea saw a vibrant arts and cultural economy as a key element of an intelligent, future oriented urban vision, but it also emphasised the anthropological idea of culture. Culture as a whole way of (urban) life becomes a resource for the city. Indeed, as de-industrialisation set in many Australian, European and North America cities, this local cultural capacity – education, attitude, history and social structure – became seen as a crucial competitive factor. In the early 1990s these various capacities were to be wrapped up in the term ‘creativity’, and it with this new resource that the cultural industries were to re-connect with national cultural and economic policy.
Though the following discussion refers to the academic discipline of cultural studies, the later sections will suggest that these were part of a wider transformation in attitudes towards art and culture.


Raymond Williams (1975) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: Fontana. Both McNamara (2009) and Ranciere (2009) point out that such complaints have been coterminous with the emergence of aesthetics at the end of the 18th century.


Janet Wolff (1983) op. cit.

Terry Eagleton (1990) op. cit.

Both McNamara (2009) and Ranciere (2009) point out that such complaints have been coterminous with the emergence of aesthetics at the end of the 18th century.


Janet Wolff (1983) op. cit.

Terry Eagleton (1990) op. cit.


Jonathan Rose (2002) op. cit. All quotes p.461


Derek B. Scott (2008) Sounds of the Metropolis op.cit p. 218


Both Quotes from Owen Hatherley (2009) op. cit. p.108


Chapter 6
Creative industries and art

Creativity
At the moment when the notion of ‘artistic genius’ was being thrown out by art history and cultural studies, ‘creativity’ was being presented as a new, universal, resource for economies and societies. Sarah Selwood points out that in a review of UK arts policies in the 1980s the word creativity was not used.

Kate Oakley suggests that it was not used as an abstract noun until 1933; others put it earlier. In this sense, the debate can get rather arcane. ‘Creativity’ gained traction within professional disciplines early in the 20th century in educational theory and psychology, drawing on models of artistic practice and perception to suggest different forms of learning and understanding from those of ‘linear’ rationalist thinking. Much of writing has traced the word across other disciplines from management and HR, through to innovation economics and neuroscience. However, from our perspective of arts and creative industries, the notion is so central it is very easily overlooked.

First, human beings’ ability to create new things, to invent, to build has always been seen as one of their essential characteristics; though how this relationship between humans and the natural world and with other humans has been conceived and lived is very different in different societies. The power to create new things outside the measure set by God was something that emerged in Europe with the Renaissance. The foundations and consequences of man’s productivity and the bounds within in which it might be set (reason, morality, justice) were the starting point of the Enlightenment.

In many important senses ‘creativity’, as a universal quality of individuals and societies, has been the central focus of European philosophy, economics, politics and sociology for the last 300 years.

Second, the specific association of creative ability with artistic practice occurs in the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This is frequently seen as a ‘locking up’ of creativity within the artistic genius and thus in some ways an act of elitism. This notion is linked to the radical critique of aesthetics we have already discussed; that it makes art the realm of freedom and work the realm of necessity, acting as compensation for, and ideological masking of, the inequalities and injustices of capitalism and modern industrial society. However, we have suggested that art and aesthetics have also been about a manner of apprehending and acting on the world different to that of cognitive and moral reason. Art’s autonomy has sometimes been interpreted as a radical separation from social reality – ‘art for art’s sake’ – but has most consistently been associated with a space in which the world might be differently apprehended. And this has had tremendous social and political consequences. Art and aesthetics have been central to the understanding, critique and productivity of modernity itself.

Third, the fact that ‘creativity’ has gained wide currency in the last 20 years might suggest either that the artist’s vision has finally been taken seriously, or that a creativity monopolised by artists has now become a democratic right. But behind these lie bigger narratives about the transformation of work, of individual subjectivity and of social organisation, which in turn involve claims about collapse or folding of culture and economy into one another. Such assertions would radically challenge the claims of art and subsume them under a ‘creative industries’ capable of driving a new kind of economy.

Information Society
The work of Alvin Toffler and Daniel Bell in the 1970s suggested that the dominant trend in advanced economies was towards the production and management of information. In the 1980s it became widely accepted that competitiveness was to come not from prices but innovation, and as such ‘knowledge’ or ‘symbolic’ workers were positioned as central. Two aspects are important for us.

First, being competitive involved a cultural capacity – the ability to “process knowledge and manipulate symbols” in Manuel Castells’ phrase. At one level culture was being used in the sense of particular symbolic systems, such as science, mathematics, statistics and other forms of knowledge. But it was also used in the anthropological sense. The ability to be innovative meant not just manipulating existing codes but challenging the systemic rules themselves. ‘Creativity’ becomes this ability to work at the more innovative, rule-breaking end of the knowledge economy. This creative capacity relied not simply on creative individuals but on the wider social, economic and cultural structures within which they operated. For example, the famous contrast between Boston and Silicon Valley suggested that the former had rigid divisions between different social and economic sectors, whereas the latter had much more lateral connections. Indeed, it was the social and cultural ethos of California which was deemed to have allowed such radically innovative...
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and entrepreneurial success. Thus it was not just traditional indicators such as levels of schooling, transportation, R&D investment, or amenities that seemed decisive, but more subtle assessments of ‘weak social ties’, cultural attitudes, and openness to diverse social connections – the socio-economic configuration and culture as a ‘whole way of life’. Second, in the 1980s knowledge workers were seen as driven by job fulfillment, demanding of high levels of autonomy, and having wider ethical and political concerns that they brought to their jobs. This has clear overlap with cultural workers with whom they were increasingly associated. Indeed, by the later 1990s writers such as Richard Florida and John Howkins were placing all these knowledge workers together under the banner of ‘creative class’ and ‘creative economy’. The notion of ‘creativity’ then becomes part of the innovation system within knowledge intensive industries, located at the more ‘blue skies’ end of the spectrum. There is a lot of literature on how innovation and creativity relate, and how they can be managed. But creativity is used to refer to the kind of lateral, non-linear thinking associated with artistic and scientific practices when they operate at the limits of the established rules. Moreover, those involved in these processes were seen as achieving the kind of self-fulfillment and a level of autonomy previously associated with artistic labour.

Entrepreneurs as the new rebels

The ‘knowledge class’ was frequently attacked in cultural studies, which positioned it as elitist with respect to popular culture. At the same time, the idea was also associated with ‘corporatism’ and the planned economy by many on the political right. Indeed, though the ‘knowledge class’ had power, they (as with Bourdieu’s ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’) were never as powerful as the owners of economic capital. In the 1980s Schumpeter’s notion of the entrepreneur displaced the autonomous knowledge worker from the driving pole of innovation.

Schumpeter’s solution to Marx and Keynes’ critique of capitalism’s market failures (falling rates of profit as markets get saturated) was to suggest a periodic break with existing ways of doing things. Old markets and production structures would be shattered and new ones emerge out of the ruins in a process he called ‘creative destruction’. The key to this was not the state or corporate professionals but the maverick figure of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs don’t follow obvious profits but look for new products, new markets; if successful they shatter the existing arrangements, leading to short term economic turmoil resulting in new levels of growth. Schumpeter’s creative destruction has obvious affinities with a form of modernist artistic innovation – the avant-garde’s destruction of the old and clearing the ground for the new. Business and management literature in the 1970s began to equate the entrepreneur and the artistic rebel. Both broke the rules, worked outside their ‘comfort’ zone, trod paths at a tangent to the mainstream, and thought ‘outside the box’. Both thrived when ‘all that is solid melts into air’.

There were three consequences.

First, the agenda of ‘creativity’, which emerged in the 1990s used knowledge and information society discourses, but linked these more directly to that particular manner of dealing with this information/knowledge found amongst artists and cultural workers. Second, it shifted the emphasis from corporate professionals in the knowledge economy towards entrepreneurs and the SME sector. This was especially so when innovation within Internet and digital technology seemed to be driven by this latter sector (the ‘dot.com boom’ was key). Third, it made an association between the radical practice of both entrepreneurs and artists in such a way as to allow ‘creativity’ to be applicable to both.

As a result Florida’s ‘creative class’, Howkins’ ‘creative economy’ and, in 1998, the UK government’s ‘creative industries’ established themselves at the confluence of some powerful and evocative contemporary discourses. The richness or ambiguity of this notion of creativity could suggest that the different productivities of culture and economics, art and industry, which had seemed to take divergent paths at the end of the 18th century, were now headed for a reconciliation.
Creative industries

The associations between creative artist and creative entrepreneur – the entrepreneur as the new bohemian rebel – could remain merely suggestive. What made the difference was the very real growth in the size and significance of the cultural industries and those markets that relied on ‘aesthetic’ innovation.

We have already noted how in 1991 Lash and Urry had re-positioned clusters of small-scale cultural businesses as ‘cutting edge’. If post-Fordism demanded more flexibility and responsiveness to niche markets, and thus new levels of both hard and soft (intuitive, immersive knowledge) information, then those industries who increasingly dealt with non-functional, ‘unknown’ values such as the new service sector (also being renamed as the ‘experience economy’), and design-led manufacture should look to the cultural industries as a role model. Despite the glamour attached to these industries – which should not be discounted and which was not lost on policy makers – they exemplified the new resource of ‘creativity’ not because they were stuffed full of visionary artistic geniuses but because their skills and business practices were attuned to these new kinds of ‘cultural’ markets. They dealt in unknown values; that is, non-functional goods whose value was not set within neo-classical cost-price mechanisms. Those cultural industries, which sought to produce for this market, were highly dependent on feedback loops and non-linear production processes which had evolved from the art worlds and cultural markets of the 19th century and early 20th centuries.

However, the UK government’s definition of the creative industries was very different:

*those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property*.

This emphasis on creative individuals generating intellectual property moved away from the industrial, sectoral or ecosystem approach. It did so because it was concerned to focus on creativity as a universal, human resource that could be tapped. The information/knowledge society demanded creative individuals, and the creative industries involved such individuals par excellence. But it set the net too wide. The DCMS was, after all, a cultural policy body and its definition resulted in a fairly conventional list. It included ‘the arts’ and the classic cultural industries sector – adding design, fashion and, more controversially, parts of ‘software’ to these. But was science not creative, or other businesses; did not other sectors deal in intellectual property; did the production of intellectual property adequately describe the economic operations of all in the creative industries? The price paid for the re-branding of the creative industries was a lack of clarity as to their specificity. What did they do differently to science, or business services, or indeed the service sector generally; what was distinctive about cultural, or aesthetic, or artistic value? These are crucial questions and we will return to them in a moment.

The price was paid because the DCMS wanted to position what had been known as ‘the arts and cultural industries’ as economically important and cutting edge. They also plugged into other politically attractive discourses.

Creative work

First, the promotion of ubiquitous individual creativity suggested its democratisation – no longer was it just artists, careers in the creative industries were now to be made open to all. But equally ‘creativity’ was to be a value sought for amongst the workforce as a whole, who in turn could legitimately expect to exercise creativity in their jobs. What the creative industries idea did was to promise levels of autonomy and personal fulfilment at work which had been long associated with artistic work (or ‘creative labour’), but which had also been a demand of skilled and ‘knowledge workers’ since the 1960s. It took that part of the promise of art to ‘change life’ – to make work into free creative activity, meaningful rather than alienated – and linked it to a new kind of productivity centred on innovation.

Leaving aside for the moment the linkage of creativity and economic innovation, this emphasis on creative labour has brought a lot of criticism. First, it ignored the persistent low wages in the sector, the high levels of self-exploitation, and new kinds of ‘creative exploitation’, which go with the undoubted pleasures of cultural work. There is now far too much research on these effects to be dismissed by policy makers. When we add the increased routinisation of cultural work, and especially its links to international divisions of labour (the digital sectors in East Asia have close affinities with the most mundane factory work) then this becomes one of the most pressing themes in contemporary literature on this sector.
Second, it has been claimed that this promotion of the autonomous creative entrepreneurial individual has not only led to new kinds of workplace exploitation, but was also part of a wider shift in approaches to the labour market. These approaches involve the positioning of the individual as entirely responsible for her or his own fate; that formal training and a more entrepreneurial attitude to the self was the most appropriate way of ensuring labour market entry. Here the anthropological notion of ‘culture as a whole way of life’ becomes a way of shifting responsibility for economic and social failure onto individuals and communities themselves. The relation between this ‘disciplinary’ discourse of creativity and what has been called ‘the new cultural state’ is something that also needs to be registered in the creative industries debate.

Creative consumption
The logic of post-Fordism does not just lie in the nature of production but also in consumption. Just as Fordism was associated with mass consumption, post-Fordism was linked to niche markets and to the increased cultural components of goods. This has been seen as a shift from a first to a ‘second modernity’, where identity is no longer directly linked to class, group, occupation, ethnic group, etc., but is constructed by individuals themselves. This is part of that transformation of attitudes to the self discussed above; we now have no choice but to make choices and thus need to develop capacities to allow us to negotiate these. It is what the German Sociologist Ulrick Beck called ‘risk society’ – where those risks (as well as opportunities) are now set squarely on the shoulders of the individual. In the words of one recent Chinese blogger:

‘As opposed to given, organic, primordial identities, a lifestyle is an active choice about identity. The general historical movement has been away from given and secure identities and meaning determined by parentage, religion, and work toward moral relativism and meaning/identity unmoored, left increasingly to personal choice. Globalization accelerates this existential shift, which is both liberating and frightening. You are freer to choose larger parts of your own identity, but how exactly do you make that choice? How is one set of values better or more “true” than another?’

Much of this was being asked by the 18th century enlightenment philosophers, but crucial for us is that important aspects of that identity are now deemed to be constructed through consumption, and in particular the consumption of cultural goods. And not only artistic or cultural goods but also those objects and services which increasingly contain symbolic meanings or non-functional values. Mike Featherstone called this ‘the aesthetisisation of everyday life’; this might mean the construction of self as a work of art – a traditional concern of what might be called the ‘aesthete’ – but also the saturation of everyday life by symbolic consumption and the cultivation of one’s identity around this type of consumption.

There have been various ways of approaching these developments. Abraham Maslow’s 1943 ‘hierarchy of needs’ was frequently (mis-)used to show how, after having satisfied ‘basic safety needs’, ‘the needs of love, affection and belongingness’ and ‘the need for esteem’, society can now move on to satisfying the ‘need for self-actualisation’. This schema has been used to describe the historical progress of the consumer economy, with increasing prosperity leading to the search to satisfy higher needs. Leaving aside the objection that ‘self-actualisation’ seemed to be something that had been historically postponed until the economic boom of the 1950s (as opposed, for example, to the emergence of the earliest religious or symbolic acts, such as cave painting) its overwhelming use has been within marketing to promote non-essential, lifestyle or ‘identity’ consumption. But these ‘post-materialist values’ have paradoxically become associated with ‘up-market’ consumption of cultural goods whose primary value lies in their role as status markers. That is, they partake of that social system of distinction outlined by Pierre Bourdieu with the caveat that the traditional hierarchies of high art/popular culture are now attenuated to such a degree that the boundaries are looking rather weather-beaten.

It is in this sense that the counter-cultures and bohemias of the 1960s are charged not with challenging the system, but with contributing to its survival and growth through new forms of cultural consumption. As Jonathan Rose argued, the jostling of metropolitan urbanites for the next new thing resulted in highly niched markets and the inclusion of these (ex-) bohemians on the rich lists. Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘restricted production’, which had set art for the cognoscenti against mass production for money, now becomes the generator of extended niche production whose initial refusal of the mainstream is predicated on the consequent economic returns from the cultural...
capital accumulated by such a refusal. The circuit between cultural and economic capital is thus made more rapid, more extensive and forms a business model now central to capitalism itself.

**Culture-economics détente?**

The ‘elective affinity’ between capitalism and modernist art – their break with the past, their search for the endless new – was part of the 1980s critique of modernism, and art’s link with a new consumer economy was a defining aspect of ‘post-modernity’. Jonathan Rose’s ‘everybody is a weekend bohemian’ underscores this close link between modernism and consumer capitalism. As Lash and Lurry argued, we are surrounded by culture. In 1945, “what was mostly encountered in everyday life were material objects (goods) from the economic infrastructure....But in 2005, cultural objects are everywhere: as information, as communication, as branded products, as financial services, as media products, as transport and leisure services, cultural entities are no longer the exception: they are the rule”103.

Cultural consumption has not only accelerated but has increasingly marked the consumption of goods and services previously outside the arts and cultural industries. Adorno’s Culture Industry was about the production of homogeneity; for Lash and Lurry, the creative industries are about the production of difference. Traditional commodities are identical functional material objects; creative industries produce non-identical objects and services. Or as Andre Gorz put it:

“The commercial value (price) of the products was, then, to depend more on their non-measurable immaterial qualities than on their substantial utility (use-value). These immaterial qualities – style, novelty, brand prestige, scarcity, or ‘exclusiveness’ – were to confer on products a status comparable to that of art works. These latter have an intrinsic value; there is no scale by which a relation of equivalence or “true price” can be established between them. They are not, therefore, real commodities. Their price depends on their scarcity, on the reputation of the artist who made them, and the desire of the potential buyer. The incomparable immaterial qualities procure for the producing firm the equivalent of a monopoly and the possibility of deriving a rent from novelty, scarcity, or exclusivity”104.

For some this is not problematic – cultural consumption is now a part of identity and citizenship and adequately served by the market. This argument is given more force as the potential of home computing and the Internet have – it is claimed – eroded the gap between producer and consumer, between ‘the culture industry’ and everyday social life, between the professional expert and the amateur.

From this perspective, the triumph of creativity, which seemed like a validation of the artist after years of being positioned as marginal, turned out to be something rather different. Not only is everybody and every activity potentially creative, but ‘art’ – its productivity, its validation of difference, its concern with sensuous knowledge – seems dissolved in a ‘culture’ that is more or less indistinguishable from everyday life and, more importantly, from the economy. Indeed, it could be said that the dream of bringing art into life, associated with such as William Morris or the Bauhaus, has now been fulfilled. As such, whilst contemporary society needs ‘creatives’ – and we are all creatives now – it does not need artists. John Hartley, for example, sees the marginalisation of ‘art’ as one with the universalisation of creativity; its demise is both a victory for democracy and heralds the end of the elitist art-industry divide inaugurated by aesthetics and cultural policy105.

**Creative industries: for or against the arts?**

One strand of the creative industries discourse, then, positions the arts as minority and elitist. For the arts agencies this might suggest a crisis of legitimacy. Not only did ‘excellence’ in the arts run up against the universality of creativity, but also ‘market failure’, rather than a justification for subsidy, might in fact be a democratic judgement on art’s historical redundancy. In these circumstances, apart from a retreat to heritage (or ‘cultural infrastructure’), more pragmatic justifications of the arts as providing ‘R&D’ or other ‘inputs’ into the creative industries come to the fore.
Art, popular culture and the public sphere

These challenges to arts and cultural policy cannot be understood apart from a wider context in which not just cultural – but any ‘public interest’ arguments outside the market – have been made increasingly difficult. In 2001 Graeme Turner pointed to:

"the pre-eminence achieved by the institutions of business, by discourses of the economy, and by the broad deployment of the concept of the market as a strategy for social organisation. The alignment of these forces with a rationalising and globalising capitalism has proved almost irresistible. Free market economics represents itself as fundamentally democratic whilst it turns regulated environments into markets; the consumer benefit of proliferating choice is offered right across society as a means of closing down government services, demolishing regulatory structures, and minimising the commercially inhibitory effects of existing policy frameworks….this trend directly denies the point of having publicly funded cultural institutions at all."

In this context it has been easy to make the equation between popular culture as democratic citizenship and popular culture as market choice. Here the citizen and the consumer do not just overlap, they are the same thing. This idea is closely related to the debates around cultural value that emerged in cultural studies in the 1990s. If, as Gay Hawkins wrote categorically in 1993, the “primary function of discourses of value is social differentiation” and, as John Frow and Tony Bennett suggested at the same time, all judgements of value are related to the social interests of those (intellectuals) with the power (cultural capital) to make these: how could a cultural policy be possible?

John Frow also showed how relativism or ‘anything goes’ does not work either – on philosophical and, as above, on practical grounds. Disagreement implies some core-shared grounds around which the dispute takes place; incommensurability implies mutual ignorance/indifference and fragmentation. In the context of modern capitalist society however, one solution to this stands out. As Francoise Lyotard wrote in his foundational postmodernist text of 1979:

“[T]his realism of the ‘anything goes’ is in fact that of money; in the absence of aesthetic criteria, it remains possible and useful to assess the value of works of art according to the profits they yield. Such realism accommodates all tendencies, just as capital accommodates all ‘needs’, providing that the tendencies and needs have purchasing power. As for taste, there is no need to be delicate when one speculates or entertains oneself.”

What was a real quandary for some, therefore, was easily solved for others; the market was the only judge.

This was further complicated by the accelerated rejection by many of both the feasibility and desirability of a unified national culture, that other prop of cultural policy in both ‘nation-building’ and social democratic guises. The spread of globalised cultural markets, Graeme Turner argues, often resulted in “an enthusiastic advocacy for the vitality and democratic inclusivity of a wholly commercialised public sphere which markets its benefits without fear, favour, or regulatory inhibitions to citizens of all nations.” But even those who distinguish between capitalist globalisation and the other aspects of a ‘global citizenship’ made possible by increased mobility and the Internet, and who are aware of the illusions, injustices and exclusions of the nation-state, are faced with the old cultural studies question of a ‘common culture’.

*Given the fact (if this is conceded) of incommensurability between different regimes of value, and given the intense social interests that play around these fractures and asymmetries, how is it possible for judgements of value to be applied in the routine and everyday manner required by school and university curricula, by editorial decision-making, by decisions about arts funding and research funding, and about the exhibition of artefacts? What gets floor-space and wall-space in the museums and the gallery? What gets discussed in the arts pages of the newspapers and magazines?”
Cultural studies’ attempt to extend the range of the public sphere, to keep open the conversation with those so often excluded from it, has been the source of its vitality since Williams and Hoggart in the late 1950s. How ‘art’ and ‘mass culture’ have helped fix elitist, non-permeable lines between class cultures has been well documented. But as this too became orthodoxy, both Hoggart and Williams became anxious. Jonathon Rose tells us:

“Hoggart unfortunately lived long enough to hear an Oxford academic proclaim that ‘lavatorial graffiti are not to be distinguished in any qualitative way from the drawing of Rembrandt’ and a BBC executive declare ‘there is no longer art. There is only culture – of all kinds’. ‘Here the far left meets the slick entrepreneurs’, Hoggart sighed. ‘Some of our arguments come back to haunt us’”\(^{112}\).

The problem here is not just the value of art (which we will discuss in a moment), but also the very possibility of a common culture around which any such debate could take place. As Williams and Hoggart both strongly argued, this common culture was not the same as the market; indeed, the market – in the sense of the systematic and unending search for profit – was in many ways inimical to that common culture. As Gorz wrote, this search:

“forces firms to invent new needs and desires constantly, to confer a symbolic, social, erotic value on commodities, to spread a ‘consumer culture’ predicated on individualization, singularity, rivalry, and jealousy – in a word, on what I have elsewhere termed ‘anti-social socialization’\(^{113}\).

In this sense the search for a common culture is less now about cultural elitism than about finding a way beyond this ‘anti-social socialisation’ with which an expanded cultural consumption has now become intertwined. As Nick Couldry puts it:

“what is urgent now is not defending the full range of cultural production and consumption from elitist judgement (an old story), but defending the possibility of any shared site … for an emergent democratic politics”\(^{114}\).

The distinctiveness of art
We have suggested that from at least the 18th century ‘art’ became separated out from wider social and cultural practices. It became autonomous (self-legislating) from cognitive and practical reason, as well as operating with different dynamics and in different social times and places to ‘everyday culture’. We also suggested that whilst this has been accompanied by a range of elitist and ideological functions (the status of the new middle class, the idealist compensation for the inequalities and injustices of the world), it also had enormous potential for social and personal empowerment and transformation in the face of the given world.

We have also seen how cultural studies and the new art history had challenged the ‘transcendental’ view of artistic genius, rejecting some mysterious ‘creativity’ for a more socially grounded ‘cultural production’\(^{115}\). In the last decade a new kind of radical aesthetic thinking has emerged which accepts many of the critiques traditional aesthetics but insists on centrality of artistic creativity for human emancipation and its distinction from ‘everyday life’.

Raymond Williams, concerned like many to bring an idealising, transcendental art back to its real social conditions of production, was also aware of not reducing art to these conditions, or obliterating its radical potential.

“The attempt to distinguish ‘art’ from other, often closely related, practices is a quite extraordinarily important historical and social process. The attempt to distinguish ‘aesthetic’ from other kinds of attention and response is, as a historical and social process, perhaps even more important”\(^{116}\).

We saw with Bourdieu that this was a historical process but it should not be reduced to this process and dismissed. We also saw how ‘aesthetic art’ constantly penetrated into ‘everyday life’, and vice versa; in this sense it generated powerful impulses for individual and social transformation based on a specific way of apprehending the world, in a mode ‘different from that of domination’ as Ranciere put it.

For this reason many within cultural studies, following Williams, have been concerned not to dissolve the difference between art and culture, or to dismiss the vital and critical tradition which art and aesthetics represents. The nature of that aesthetic specificity has been subject to much debate; but despite the onslaughts of deconstructionist philosophy and critical cultural studies, aesthetics can no longer be equated with 19th century romantic aesthetics; things have moved on. Isobel Armstrong, from a critical feminist perspective, echoes Janet Wolff in arguing strongly for the distinction between art
and everyday culture if this everyday culture is defined purely in terms of consumption. But such a distinction cannot retreat into elitism or become a form of specialised value creation for the cultural economy. Following the American philosopher and educationist John Dewey, Armstrong argues for an inclusive notion of art that connects with everyday or popular culture. The question is how to combine art’s creative inclusiveness and its distinctiveness from the everyday, especially everyday consumption.

**The challenge of creative industries to art**

In this sense the connections between art and economy established within the idea of creative industries can be quite disruptive. The link is centred on the new productivity of ‘creativity’, which conflates two distinct meanings. First, the idea of ‘creative’ relates to innovation in general – a general capacity to invent, to improve, to enhance using more non-linear, ‘left of field’ approaches associated with the artist. Second, a much more specific account of the abilities required to work within a cultural economy that deals in non-functional goods. In this sense it foregrounds the production of novelty, of new kinds of ‘allure’, new kinds of desire, specifically associated with ‘aesthetic’ products.

From this perspective contemporary capitalism seeks, generates and exploits concrete differences, qualities not quantities, and manages eddies of desire and identification in ways previously associated with the work of the artist. This has been a source of the new economic centrality of culture and creativity, but it also made art’s claim to a radical critique or to a unique apprehension of the world difficult to sustain. In these terms there is little to suggest that ‘art’ is either a space of cultural reflection set apart from the logic of economy, or that it need do anything differently from any of the many other forms of creative or cultural activity which make up contemporary ‘social network markets’.

However, we might object that this reduces the productivity of art to innovation, novelty and difference, that it merely expresses and responds to individual subjective desires. We hope we have shown that art has certainly been about this – it has been disruptive and innovative and de-stabilising, as the art in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’. But that it has not just been about this. It produces the new within specific codes of collective social meaning, which it both accepts and challenges. Indeed, the ‘elective affinity’ of modernism and capitalist ‘creative destruction’ is something long recognised and resisted within art theory and practice. ‘The Shock of the New’ is no longer the defining characteristic of art, no matter how much the media wants it to be. Indeed, many have stressed its role in documentation, in preservation, in mourning, and in re-visiting the past which modern society leaves behind.

**Art as knowledge**

Our understandings of the kind of sensuous knowledge produced by art has been expanded and made more complex as notions of subjectivity and emotion, rationality and social power have shifted. But it is crucial to stress that art is about knowledge as well as expressivity, collective as well as individual meaning. As such art says things about the world, holds it to account in its particular ways. Many of those who have tried to isolate an ‘intrinsic value’ for art as opposed to social and economic values have fallen into the trap of associating ‘intrinsic’ with ‘individual’. John Holden, for example, sees the consumption of art as a purely personal affair, for its own ‘intrinsic’ sake. This is akin to John Carey’s idea that art is purely in the mind of its beholder and thus there can be no judgment of value. This has resonance with the identification of ‘creative industries’ with ‘expressive value’ or ‘identity’ or ‘experience’ goods. For Holden this is set against the ‘instrumental value’ of wider social impacts, but in fact it is precisely the economic and social that are so often at stake in the work of art.

Art is autonomous but it is also a deeply social act; it is not merely about individual subjective expression but makes claims to knowledge. Though undoubtedly the relation between individual and social here is problematic, this is a problematic that has marked aesthetic theory and practice from the beginning: how is the deeply subjective act of making meaning related to our wider life in common? Seeing the ‘intrinsic value’ of art as individual pleasure and identity construction, and its social value as ‘extrinsic’ is to misunderstand the last 250 years of aesthetic debate. Although Holden dismisses Adorno as an ‘aristos’, the German philosopher’s concerns with how the injustices of the world are registered at the very heart of aesthetic form indicate a concern with art as a form of collective knowledge which is frequently absent from this tradition of cultural policy analysis.
Indeed, without this notion of the collective and ‘objective’ dimension of art, the cultural studies reworking of popular culture as the free play of consumption and identities easily becomes an uncritical account of cultural consumption. And aesthetics becomes – as Tony Bennett suggested – a mere cipher for the surface allure on which these products base their appeal. Art becomes merely an input into the creative industries system – a method of working, a resource for images and ideas, the blue skies end of R&D. Greenberg’s opposition of avant-garde and kitsch – where the former challenges, and the latter confirms, the audience – is reworked into a schema where the former becomes R&D for new modes of identity confirmation. ‘Identity’ is assembled through choice across a range of niche products whose very refusal of initial identification gives them a distinct market edge.

On the other hand, using these collective and objective dimensions we might look again at the counter-culture. It certainly did lead to the rise of new forms of consumption, just as perhaps the later breed of punk bohemian entrepreneurs led to the creative workforce of today. But this was not all they were about. It was an attempt to challenge and rethink mass consumption, and to find new forms of community in a rapidly changing world. These are questions that are still with us. As the Chinese blogger continued:

“Yet lifestyle politics is not just about consumption. The concept of lifestyle extends beyond the pursuit of leisure and consumption practices to involve the expression of individual rights and a consciousness about the social responsibilities associated with a given lifestyle. It is about associating with a group or class of people in order to claim rights and recognition against the insecurities of contemporary, globalized society.”

In this sense we can make a connection – and it is not easy or straightforward – between the attempt to make value judgements in art and the attempt to question the values of our being together in society. As Williams said:

“The attempt to distinguish between good, bad, and indifferent work in specific practices is, when made in full seriousness and without the presumption of privileged classes and habits, an indispensable element of the central social process of conscious human production.”

If ‘creativity’ is not simply a form of aesthetic-technical input into product, it is also a reflection, a questioning of the ends of that economic growth and innovation.

**Art, popular culture and a ‘whole way of life’**

Here we encounter another issue. The use of culture as ‘a whole way of life’ is frequently opposed to ‘the arts’ as if this means popular culture per se, and in particular commercial popular culture. We have suggested that ‘popular culture’ – the commercial and voluntary production of symbolic artifacts – has long been intertwined with ‘aesthetic’ dimensions. The similarities and differences between an ‘art’ and a ‘popular culture’ aesthetic is something that has been buried between the opposition of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, or ‘depth’ versus ‘horizontal’ models. ‘That there are a range of times and places in which to value ‘light’ or ‘serious’ art, ‘surface’ and ‘depth, the transitory and the enduring, the celebratory ecstatic and the disturbingly opaque is a generally accepted part of contemporary culture. Mapping these onto ‘high art’ and ‘popular culture’ is no longer straightforwardly possible. Lines between good and bad are drawn in all these areas; so too judgments of when either is appropriate, if at all.

To dismiss the arts as merely one (expensive, subsidised) preference amongst all other consumer preferences is at the same time to refuse to extend artistic value to popular culture. But in fact the notion of ‘art’ and ‘artist’, of an aesthetic dimension distinct to the music, the writing, the image making, the computer game, is a persistent refrain in most reflections on popular culture. Creating such value is part of the sense of fulfilment and pleasure we discussed in terms of cultural work, that which makes a lot of hard work, low pay and exploitation bearable (most of the time). Unlike many in cultural studies, very few creative workers refuse the value of ‘art’ either to ‘the arts’ or to their own work.

A contemporary aesthetic where what were ‘popular’ and ‘high’ cultures intermingle – the encounter Williams and others before him looked forward to – is not just one in which all are reduced to a game of distinction through consumption. The idea of the cultural omnivore – one who appreciates hip hop and symphony concerts, baseball and gallery openings – has mostly been used to undermine Bourdieu’s fixed...
oppositions of high and low. But it might also work to open up a democratic space for contemporary culture in which we are not just “weekend bohemians” looking for the new consumption item, but the emotional, sensuous knowledge of art serves to bring into view the collective and individual transformations of which we are capable. It is in that spirit that the academic and Mercury Prize judge Simon Frith writes:

"Culture as transformation... must challenge experience, must be difficult, must be unpopular. There are, in short, political as well as sociological and aesthetic reasons for challenging populism. The problem is how to do this whilst appreciating the popular, taking it seriously on its own terms. [My own tastes are] for the unpopular popular, my own belief [is] that the “difficult” appeals through the traces it carries of another world in which it would be "easy". The utopian impulse, the negation of everyday life, the aesthetic impulse Adorno recognised in high art, must be part of low art too".

Conclusion

The idea of the creative industries can thus be used to suggest that art is elitist and/or merely (one) useful input into production. On the other hand, it can also be seen as part of an exciting encounter between popular culture, the cultural industries and ‘the arts’. There are four broad conclusions we might take from this second position.

1. **Art not ‘the arts’**

Art may not be the same as everyday culture, but it cannot be equated simply with what is currently funded as ‘the arts’ – with the traditional, pre-mass reproduction art forms. These traditional art worlds have grown up over centuries and have evolved a complex ecosystem of institutions, practices, validations and markets that carry a vital part of our common culture. They are increasingly expensive and resistant to the sorts of productivity gains available to art forms built on mechanical reproduction. And they are also permeable to new cultural currents, new interpretations and new technologies in ways that make them much more than the “already known” of heritage. They are part of contemporary culture not because they are ‘new’ but because they re-open our common past in the light of our current predicaments.

However, if art is more than ‘the arts’, if it is not opposed to ‘popular culture’, nor to some ‘other’ of commercial culture, then arts policy must inevitably engage with this broader spectrum of cultural activity, and a significant part of this will be under the heading of cultural or creative industries. This is more or less accepted by the policy heading of ‘arts and cultural policy’, but it is necessary to make this explicit. Too often popular culture is acknowledged in policy documents but the actual material support goes to ‘the arts’, leaving popular culture to the market. We will explore this more in the final chapter.

2. **Cultural and economic values are not the same**

The idea of the creative industries has frequently been used to suggest that there is no longer any conflict between cultural and economic value. But whilst the terms of this conflict have changed enormously in the last forty years, we have suggested that both ‘art’ and ‘popular culture’ contain values at variance to the maximisation of profit. Cultural producers constantly made distinctions between the values of ‘art’ or ‘culture’ and those of financial gain. Though working within markets, and even seeing themselves as ‘entrepreneurial’, creatives seek to ‘make a living’ not to pursue unlimited economic growth. Balancing the need to make a living with their wider creative aspirations involves a complex set of judgments, which make up the texture of the life of a creative entrepreneur.

Policy makers too, adding economic development tools to the growing repertoire of cultural policy instruments in the 1980s and ’90s, witnessed overlap between economic and cultural objectives – but also real conflicts. For example, the promotion of creative production by local cities has frequently led to rapid increases in property prices and a domination of the urban landscape by cultural consumption often run by international companies. What was often presented as a win-win scenario – where cultural and economic value would now walk hand in hand – was not always so. Though the creative industries were often presented as merely technical economic development policy questions, in this area like others, they involved cultural-political value-judgments.
3. Market failure includes the failure of markets

Creative industries policies are public policies – they involve a range of economic, cultural and social questions that make for complex policy making. This is made more difficult if economic growth is seen as the central objective; it not only ignores the cultural aspirations of the creative industries themselves, but also those individual and collective values within art and culture which rub against the economic imperative. ‘Market failure’ is not just about the failure of arts within the market, it is about the failures of the market itself; that is, the ways in which economic forces both provide for us but also undermine and cut against individuals and communities.

Leaving the creative industries to the market alone, merely providing for ‘the arts’, is not a democratic cultural policy. This is recognised at both national and local levels. National government is concerned with the quality of Australian television, publishing, film, music and so on; with how it expresses and challenges our values, as well as how it excites and inspires us. Local government is concerned with promoting local cultural production and consumption for cultural as well as economic reasons. The policy tools involved in this will be explored in the final chapter, but the principles on which interventions into the whole creative ecosystem are based also need to be spelled out in the face of purely economic justifications.

4. Common cultures

These principles involve common values and common cultures, and we have seen how these have been radically challenged in the last forty years. The pre-eminence of art within cultural policy; the authority of ‘experts’ and the ‘knowledge class’; the desirability of a ‘national culture’; the possibility of any public sphere to establish cultural value as other than an act of elitism: all these have raised crucial questions which have enormously enriched the debate. But, as we saw, they have frequently resulted in the (often unintended) outcome that the market itself – individual consumer preferences – becomes the only possible arbiter of cultural value. The notion of a unitary national culture whose ‘essence’ could be represented by certain emblematic art works or genres was only ever partially tenable; as we have tried to show this was always challenged across a broad spectrum stretching from high modernism to vulgar popular culture. Similarly the notion that cultural policy was about removing ‘art’ from the market place has also been challenged – most especially by that policy tradition which comes out of cultural studies. But it sought to extend the question of cultural value not to abolish it; to open up art to contemporary popular culture not dissolve it into ‘everyday life’; to engage with the realities and possibilities of markets, not become an engine of economic growth.

If this is to be the case not only must we have new policy instruments but – as Williams suggested in his review of the Arts Council of England thirty years ago – new kinds of democratic engagement about cultural policy and cultural value. On the one hand this points to new kinds of public engagement – as active and interactive audiences, as consumers, as markets. On the other, as John Holden has suggested, it requires a new kind of democratic input into the management of cultural policy making. But it also points to a leap in the evolution of cultural policy as a whole. We need not shy away from this.
98 A criticism acknowledged by the DCMS’ later use of term ‘creative economy’
102 Abraham Maslow (1943) A Theory of Human Motivation Psychological Review 50 pp. 370-396
108 John Frow op.cit p.154
110 This argument was made even easier with the emergence of the Internet, and claims that it undermined the big culture corporations which controlled access and distribution, and that everyone could be a creative producer and develop markets with like-minded people across the globe.
111 Graeme Turner (2001) op.cit p.194
112 Jonathan Rose (2001) op.cit. p. 366
113 André Gortz (2010) op.cit. p.8
120 Ying Zhu and Bruce Robinson op.cit.
121 Raymond Williams (1981) Culture op.cit. p. 126
123 John Holden,(2008) Democratic Culture: Opening up the arts to everyone. London: Demos
Chapter 7
Defining the arts and creative industries

The creative industries moment

As we suggested at the beginning, the questions we asked of the relations between the arts and creative industries were not just about technical definitions; neither ‘the arts’ nor ‘the creative industries’ is a straightforward term but involves some fundamental issues of contemporary economy, culture and society.

Creativity has become one of the most overused contemporary concepts and, like all such aspirational terms, it has lost much of its precise meaning. We have suggested that in this context it contained two senses. First, it was seen as a particular kind of inventiveness at the more innovative, rule-breaking/bending end of the spectrum, and it drew on certain non-linear, even non ‘rational’ ways of thinking and working traditionally associated with the artist. Second, as the specific set of knowledge and practices associated with the ‘creative’ sector who produce non-functional and thus ‘unknown’ goods and services for audiences/markets – ‘symbolic’ or ‘aesthetic’ inputs which also increasingly mark production outside the traditional cultural sector. The notion of ‘creativity’ as a key input into contemporary economic and social development conflates these senses – the growing general importance of creativity and the expansion of the creative/cultural industries – in ways that cause much conceptual confusion.

The UK’s Department of Culture, Media and Sport renamed the cultural industries as ‘creative industries’. It did so, according to the minister Chris Smith, for pragmatic reasons – to lever more money out of the economic departments of state. This pragmatism involved avoiding the word ‘culture’ (associated with ‘luxury’ consumption and public subsidy), a tactic which has been seized on by many lobbyists for the arts and creative industries ever since. It’s a move that has its risks, because it establishes a reliance on an economic justification, which is difficult to turn around. For many, indeed, the introduction of creative industries policy ideas is precisely about emphasising their economic importance. But the appeal of this new agenda was always broader than the purely economic.

Creativity, for many, carries the suggestion of a universal capacity available to everyone; an anti-elitism and a challenge to the experts in its democratisation of powers previously ascribed to the artist. Thus ‘creative’ has frequently been read as more democratic, more about popular culture, about easier access as opposed to the stuffy institutional worlds of ‘art and culture’. In many countries – Portugal, Brazil, Taiwan to name only a few – ‘creative industries’ has been adopted as a way of shaking up cultural establishments, of bringing a breath of fresh air. This echoes the liberating, optimistic elements of ‘Cool Britannia’ and indeed Creative Nation before it.

Even where it was welcomed primarily as a new economic agenda – policy makers gleefully removing it from its association with cultural value and planting it foursquare on the agenda of growth and innovation – it could still represent a popular challenge to the established or ‘elitist’ cultural order. And from the perspective of many new creative entrepreneurs these two aspects run together; creative industries gives them the space in which to make a living making new culture.

On the other hand, many academics continue to use the term cultural industries, arguing that ‘creative industries’ makes little sense and that ‘cultural value’ is precisely what marks this sector as distinct. This stance has proved difficult to sustain in the face both of its adoption by influential policy bodies and its widening currency. The term ‘creative industries’ may not be academically robust, but its associations resonate with fifty years of cultural studies and critical art history, as well as the growth and massively enhanced legitimacy of popular culture. As a result the term ‘creative industries’ has not only asserted the economic importance of this sector – an argument that in fact had been made from the 1970s onwards – but has frequently linked this to the ‘elitism’ or ‘marginality’ of the arts. In the light of those wider political trends towards a pronounced validation of the ‘laws of the market’ (chapter 6), this has tended to put justifications of the arts on the back foot.

A replacement for art?

This report has attempted to give due weight to these arguments: that art is rooted in wider social processes and structures; that it involves complex combinations of labour, capital and technology; that it has been implicated in processes of social distinction and exclusion; and that it has been linked with the ‘social technologies’ of nation building and newer forms of subject-construction. Finally, a range of social, cultural and economic developments has combined to suggest to many that ‘art’ is a historically redundant category.
Taking an historical approach, the report has attempted to show, however, that these issues have been part and parcel of debates on art since it emerged as a distinct set of knowledges and practices in the 18th century. ‘Art’ emerged as part of that wider set of transformations we know as ‘modernity’ – the rise of capitalism, modern technologies, modern cities, complex social structures, and the radical doubt associated with the uncoupling of social and individual meaning and morals from traditional and theocratic authority. The art of modernity contributes to the world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’, but it also looks beyond it. In particular it asserted a different kind of knowledge and a different kind of experience to that presented under the laws of scientific, economic and administrative rationality.

The radical attack on art and aesthetics that picked up momentum from the 1960s has indeed challenged and transformed how we talk about art and culture. However, this report has suggested on the one hand that the radical rejection of aesthetics – an account of the specific experience articulated by art – leaves only a vacuum into which purely political or economic rationality can step. In the last twenty years, the absolute authority of markets has frequently replaced the ‘elitism’ of art. Yet at the same time much of the critique and promise of ‘art’ has been embraced by popular culture and by wider sections of the population.

Some have argued that in this way art has not become redundant but in fact animates the most dynamic (i.e. profitable) elements of contemporary capitalism – we are all ‘weekend bohemians’ consuming the latest trends. This report suggests other ways of reading this; that the intertwining of art and popular culture has resulted in new forms for the articulation of modern experience that have moved beyond 18th/19th century aesthetics. But the latter’s concerns have not been erased; much of 20th century modernist culture actively sought to critique and transform these concerns, and its attempts continue to mark contemporary popular culture. Indeed, we might suggest that in many ways the traditional divide between art and popular culture is increasingly threadbare.

Art’s claims to legitimacy as a set of social practices and understandings worthy of public policy support do not therefore lie in their economic function, nor in their importance for individual consumption or ‘expression’, but in their ability to articulate a shared experience, a shared knowledge of that experience, which is more than that of abstract economic or political rationality.

In this sense, if ‘creative industries’ suggests an opening up of cultural participation (reception and production), a widening of focus beyond the big public and private organisations towards the dispersed and fragmented ecosystems of producers, consumers and citizens – then all well and good. But more frequently, just as ‘creativity’ draws on artistic practice but effaces the specific kinds of values and understandings involved with it, ‘creative industries’ draws on the allure of ‘art and culture’ but avoids the full weight of its historic challenges for contemporary society.

At stake for a contemporary creative industries policy is to acknowledge and understand the myriad connections between art and culture and wider socio-economic dynamics – but not to reduce them to it. Recent developments have certainly transformed the set of oppositions and tensions between ‘art’ and ‘industry’ that marked the industrial epoch, but they have not vanished as if some historical bad dream. Nor would anyone want them to.

Definitions

This report was prompted by a set of related definitional questions which we are now in a position to answer:

- What unifies the groups of industries collected together under the name creative industries?
- Are the arts a part of the creative industries per se?
- What are the inputs of the arts to the creative industries?
- Are they just a subsidised input to the creative industries?
Is ‘creativity’ the unifying factor?

The Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) famously used ‘creativity’ as the defining characteristic of all those industries:

“which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property”.

The problem with ‘creativity’ as a definitional tool is that it is far too wide: were not science, engineering, business services creative? John Howkins’ The Creative Economy was subtitled ‘how to make money from ideas’. He thus defined this creative economy in terms of intellectual property – patents, copyright, trademarks and designs. But like the ‘information’ or “knowledge society” this too would include science and other forms of R&D, as well as financial services, engineering, business services, tourism, the service sector and so on. And it was also clear that much of the creative industries did not trade in intellectual property. Many business to business services do not retain IP rights on the products to which they contribute; many creatives either do not chose to or are unable to enforce any rights that they might possess. Defining the sector in this way is thus reductive and inevitably favours the larger corporations who dominate the extraction of IP revenue.

In fact the DCMS articulated a rather traditional list of 13 sub-sectors which made up the creative industries, including ‘the arts’ and cultural industries (TV, radio, publishing, recorded music etc.) adding computer games, fashion and architecture (which were more or less included in most local authority lists). Only ‘software’ was new and it caused much controversy as it was unclear what it contained (bright young Gen Xs or routine programming drones?) and it over-inflated the employment figures for the sector. Though there have been a few modifications, this list has become more or less standard for the creative industries. The biggest omission by the DCMS was that of galleries, libraries, archives and museums (GLAM), and most surveys now include them – especially at a local level where these are often very big employers. Others have sought to add sport and tourism to this sector, but though used by some countries to inflate their cultural economy figures, there are usually distinctions made between the creative industries and these other sectors.

This list of the creative industries sector (including GLAM) has become standard; but what was specific to these that would differentiate them from other elements of Howkins’ ‘creative’ economy? The answer is that they are all involved in the production of goods and services with cultural value. But ‘cultural value’ can also be set very wide. At its most general it refers to products/services that gain their value from the meanings which we ascribe to them: traditions and customs, codes and beliefs, shared communal meanings and group identities, communicative practices and so on. In short a ‘whole way of life’. In this sense by far the most important cultural or creative industry is the education system, which accounts for huge amounts of government and private spending. Leaving this aside, there has also been a huge increase in the commercialisation of ‘everyday life’. Services and goods that used to be provided outside the market (caring for old people and kids, giving advice, preparing vegetables) are now big business, and many of these concern issues of ‘cultural meaning’. For example, ‘identity’ used to be a function of class, gender, and ethnicity, etc. – an ascribed social position; now, it is increasingly constructed through commercial ‘cultural’ consumption, and previously functional goods now build such cultural appeal into their products.

These issues will be discussed shortly; we suggest that in historical and contemporary debates the production of goods and services with cultural value refers, in a more restricted sense, to those cultural forms that have been associated with art and popular culture since the 18th century. That is: visual arts, music, books and magazines, performance, dance, film, records, radio broadcasts, TV and so on. In short, with those cultural practices of modernity which, though rooted in wider social practices are also distinct from them, having their own logic and autonomy. These practices have become crucial to our individual and collective sense of ourselves. They are also complex systems of production and consumption involving commercial markets, formal and informal institutions, and circuits of public opinion organised into ‘art worlds’ or ‘fields of cultural production’ or in more recent times, cultural or creative ‘industries’.

For many policy makers there was a great deal of uncertainty as to what ‘creativity’ was when it came to actually dealing with specific policy agendas. It was certainly a value to be promoted in education or management or across cities as a whole; how
did it relate to its prime constituency covered by those thirteen sub-headings? In 2006 the DCMS re-launched the idea of creative industries around the ‘creative economy programme’ and asked Observer editor and economist Will Hutton to produce a new definitional document, *Staying Ahead*. In trying to define more specifically what kind of value was produced by the sector, what set it apart from the wider ‘knowledge economy’, Hutton used the term ‘expressive value’.

*Staying Ahead* defines expressive value as ‘every dimension which…enlarges cultural meaning and understanding’. ‘Expressive’ clearly draws on the ‘artistic’ connotations of creativity and is part of culture understood as a shared public meaning system. Hutton endorses the Australian cultural economist David Throsby’s list of the different values associated with cultural value – ‘aesthetic, spiritual, social, historic, symbolic, and authentic’. This is the same list upon which John Holden drew to define the different dimensions of the ‘public value’ of culture. It is clear that ‘expressive’ value involves cultural values, the same cultural values as are also at stake in contemporary cultural policy.

These ‘expressive values’ are the basis for a range of major economic activities and thus a clear connection is implied between economic and cultural policy but these cultural values are also legitimate policy goals in their own right. How this is dealt with is not directly addressed in Hutton’s report – but there is a clear indication that support for the creative industries is done for economic and cultural reasons.

**Are ‘the arts’ part of the creative industries?**

If creative industries produce cultural value, then in a broad sense ‘the arts’ are obviously part of them. In that sense too ‘the arts’ cannot be an input – subsidised or otherwise – into the creative industries as they are already inside the creative industries. The question is what kinds of relationships exist within the creative industries. The sector is not homogenous, there are internal distinctions to be made. In policy terms this is crucial both for an understanding of the different dynamics and requirements of the sub-sectors, but also as to what policy body takes ownership and with what priorities.

Immediately after the introduction of the new term ‘creative industries’, policy agencies and consultants began to make distinctions within this sector because clearly the sector was not homogenous. Visual art, computer games, TV production, and fashion design: they did different things, they worked in different ways, they had different objectives, and they had different connections to different policy agendas. Under whose remit did they fall and what priorities – economic, cultural, and social – should be applied to them? Arts agencies, for example, wanted to push claims for their expertise in this newly important economic sector, but policy bodies responsible for economic development or innovation or IT policy wanted other parts for themselves. Thus a whole suite of terms came into existence; ‘creative and cultural sector’, ‘creative and digital’, ‘creative media’, ‘new media’ and so on, in which non-cultural agencies tried to separate the more ‘innovative’, ‘fast growth’ parts from the artistic and cultural (or, as one development agency termed it, ‘lifestyle’) ends of the spectrum.
One influential model for understanding the sector has been that of concentric circles, with a ‘creative (arts) core’ surrounded by the ‘cultural industries’ and then the ‘creative industries’. We can look at three influential versions of this as a way of pulling out some of the issues and more problematic conclusions drawn from this way of dividing up the sector.

David Throsby: Cultural Industries Sector.

Core Creative Arts: Music, Dance, Theatre, Literature, Visual Arts, Crafts, Video Art, Performance Art, Computer and Multimedia Art

Wider Cultural Industries: Book and Magazine Publishing; Television and Radio, Newspapers and Film

Related Cultural Industries: Advertising, Tourism, Architecture, Design, Fashion

Will Hutton: Staying Ahead.

Creative Core: all acts of original creation of expressive values.

Cultural Industries: commercialisation of expressive product (TV, Radio, Film, Music, Computer Games etc)

Creative Industries: combination of expressive and function values (architecture, advertising, fashion, design)

Wider Economy: expressive input into manufactured and service goods (Dyson, Virgin)

KEA: EU Cultural and Creative Sectors.

Core Arts Fields: Visual arts; Performing Arts; Heritage (Sub-sectors: crafts, painting, sculpture, photography)

Cultural Industries: Film and Video; TV and Radio; Videogames: Music; Books and Press (Sub-sectors: Recorded and Live music, Collecting Societies, Books and Magazine publishing)

Creative Industries: Design, Architecture, Advertising (Sub-sectors: fashion, graphic, interior and product design)

Related Industries: Manufactures of MP3s, PCs, Mobile Phones etc.

We thus have a confusing system whereby the creative industries can often become a sub-sector of ...the creative industries! But there are more difficult issues buried in these superficially similar models.

Mass reproduction?

KEA identified the core as ‘the arts’ in the traditional sense, and they are defined as “non-industrial activities”. ‘Non-industrial’ here can have two senses – non-commercial/subsidised, and not involving mass reproduction. Both of these are at play in the allocation of ‘recorded and live music’ to the ‘cultural industries’, characterised as “industrial sectors aimed at massive reproduction”. Here, then, we have an extremely conservative version of the creative arts, which associates these art forms with pre-mechanical reproduction art forms and non-commercial, subsidised activities.

There are certainly major new dynamics involved when technologies of mass reproduction opened up increased levels of profitability. Some cultural theorists and policy makers set the ‘uniqueness’ of traditional art products against the ‘industrialisation’ of mass reproduction, but this kind of technological-aesthetic binary, already challenged in the 1930s by such as Benjamin and Brecht, has very little contemporary credibility. The more telling critique was that mass reproduction held out the possibilities of high profits – and required expensive processes of production, artist selection and management, marketing, distribution and so on. That is, it was high levels of capitalisation rather than mass reproduction per se that marked these new cultural forms. We have shown, however, to refuse to allow these forms the status of ‘art’ is highly questionable. The notion of ‘mass reproduction’ ignored the complexities of production – organised around a mosaic of companies and freelancers, and driven by the need to produce new cultural value – and of consumption, which became increasingly literate as well as highly niched.

On the other hand, to suggest the arts are not a commercial ‘industry’ (in the sense we have used it here, as an economic sector) ignores their connections – through recording, film, radio and television, publishing and so on – to mass reproduction and, more importantly, mass distribution. The traditional arts certainly have a ‘live’ or ‘unique’ presence upon which they thrive and which to some extent restrict productivity gains, but they are no strangers to the possibilities these industries and technologies open to connect with a wider audience. The Internet has merely underlined this, but there are organisational innovations such as franchising, which have
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview

become huge money earners. Think of musicals and circuses, operating at global multi-troupe levels, for example, or the Tate, MOMA and Guggenheim brands. It is also to ignore the hugely profitable and highly prestigious sections of their own markets. Parts of the visual and performing arts are as internationally connected and as highly capitalised as many cultural industries. Their command of public subsidy also results in high levels of spending and influence – employing staff, setting the terms for artistic markets, altering urban profiles and landscapes. Even as publicly subsidised they are big business. Finally – and we shall return to this – the arts and cultural industries share skills and personnel, ideas and aspirations, and often the social spaces in which these circulate. Their ‘art worlds’ or ‘creative fields’ – those complex ecosystems of economic and cultural value creation that mark the traditional arts as well as the newer cultural forms – overlap and intermingle.

There are differences between these different art practices, and between them and the larger media companies with whom and for whom they often work. But it is simply not possible to separate ‘art’ from ‘live and recorded music’, or from a film, or TV mini-series, in such a way.

Art’s input into the cultural and creative industries

Creative core?

David Throsby has a ‘creative arts core’ which is “the locus of origin of creative ideas, and radiating outwards as those ideas become combined with more and more other inputs to produce a wider and wider range of products”131. This is echoed by Will Hutton’s ‘creative core’ whose “commercial outputs possess a high degree of expressive value and invoke copyright protection”. Hutton notes: “Importantly creation… should not be interpreted solely in terms of traditional artforms. The writing of computer software, the establishment of a 2.0 website or the evolution of a new character in a video game all belong here”133.

There are two problems with this. First, though inventing a new game character involves ‘expressive value’, it is not clear that writing a piece of software or establishing a website does. They might, yet there are websites and codes which could not be described as having ‘expressive’ or ‘cultural value’. Here Hutton is confusing ‘creative ideas’ in general (inventive, original, rule pushing) with creative cultural ideas.

This confusion relates to the second, bigger, problem. Hutton’s ‘creative core’ is not about industries per se but creative acts or inputs into cultural products. A new game character is certainly a creative input, but it would most likely be produced within a cultural industries company. Similarly musicians are placed at the creative core but music industries are in the cultural industries circle. What appears initially as a way of categorising different kinds of industries is here being used to identify different inputs or activities. Hutton’s model is a kind of value chain: from creation, to reproduction/commercialisation, to incorporation into functional product. In reality, those creatives in the creative core are actually employed throughout the various circles; they do not form a determinate set of industries in themselves133.

Hutton’s ‘cultural industries’ are those that focus “primarily or solely on the commercialisation of pure expressive value”. His creative core is thus distinguished from those industries that do the commercialisation; it is not a distinct set of industries, but merely the general source of ‘creative input’. As such Hutton’s model separates the creatives and the creative process from the industries in which they are set to work. Cultural industries are thus about the commercialisation – not the creation – of ‘pure expressive value’, just as ‘the arts’ – included in this core but nowhere else – can only be about pure expressivity not about commercialisation.

There are then severe shortcomings with this model. Not only does it mean that the arts cannot be an industry – just pure creativity – it presents creativity as providing the raw material subsequently ‘commercialised’ by the cultural industries. But as we noted above, these creatives are employed within the creative industries (directly salaried or as sub-contracted), and these industries actively commission, seek out, produce, co-develop – as such co-create – much of the content that they commercialise. This separation of a creative core from the industries, which is then commercialised, fails to register neither the real position of the arts nor the actual operation of the creative industries. The model might be accused of
suggesting an individual genius, rather than collaborative approach to creative production; it certainly ignores the active role of industry in the generation of that creative product, and consequently evades some of the very real conflicts between creative labour and the conditions in which it is put to work.

Compare this with Throsby. His ‘core creative arts’ – suitably expanded to include contemporary forms of digital/on-digital practices – are industries not just “creative input”.

“Each of these art forms on its own can be regarded as an industry, and is frequently referred to as such, although such a usage usually embraces more than just the original producers.... [T]he ‘music industry refers to an enormous range of participants, including composers, performers, publishers, record companies, distributors, promoters, retailers, collecting societies and so on”¹³¹.

That is, Throsby’s core identifies a group of industries that centre on the creative arts. In this sense they might be seen precisely as that extension of the traditional arts to embrace new forms of contemporary popular culture to which Williams and others looked. There seems no reason why computer games might not fall within this sector. The creative arts core therefore includes the traditionally state subsided arts and those more commercial sectors which rarely receive such funding.

**Cultural industries as partially non-cultural?**

Throsby’s designation of the ‘core creative arts’ as a distinct set of industries is thus much more useful than KEA or Staying Ahead. Throsby then goes on to distinguish between the ‘core creative arts’ and the ‘cultural industries’ on the grounds, not of industrialisation, commercialisation or mass reproduction (all of which can exist within these creative arts industries), but according to the proportion of ‘primarily cultural goods and services’ they produce. Thus book and magazine publishing, television and radio, newspapers and so on are cultural industries because they mix cultural commodities with the ‘non-cultural’. But Throsby’s distinction is not entirely clear. Television or newspapers provide cultural and non-cultural commodities. What might this non-cultural commodity be? On the one hand this could be those information and communication services which characterise ‘the media’. That is, they are non-cultural in the aesthetic sense but they are part of that circulation of information, knowledge and opinion – the media - which is central to the workings of complex modern societies, including that ‘public sphere’ which – as we saw in chapter 1 – grew up with them. They are also – as we saw in chapter 2 – central to the creation of economic and cultural value within ‘art worlds’.

For this reason both the ‘aesthetic-cultural’ and the ‘media-cultural’ are both legitimately part of cultural policy though, as we noted, these have been historically split into a distinct policy areas (art as opposed to broadcasting, communications, media, etc.). This is not spelled out by Throsby: his ‘non-cultural’ can easily fall into an older division between art and ‘entertainment’.

Throsby places film within ‘cultural industries’ but he expresses uncertainty.

“Some would place film clearly in the core arts group, others would see it falling into the media and entertainment category; in reality a division into types of film would be required to assign sectors of the film industry into one category or another”¹³¹.

Here the grounds seem not to be that film produces ‘non-cultural’ content (in the sense we use it above – maybe documentaries, or current affairs) but that it also produces ‘entertainment’. In what sense is entertainment ‘non-cultural’? The suggestion of a case by case basis indicates that this is a qualitative category in which judgements of ‘art’ or ‘entertainment’ establish a line between the ‘cultural’ and the ‘non-cultural’. One of the most powerful thrusts of cultural studies has been that art/entertainment is either not a tenable distinction, or one that requires high levels of reflection and justification. It certainly cannot be used to establish lines between different industries, where the ‘non-cultural’ element is clearly about mere money making or ‘easy’ culture. We may want to make case by case distinctions between films – as we do with music or theatre – but these are about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cultural products not the ‘cultural’ and the ‘non-cultural’. 
We suggest that we can use the idea of the cultural industries as a mix of cultural – conceived as aesthetic or ‘expressive’ product – and ‘non-cultural’ – as media, communications, information and knowledge. This means that television companies can produce and distribute art of the highest quality (The Sopranos, for example) but that this is not the only concern of the companies involved; they produce news, chat shows, games shows etc. In this sense film companies, along with music and with computer games, should all belong to core creative arts. (The position of the television production company, which sells drama to broadcasters, will be discussed below).

The creative industries as non-cultural?
Throsby’s ‘related cultural industries’ correspond to Hutton and KEA’s ‘creative industries’. They “operate essentially outside of the cultural sphere but some of whose product could be argued to have some degree of cultural content”\footnote{Throsby adds that they are included in the cultural industries\textsuperscript{14} only if a very broad definitional basis were adopted. KEA describes the creative industries as “non-cultural”, but suggests “they employ creative skills and creative people i.e. people who have been trained in the arts”. These definitions are both problematic.\textsuperscript{15}}. Hutton tries to avoid this: the creative industries are “analytically first cousins to the cultural industries; distinct while belonging to the same family of activity”, and they create both ‘expressive and functional value’. That is, they are both aesthetic-cultural and functional; it is not a zero-sum game where the more functionality means the less cultural, or that the creative inputs are a long way from the sun of the arts. Hutton’s suggestion that they produce both expressive and functional value does not suggest that therefore the former is either derivative or compromised. These industries must deliver both, and of the highest quality. They are frequently plugged into the cutting edge of cultural debates within which they are clearly a major force. That the dress should not fall apart in the rain, or the building leak, requires functional skills which give this sector special characteristics, but does not forcibly eject it from the palace of culture.

In what way can fashion design be deemed ‘non-cultural’ or operating ‘outside of the cultural sphere’? The KEA model implies that, rather than having distinct design skills, creative inputs have to be imported from those trained in the arts. Presumably only artists can supply the inputs into a building, a new collection or an interior that prevents it from being merely functional. This approach simply does not capture the aesthetic and cultural literacy that operates within these specific industries, or the fact that its exchanges with other art worlds are conducted at the highest levels. It would come as a shock to the participants of a contemporary design seminar, with aesthetic theory coming out of their ears, to know that they were operating outside the cultural sector. This categorisation therefore confuses the functional with a low aesthetic priority, or as merely derivative from the ‘pure arts’ sector\footnote{Hutton tries to avoid this: the creative industries are “analytically first cousins to the cultural industries; distinct while belonging to the same family of activity”, and they create both ‘expressive and functional value’. That is, they are both aesthetic-cultural and functional; it is not a zero-sum game where the more functionality means the less cultural, or that the creative inputs are a long way from the sun of the arts. Hutton’s suggestion that they produce both expressive and functional value does not suggest that therefore the former is either derivative or compromised. These industries must deliver both, and of the highest quality. They are frequently plugged into the cutting edge of cultural debates within which they are clearly a major force. That the dress should not fall apart in the rain, or the building leak, requires functional skills which give this sector special characteristics, but does not forcibly eject it from the palace of culture.\textsuperscript{16}}.
Arts and creative industries: a historical overview

Intersecting policy sectors

Based on the above definitional discussion we might now approach the different relationships within the creative industries by identifying three broad, inter-related sectors: art, media and design. These are not meant to be hard and fast lines but they allow us to be more aware of their particular dynamics and structures. The sectors are organised around the combination of art (in our wide sense of art-popular cultural forms) with other social and cultural functions.

Art designates those activities/industries concerned primarily/exclusively with the creation of these expressive-symbolic values – music, performing and visual arts, computer games and ‘digital art’. What media companies call ‘content’. Art overlaps with media – parts of book publishing and television/radio production are clearly concerned with art. It also overlaps with design – parts of craft, graphic design and photography for example, have been seen as art. Art would include the industries within which this production is organised – the music industry or computer games publishing, for example – and those public or non-commercial institutions which also facilitate the production of both cultural and economic value; that is, the GLAM sector and parts of media and publishing.

a) They are all ‘industries’

They all mobilise a range of economic resources, produce commercial and non-commercial outputs and involve ‘non-creative’ specialists and functions.

b) They all produce artistic or aesthetic value

There is no reason to believe that the artistic skills involved in design are somehow lesser than those in, for example, the visual arts. The production of material culture – in architecture, fashion, interiors – often assigned to the merely ‘decorative’, not only represents some of the greatest works of art, but has been a central part of that aesthetic impulse to ‘change life’ which we have outlined. Nor need we spell out that television and publishing and so on are responsible for some of the very best things done in contemporary art.

c) They mix artistic, cultural and social values

The concentric circle model implies a hierarchy based on an increasing mix (or watering down) of culture with non-culture; we suggest rather that the mix should be seen in terms of artistic (or aesthetic) values with other cultural and social values/functions. Media and design do other things than produce artistic value; they combine this value with social and cultural values/functions both in terms of specific productions and services (a programme schedule, an iPhone) and the mix of business interests involved (communications infrastructure providers, engineering firms, service delivers, etc.).

d) Intrinsic/instrumental mix operates across all three sectors

The concentric circle model also implies a hierarchy based on increasing commercialisation or industrialisation. It then ascribes policy responsibility based on the respective priority of cultural and economic value within each sub-sector. We suggest rather that a mix – and indeed often a conflict – of cultural and economic, ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ value operates across all three sectors. All three have elements of mass reproduction, high capitalisation and conglomerisation; all have high numbers of freelancers and micro-businesses operating within them.

e) Judgements of value operate across all three

Judgments of artistic quality are constantly made in all three sectors, and quite clearly there’s a lot of rubbish pumped out in music and film, art galleries and computer games, just as there is on television and gracing the landscapes of our cities and shelves. These judgments are not the same in each sector – there are different standards and requirements, and there are other social, cultural and political grounds for such judgments. And of course there are different ‘regimes of value’ within each sector (chapter 6). But judgements also speak across the sectors, just as there are many overlaps and transfers (think of fashion photography becoming ‘visual art’, telephone boxes becoming design icons, abstract art becoming advertising or furniture).
There are different intensities of inter-relationships across these sectors. Some parts barely communicate (computer games and classical music, product design and dance?) others have long standing symbiotic connections (music and radio, architecture and visual arts). These intensities differ between places (art, fashion and pop music can be distinct or closely fused in New York or London).

All three form the horizon of our contemporary culture. They all partake of that public sphere in which cultural values – and thus economic values – are established and contested. As such they are all legitimate objects of public policy. The nature of that public sphere is now much more fragmented and complex as we noted in chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless, though the economic potential of contemporary culture has been increasingly recognised through the notion of cultural and creative industries, we cannot uncouple this economic dimension from the cultural.

Media and design industries
These three broad sectors have different dynamics, different mixes of value, different histories. Thus, in relation to art, media have much more explicit social and political priorities, as design has social and material-functional priorities. They also have different policy histories. We have already discussed art-media links in chapter 4; art and design relations also have complex histories, which, like media, differ between countries.

Nevertheless, the creative industries as art-media-design are closely intertwined in their production of cultural, economic and social values. Together they form the horizon of our contemporary culture and it is hard to think of these policy constituencies operating in isolation.

Media industries
Media industries do not just make art. They provide the space within which arts and information/discussion about arts circulates. They also do current affairs, documentaries and reality TV shows. They provide community information and access. They do education. They also provide the infrastructure and the software to allow such communication. The central role of the media, deriving from the inevitable fact of mediated communication in modern societies marked by complex divisions of labour, includes a range of cultural, social and economic functions which go beyond what we have called art, but which make much of that art possible. For this reason media policy has always involved more than an ‘arts’ policy, and indeed more than a ‘cultural’ policy (for example, it is central to democratic government and economic exchange). But arts and cultural agendas have a legitimate stake in helping determine such media policies.

We have suggested above how art and media have emerged together and have long been intertwined. The connections remain between nation-building and privileged narratives, images or music: the ways in which the ‘aesthetic subject’ has been linked to the creation of responsible citizenship. Both emerge in the context of complex modern societies in which traditional art forms tend to be challenged. In this context the desire for new forms of social communication, forms of social being together, have historically seen art and media mutually informing one another (Brecht and Benjamin stand out again here). More concretely, the social, cultural and economic foundations of art worlds are inconceivable without the media sphere.

The growth of the internet has transformed much of established media structure in ways we cannot outline here. It challenges media business models because it disrupts many payment mechanisms, but it also opens up distribution channels; anyone with a connection can distribute to anyone else who is connected. The internet also impacts on the possibilities of social communication – ‘social media’ – extending possibilities, which were merely latent in older technologies. It is a media with possibilities not just for the distribution of ‘content’ (a film on You-Tube), nor only for new kinds of artistic production (a collaborative ‘open source’ music piece), but for new kinds of social and cultural connections. All these have been part of arts concern with media, and for this reason the internet falls within the legitimate concern of arts agencies in certain areas. A new broadband network has profound cultural consequences.

Design industries
Design industries are not solely concerned with aesthetics but also with functions – of objects, spaces, services and social organisations. Functionality needs to be distinguished from commerciality. Commercial imperatives and ‘bottom lines’ are present in all three sectors, in a music show, in a TV mini-series, in a new building. Functionality involves a set of technical and conceptual skills concerned with use-value.
As ‘craft’ (‘techne’, ‘artisanship’) these have always been associated with, though often subtly distinguished from, ‘art’ and ‘artistry’.

We saw in chapter 2 how part of this distinction concerned the different status of artistic and manual labour – where one was ‘transcendent’, freely creating, and the other dominated by the necessity of work. The constant tussle between art and craft (nicely outlined by Becker in Art Worlds) was often about the status of ‘artistic vision’ versus ‘mere technique’, between the ‘pure’ and the ‘applied’ (or ‘decorative’). However, this conflict was offset by a continuing shared sense amongst artists and artisans of being true to the material and the tools at hand, of a certain fitness-for-purpose embodied within the material world, which Heidegger evoked in his critique of technology as domination of nature. Richard Sennett’s recent book The Craftsman develops this notion of craft and extends it to the work of the hand and eye involved in surgery, in design drawing and in software development.

Though 19th century aesthetics frequently asserted the art/craft distinction, there were also powerful counter-currents that valued the ‘craft’ in art and the social-ethical responsibilities of art to connect with and transform ‘everyday life’. From William Morris (or before him William Blake) through the avant-garde (Bauhaus, Constructivism), craft skills became part of a future oriented conception of ‘design’ for living in which the ‘aesthetic’ played its part. So too, though modernism is often castigated for being a new version of ‘art for art’s sake’ (see chapter 4) another avant-garde strand stressed the new socio-political functionality of art for re-inventing modernity.

Design involves planning and craft; it also involves the aesthetic quality of how it looks, feels and sounds. Famously the Roman architect Vitruvius suggested three aspects of design – firmitas, utilitas, venustas. The first concerns structure – the province of the engineer; the second is the programme – province of the planner; the third, form or beauty, the province of the artist. In this conception ‘aesthetic’ – pertaining to the sense, to perception – becomes the look, the allure and the surface. How these three aspects are put together involves engineering and craft skills (some cutting edge, some often long acquired, locally embedded and tacit), planning skills (‘what is this thing trying to achieve and with what means’ can be a visionary or mundane question) and ‘artistic’ or ‘creative’ skills. These are not strictly separated. In particular, the ‘aesthetic’ is frequently restricted to this surface allure – and hence the label ‘designer’ in the 1990s acquired the sense of an object that transcends its basic function to appeal to an (upmarket) ‘artistic’ appreciation. However, the ‘aesthetic’ as we have discussed it – the tradition of modern art since the 18th century – is not confined to ‘beauty’ in this way. It has aspirations to articulate and transform experience, giving it an ethical and political charge that formed the intent of William Morris, Bauhaus, Le Corbusier, and Buckminster-Fuller – maybe even Steve Jobs. Thus the ‘aesthetics’ of design has rarely been simply decorative allure (venustas, after Venus), but always an intrinsic part of the social, cultural and political vision of firmitas and utilitas (as in the Acropolis, or Pantheon, for example).

Chapter 6 illustrates how the increasing importance of the non-functional ‘expressive’ or ‘symbolic’ or ‘cultural’ aspects of consumer goods and services has been seen as a main driver for the creative industries as a whole. This is part of the wider extension of the notion of culture from ‘the arts’, or even popular ‘entertainment’ forms, to the anthropological notion of culture as ‘a whole way of life’. Featherstone’s (1996) “aesthetisation of everyday life” and Lash and Urry’s (1994) “culturalisation of the economy” register this rise in cultural consumption. We have shown how this equation of ‘aesthetics’ and ‘cultural value’ with the allure of individual ‘expressive’ consumption is problematic, and flattens out much of what ‘aesthetic art’ has attempted to articulate.

On the other hand, the utilitas of art cannot be reduced to its ‘allure’ for consumption. The social function of melody, rhythm, movement, line, shape and image and their role within the everyday meaning and social interaction – elements never eradicated by ‘aesthetic art’ – are also part of the concern of design.

Design has now a higher prestige than at any time in the last 200 years. Designers increasingly distrust aesthetics as allure and look to its wider social and cultural function. Designers have become increasingly reflective about their practice, its core mission, skills and ethics. In doing so they often claim not to be ‘artists’. This is true to a degree; at the same time such impulses to wider social responsibilities are by no means alien to the art tradition as we have outlined it.
Interestingly in China, 'cultural industries' is a term reserved for the more sensitive areas of content (national identity and heritage, ethical values, current affairs) subject to cultural policy considerations; creative industries is allowed for non-sensitive areas ('entertainment', animation, fashion, design) subject to economic policy priorities.

'Experience economy' has been used as a descriptor, but it derives from a service industry perspective, which would include the full range of everyday culture in its purview – children's parties, tourism, hotels and catering, and even the experience of dealing with a financial services institution, C. L. Richard Lanham (2006) The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Others use 'attention economy'; this points to the fact that they are not necessities but appeal to other 'non-tangible' aspects of ourselves. They are also in competition with all other such attention goods that are infinite and thus they have to be 'attention grabbing'. The term is far too wide, describing general economic transformations, rather than specificity of this sector, C. L. Joseph Pine and James Gilmore (1999) The Experience Economy: Work is theatre and Every Business a Stage. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press.

Another school of thought saw creativity as the creation of novelty or unknown economic value per se. But this definition, aiming to directly link the creative industries to the innovation system, ends up with a definition which can include nanotechnology and early bicycle manufacturing – anything that is of unknown value. At the same time it excludes known cultural value – including the arts – from the creative industries.

Some use the term 'symbolic value', but this has less specificity, as mathematics is a symbolic system, so too business information systems, and of course, language itself.


The problem with 'expressive value' has already been raised in connection with John Holden. It can easily be identified with individual enjoyment and preference – Holden's 'intrinsic value' – and with 'identity building' conceived as the upmarket consumption of status goods.


Similarly, though their products might be protected by copyright, they do not necessarily own these or do they profit extraction from them, confusing

As Throsby defines the whole sector, rather than the now more usual 'creative industries'.

Alan Scott calls the whole sector 'cultural commodity production'. However he uses a service/manufacture distinction to separate two different kinds of commodity. Service outputs focus on 'entertainment, edification, and information' (e.g., motion pictures, recorded music, print, media, or museums); manufactured products are those through which consumers construct distinctive forms of individuality, self-affirmation, and social display. This not a sustainable distinction; not only do 'services' get embodied in a variety of manufactured objects (what Lash and Lurry (2007 Op.Cit.) call the ‘thingification of the media’) but objects themselves are saturated with 'service' – i.e. 'creative', artistic' or 'design' – input. The service/manufacture distinction is unhelpful, especially when the latter are equated with identity construction and social display – as if this is not involved in the consumption of music or books, for example. Alan Scott (2004) 'Cultural products industries and urban economic development: Prospects for growth and market contestation in global context', Urban Affairs Review, 39(4) pp.461-490

Art and design have been much more opposed in Anglo-Saxon countries than in many continental European countries; the claim that the art-industry divide has collapsed thus has special resonance for those countries that saw them as separate worlds in the first place.

This is where the term 'content' comes from. At one level it serves to mark off these two distinct aspects of media industries (Telstra from Foxtel, for example); but its increasing use to describe all symbolic products and services is less than useful.


The issue this throws up for cultural policy is less that of Adorno's industrialisation of 'the arts' but the industrialisation of everyday culture. That is, the increasing reach of goods and services with high levels of design-culture appeal does not mean an end to the arts-industry separation – often an Anglo-Saxon problem – but its transposition to a new register.
Conclusion

Creative industries policy

The conclusions of this report suggest that a contemporary democratic cultural policy must deal with all three broad creative industries sectors – art-media-design.

Such a cultural policy must engage with the economic dimensions of these sectors, and this implies a new set of policy tools and visions which take us beyond the subsidy of individual artists and institutions. It needs to do so in a way that provides a clear rationale and the evidence for the cultural and social value of these sectors both in relation to and separate from purely economic goals and indicators. The imposition of overarching economic objectives and indicators in the creative sectors not only misses these wider cultural and social goals but fails to acknowledge the crucial significance of these for the economic success of the sector.

The very real economic importance of the creative industries should not result in a divided constituency – the high growth with the economic agencies, the low growth/subsidised with the cultural – but to an integrated approach. The mutual recognition of the different cultural, social and economic dimensions of this sector is the basis for their ‘triple bottom line’ sustainability in the coming years.

Such a creative industries policy demands that the agencies concerned with each sector – and these can be multiple – collaborate closely with one another. A key task of such a policy would thus be to identify the policy stakeholders involved and clarify the different goals and responsibilities within such a policy coalition. In the case of design the lack of a policy coalition that the agencies concerned with each sector – and these can be multiple – collaborate closely with one another. A key task of such a policy would thus be to identify the policy stakeholders involved and clarify the different goals and responsibilities within such a policy coalition. In the case of design the lack of a significant national policy body capable of engaging in such a forum is currently a problem. It does not have a policy champion despite its growing significance within the sector as a whole.

A creative industries policy should recognise the legitimate interests of arts and cultural policy agencies within the areas of media and design – and vice versa. The convergence of telecommunications, widespread computer use and broad- and narrow-cast media has profoundly altered the landscape of the creative industries. The levels of intersections between art-media-design as well as between cultural-social-economic policy suggests a new level of mutual engagement is required.

However the very real power asymmetries between such agencies needs to be recognised. Equally, the capacity of national arts and cultural agencies to engage in such a creative industries policy may demand significant structural change and enhanced capacity in these areas.

The grounds for public intervention

Subsidy and market failure

In chapters 4 and 5 we discussed issues around the subsidy of the arts and other interventions within the cultural industries. We suggested that subsidy, a tentative model in the case of the Arts Council of Great Britain, became almost exclusively associated with arts policy as such, and those art forms that received such subsidy came to be identified with ‘the arts’ as such. It led, by the 1970s, to a classic cultural policy default position – public funding for the arts, the market for the cultural industries. It is based on tautology: the arts are most ‘purely’ creative because not commercialised, but they are identified as ‘the arts’ precisely on the grounds of their not being part of a commercial ‘industry’. Translated into everyday cultural policy: if you are commercially viable you do not qualify for subsidy, and if you do qualify you must by definition be more purely creative.
Policies developed around the cultural industries challenged this approach in a number of ways. Cultural industries policies involved non-subsidy based tools. Public finance was used (various degrees of direct/indirect funding) but also regulatory interventions (content restrictions, granting of monopolies, tax breaks). These were usually aimed at large national institutions, but from the late 1980s, these interventions became more driven by cities and regions.

The ‘arts and cultural’ policies generated in Australia, Europe, the UK and North America in the 1980s and 1990s involved an increasingly sophisticated set of policy tools. As we saw in chapter 5, these tools intervened in economic and cultural dynamics because they combined economic and cultural objectives. Local economic development was seen to be closely linked to local cultural development. Cultural policies for cities treated them as ecosystems to be understood in holistic fashion – this was the ambition behind Franco Bianchini’s ‘cultural planning’ or Charles Landry’s ‘creative city’140. The post-1998 creative industries agenda has built on these initiatives; it did not start from ground zero.

‘Market failure’ as a justification within cultural policy (see discussion in chapter 4) does not suggest that the market as a whole has failed and we should move to wholesale subsidy. For cultural economists such as Bruno Frey or David Throsby, there are certain aspects of art and culture that the market does not serve well141. For example, the increasing expense of older art forms and their difficulties in increasing ‘productivity’, or the need for ‘investment’ in new and unknown ventures. Indeed, given the wider definition of ‘the arts’ used in this report and now fairly standard (Throsby includes the music industry, as does the recent Australia Council report on arts participation), the idea of an arts and cultural policy that does not involve the market in some way is unfeasible.

Chapter 5 outlined Nicholas Garnham’s contention that commercially produced culture now has a predominant place within most people’s cultural consumption and a democratic policy must address this. Further, the market was increasingly accepted on the social-democratic and socialist left as the best tool for the allocation of cultural goods and services in a post-scarcity situation. That is, there is an over-supply of cultural goods in competition for one’s time, and the market mechanism works to facilitate choice between these. This has been more or less accepted since the days of Keynes at the Arts Council of Great Britain.

The more intractable questions of ‘market failure’ do not concern the false polarity between the abstractions of subsidy (government choice) versus the market (consumer choice) but relate how real markets (and the industrial structures that grow with) them operate. Any acquaintance with the political economy of culture and media will show that the ‘free market’ simply does not describe the tendencies of monopoly, agglomeration, cartels, restrictive practices, exploitation and unfair competition which mark the cultural industries. Whatever shade of black or grey we might want to paint these tendencies, to ignore them completely is the height of naivety.

For this reason governments have been concerned to regulate these markets. This regulation may be about protecting national industries for national-cultural reasons (local content versus Hollywood) as well as encouraging local industry (local music content to support the local music industry). In reality these two intertwine. And though national identity has become more fragmented, multiple or loose, and though globalisation has impacted on ‘local industries’ these two cultural and economic concerns remain key foundations of cultural policy and form a part of the third foundation – not just national industries which produce relevant local content, but a healthy cultural ecosystem within which creatives can make a living producing cultural values. Thus, if we believe creative industries are part of an ‘innovation system’, then this too behoves intervention if ‘market failure’ means that local production is placed at an unfair disadvantage. In this sense policy concern for ‘cultural diversity’ and for ‘creative innovation’ face similar challenges.

Market failure happens all the time; one of the functions of government is to try to avoid this142. Subsidising those cultural (or other social or economic) activities deemed valuable, but that can’t entirely make it on the market, is one aspect of this; active involvement in its regulation and management is another. The association of arts policy exclusively with the former has positioned them as ‘welfare’ – John Holden has outlined how debilitating this can sometimes be. Engaging (pro-) actively with markets – regulating, managing, growing – is cultural policy as public policy.
Cultural policy as public policy

Public funding in the form of direct subsidy has a clear role here. The survival of the older art forms and the institutions – including educational – with which they are associated is inconceivable without this subsidy. There is no reason why these art practitioners should not be encouraged to find new markets and new kinds of income, within reasonable limits. There is no reason why direct financial support cannot be made more sophisticated. There is a growing body of work looking at how new kinds of smart finance – soft loans, trust funds, the abolition of restrictions (a company can go out and put their money on the stock exchange) – and on other ways in which public funding and commercial activities can be combined. This report cannot go into these details; we merely suggest that there is nothing intrinsic to ‘the arts’ that makes subsidy the only model.

Subsidy can be a blunt instrument and needs improving. It is also in short supply, it is cumbersome to administer and it fails to deal with the proliferation of individuals and micro businesses who now make up the majority of the arts sector. In addition, industries and art worlds involve a range of non-creative functions and skills, as well as social and spatial infrastructure, which need to be approached in a holistic or ecosystem approach. The development of infrastructure, common skills, network in and other kinds of facilitation, bespoke IP or marketing agencies (often public or public-private). These are all ways in which art and cultural/creative industries policies have grown together.

If it is accepted that cultural policies can have cultural and economic objectives, as well as cultural and economic forms of interventions, then this is to be encouraged. It is increasingly difficult for arts agencies to concern themselves only with direct subsidy and only with the non-commercial. Not only does this radically narrow the notion of ‘art’ it also leaves all the rest purely to the logic of the market and subject to the priorities of economic agencies.

The relationship between cultural and economic (social too, though this is less pointed) priorities is frequently marked by tension (as it is within creative businesses themselves). We suggested that the creative industries argument itself was launched as a pragmatic way of securing more credibility (and money) from the UK economic departments, and that this line has been a predominant tactic since. The problem has not just been to undermine the specific cultural arguments. Thus creative industries have been used in urban regeneration in ways that have led to rapid escalation of rents and the driving out of production by consumption and local by national/international chains. It has been very difficult for cultural agencies to make a coherent case as to why this might not be a good thing. The argument is not just that economic value cuts against cultural value, but that in so doing this economic value cuts against itself. That is, its economic success cuts off the very source of that success.

It is for this reason that we need to be very clear about the cultural values at stake in cultural policy, how markets can be used and how they can be developed and sustained. The economic outputs can be clearly identified and pursued, but if they become the dominant logic, then we have problems. Art-media-design have economic implications, and, as industries, economics has implications for them. Cultural policy requires the technical knowledge to address these implications and the values on which to make hard judgments about our response.
Ecosystems

Creative milieu and the city
We suggested that the lines between art-media-design were not meant to be hard and fast. The overlaps between them are fairly extensive. A TV drama production company, a graphic design studio and a digital media design company – and so on. Where these sorts of lines get even messier is when we look at the actual connections between these within specific ecosystems.

As we outlined in chapter 5, the rise of freelancers and micro-businesses in this sector is not just an organisational shift but part of a wider socio-cultural transformation. The inter-connections we have traced between art and popular culture took place at the ‘molecular’ level of these ‘independents’ or ‘creative entrepreneurs’. They were embedded in local tacit knowledge and quality of place. They sought to make a living through a mix of economic, cultural and social/ethical values. They operated in networks of trust, reputation and informal knowledge. The spaces they inhabited were overlapped in both social and economic senses. Ann Markusen has shown how creative moves between subsidised, not-for-profit and commercial sectors on a regular, even daily basis. Elizabeth Currid has described how different industries overlap in the informal social places of the city, which are also the main spaces of networking and deal making.

How the spatial dynamics of creative ecosystems work, how different factors of production intersect with place and space, is a major area of academic and policy enquiry at the moment. The spatial scale of an ecosystem varies, as does the specific mix of local and global, and of kinds of industries in each locale. The mix of the film industry in Sydney, or Vancouver, or Shanghai operate against a much more integrated global industry than the music industries in these cities. The intensity of contacts between art, music and fashion will differ between London, New York, and Brisbane. The cultural industry policies of the 1980s onwards attempted to intervene in these local sectors for cultural and economic reasons. Whilst there were many successes, there were always limits to what was possible. In particular, there was often a disjunction between local interventions and national policies. Local authorities tended to lack resources and were constrained by national policy areas of responsibility; national governments lacked the fine-grained approach to cultural policy required to really engage with the ecosystems of creative industries.

Cultural policy coalitions
On the other hand, it is at local levels that arts agencies and institutions have often taken the lead within creative industry strategies. First, the infrastructures of arts and cultural institutions (including GLAM) are essential to the ‘creative ecosystem’; it is hard to think of a broad creative industries sector operating in a city without arts activity. These arts infrastructures have become much more linked to urban development strategies in the last 20 years; (some) arts agencies have become highly skilled in understanding the potentials of their specific contributions. Second, (some) arts agencies have taken a lead in acting as champions for the creative industries on the grounds of cultural and economic potential of these for their own ‘constituents’. That is, they see the creative industries agenda as offering new markets for creative skills and services. Third, (some) arts agencies have put themselves forward as possessing the specific knowledge and understanding required to lead policy development in this area. Though other economic development agencies have tended to assert leadership over this new economic constituency, without the ‘cultural’ input these have tended to be over-economistic and ultimately counter-productive.

That is to say: there is a resource of arts and cultural policy development both in Australia and elsewhere that can be applied to the creative industries. The stakeholders already involved in such a constituency – national arts funding bodies, local authorities, local arts/cultural agencies, urban planners, social welfare agencies, local economic development agencies, local education authorities, cultural consultants – have long track records in many places. To these have been added agencies concerned with innovation, the knowledge economy, and – with Austrade – international links.
Final words

The creative industries agenda does have great cultural, social, economic and environmental potential. This potential has been hampered by both confusion and a polarisation. Confusion as to the values at stake in the creative industries – was it about the recognition of culture or its annexation by economic development? This led to a polarisation of art and industry, culture and economics, ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’, and dominated the agenda.

This report does not suggest that such a struggle is completely misplaced – the benign narrative where culture and economics go hand in glove. This report suggests that there are – and always have been – tensions between culture and economics (and between these and “the social”), this is part of our modernity. It suggests however that there are long-standing social, cultural and economic understandings, narratives and policy resources whereby these tensions can be managed and made culturally and economically and socially productive. Contemporary developments have redrawn the lines and set new challenges, but these resources allow us to address these tensions without complete polarisation or subsuming one under the other (art as a floating world; art as an input into economic growth).

This report has attempted to make a contribution by trying to clarify what is at stake in the heated debates between arts and creative industries. It suggests that the creative industries need not be – indeed should not be – counter posed to cultural policy; they are a development of it. This does not mean that economic objectives should not be part of this: just that they should not dominate. Indeed, economics should be seen as a means to cultural ends, though this is currently an almost utopian aspiration.

Cultural policy at its broadest is about how we become citizens. The nature of this citizenship and what rights and responsibilities come with it have expanded enormously since the democratic revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Not only does it now include our rights as cultural consumers but also – in the age of ubiquitous digital creativity – our rights as cultural producers. We have suggested that these new dimensions of cultural consumption and production have transformed our notion of art and culture and the possibilities and parameters of cultural policy.

The creative industries are absolutely central to these transformations; but to give them a purely economic inflection would be to miss the challenges, the dangers and possibilities that are at stake. To conflate economic and cultural value in a benign narrative of ‘creativity’ as a universal social resource is to misunderstand the nature and dynamics, as well as the malfunctions, of the cultural or creative industries. Equally to equate the absolute rule of the market with the apotheosis of individual choice and creative self-definition is not to extend our conception of citizenship but to extinguish it.

It is for this reason that questions of cultural value – how it is established and within what kinds of social and political frameworks – is so unavoidable. We have uncoupled this question from the need to take privileged art forms out of the squalor of the market. We have suggested the complex range of social and economic dynamics involved in its support, and that support for infrastructure and the enabling of creative producers to produce is a more appropriate direction for any cultural policy. But this does not move us from the terrain of cultural value judgment to mere technical managers and facilitators; these judgements of value need to be made. They are now made at the level of a landscape, of an ecosystem rather than specific productions.

We have used ‘art’ to describe a broad range of activities producing cultural values – encompassing ‘the arts’, popular culture and entertainment, including public and private, commercial and not-for-profit. We stated that we did not want to use terms such as art or entertainment or popular culture to define lines between industries – pop and classical music, computer games, films, TV drama and dance. ‘Art’ is one of the most important ways in which such judgements are framed. This report has outlined how such judgments have been linked to all sorts of social distinctions – and they still are. But it is more than this.

Art does not refer to a particular set of rules or forms or practices or materials as it once did. It might mean pure sensory allure or delight; it might mean a kind of mastery (the art of painting or playing a piano); it might mean an ability to do the job, hit the right spot at the right time – to express an occasion, an individual feeling, a communal
moment. All these elements of art still resonate. But it also means a moment of transcendence or autonomy – self-determination, freedom and play – where the material, the subject is presented through a “sensorium different to that of domination”, as Ranciere puts it. It’s in that space, or distance, in which a work creates its own rules, gives itself its own reason for existing, that art takes place.

Cultural policy cannot ensure such artistic works through sanctified art forms or its criteria of judgment. As Keynes wrote:

“The task of an official body is not to teach or to censor, but to give courage, confidence and opportunity. Artists depend on the world they live in and spirit of the age….New work will spring up more abundantly in unexpected quarters and in unforeseen shapes when there is universal opportunity for contact with traditional and contemporary arts in their noblest forms.”

Following the experiences of the last thirty years, policy should not just ensure ‘contact’ with art but the ability to practice and produce it. Art does not have to be professional, and we cannot ignore or patronise the amateur, especially in an age where the tools are so readily available. But much art and media and design is necessarily professional (though it includes amateur input); they form a significant sector of the economy and have profound cultural, social and political impacts. How they are organised as cultural economies is of great importance. They are ‘industries’, markets within which creative producers should be given a reasonable chance to make a reasonable living.


